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Summary 
 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) are required or permitted for 
use in over 100 countries across the world. IFRS are developed by the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). The IASB, with no formal or 
legal mandate, is performing a task normally reserved for national standard-
setters. This study sought to establish the legitimacy of IFRS by assessing the 
due process of the IASB. The study established that countries have different 
motivations for choosing IFRS which raises legitimacy concerns. The global 
financial crisis compounded the legitimacy challenges of IFRS by exposing due 
process vulnerabilities. The study established that the IFRS governance 
structures are dominated by powerful stakeholders especially members of the G-
20. Although the due process procedures provide opportunities for participation, 
actual participation is still dominated by constituents from Europe. Africa and 
South America still account for very low proportions of governance seats and 
participants in standard-setting projects. 
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Legitimacy, due process, IASB, financial instruments, IFRS 9, IFRS 13, IAS 39, 
governance, participation, standard-setting. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background information 
Sir David Tweedie, then chairman of the International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB), wrote in the 2010 IFRS Foundation annual report that “... the IASB 
is in effect setting financial reporting law for more than 100 countries” (IFRSF, 
2011a:22). What he was referring to as financial reporting “law” is actually 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), developed by the IASB and 
accepted in over 100 countries (FCAG, 2009). 
Laws are normally set at national level by elected representatives while national 
accounting standards are the responsibility of national standard-setters mandated 
through legislation (Pacter, 2005). In contrast, IFRS are set by a London-based 
organisation whose parent is a private company incorporated in the US (Perry & 
Nolke, 2006). Unlike national standard-setters, the activities of the IASB are not 
mandated by any national law (Black, 2008).  
The IASB‟s lack of a formal mandate is what leads Perry and Nolke (2006) to 
question the wisdom of placing a traditionally public and national function into the 
hands of a private entity with multiple principals. They argue that because 
accounting affects everyone in society, the development of accounting standards 
should be scrutinised. The IASB‟s lack of a formal mandate (Black, 2008) and the 
potential displacement of national accounting standards by IFRS (Kerwer, 2005) 
give rise to legitimacy challenges.  
In this study, the legitimacy of the financial reporting “law” that is IFRS is 
explored. It is posited that the legitimacy of IFRS depends on two factors: 1) the 
due process through which accounting standards are developed (Richardson & 
Eberlein, 2011) and 2) the role of accounting in society (Perry & Nolke, 2006). 
This study only focuses on due process defined as the structures and processes 
through which IFRS are developed (IFSRF, 2012c). The next section provides a 
brief history of IFRS to set the context. 
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1.1.1 The history of IFRS 
The global expansion of multinational companies (Barbu & Baker, 2010), the 
growth in international trade (Zimmermann, Werner & Volmer, 2008) and 
increasing cross-border investments (Martinez-Diaz, 2005) are some of the 
factors that precipitated the need to harmonise accounting standards. Diverse 
national accounting standards impede comparability as they limit transparency of 
financial information (Nolke, 2005). Harmonised accounting standards enable 
comparability of financial information across borders (Camfferman & Zeff, 2006).  
Foreign direct investment (FDI) and cross-border investment decisions depend on 
comparable financial information (Benston, Bromwich, Litan & Wagenhofer, 
2006). Increased FDI and the availability of capital are enablers of economic 
growth, a major concern of elected governments. Financial information in this 
context refers to financial statements comprising the income statement, statement 
of comprehensive income, statement of financial position, statement of 
movements in equity and reserves, and the cash flow statement.  
The need for comparable financial information led to the establishment of the 
International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) in 1973 (Camfferman & 
Zeff, 2006). The IASC succeeded in publishing International Accounting 
Standards (IAS) but they remained relatively inconsequential for close to three 
decades, relegated to being substitutes for developing countries that had no 
technical and/or financial resources to develop their own (Pacter, 2005). 
Developed countries shunned IAS and continued to develop their own national 
accounting standards (Camfferman & Zeff, 2006).  
The profile and credibility of IAS was boosted in May 2000 when the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) endorsed a set of 30 IASs as 
acceptable for cross-border listing (Camfferman & Zeff, 2006; Martinez-Diaz, 
2005). IOSCO is a body representing stock exchange regulators around the 
world. In the same year, the European Commission (EC) announced that all 
companies listed within the European Union (EU) were to apply IAS when 
preparing their consolidated financial statements starting in 2005 (Camfferman & 
Zeff, 2006).  
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In 2001, the IASC was restructured into the IASB and IAS were renamed IFRS 
(Pacter, 2005). While the IASC had 143 representatives from around the world, 
the IASB was set up with only 14 experts chosen on the basis of their “technical 
competence” (Richardson & Eberlein, 2011:226). The objective of the IASB also 
changed from developing reference material to developing, in the public interest, 
a single set of enforceable and globally accepted financial reporting standards 
(IFRSF, 2010b).  
The US remained one of the major capital markets not endorsing IFRS although 
the US standard-setter, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), 
signed an agreement with the IASB in 2002 committing to narrow differences 
between their standards (FCAG, 2009). Following progress with the convergence 
projects, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) exempted foreign 
firms listed on US stock exchanges from issuing reconciliation to US generally 
accepted accounting practice (GAAP) if they were using IFRS as issued by the 
IASB.  
The endorsement by IOSCO, the EC adoption of IFRS and the removal of the 
reconciliation requirement by the SEC spurred the adoption of and/or 
convergence with IFRS around the world (Eaton, 2005; IFRSF, 2011b; Zeghal & 
Mhedhbi, 2006).  In South Africa, IFRS became mandatory for all listed 
companies in 2005 (Edwards, Schelluch, Du Plessis, Struweg & West, 2006). 
Over 100 other countries have either adopted IFRS as their accounting standards 
or converged their national GAAP with IFRS (FCAG, 2009; IFRSF, 2011a). 
Convergence in this context means eliminating differences but not adopting IFRS 
without amendments. Hans Hoogervorst, the current IASB Chair, is of the view 
that convergence “… is less effective when trying to achieve an identical outcome” 
(IFRSF, 2012a:23). 
IFRS came under heavy criticism in 2007 when the global financial markets 
experienced a liquidity crisis originating in the US housing market (FCAG, 2009). 
The global financial crisis, as it is commonly known, resulted in governments and 
other critics of IFRS applying pressure on the IASB to improve its governance 
arrangements and amend fair value requirements in IAS 39 Financial 
Instruments: Recognition and Measurement. In October 2008, the IASB and 
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FASB set up the Financial Crisis Advisory Group (FCAG, 2009) to advise on the 
standard-setting implications of the crisis. 
1.1.2 Standard-setting implications of the global financial crisis 
The FCAG (2009) expressed concern that the IASB due process had become 
vulnerable to undue interference citing the success of the EC in forcing the IASB 
to waive due process and effect an amendment to IAS 39 that limited the use of 
fair values. The FCAG (2009) argued that such interference threatened the 
legitimacy of IFRS by tempting individual countries to introduce unilateral 
amendments. The advisory group recommended that representation on 
governance structures be geographically broadened. The recommendation 
resonates with Eaton‟s (2005) argument that a crisis, such as the global financial 
crisis, challenges the status quo and serves as a stimulus for change.  
In response to the recommendations of FCAG (2009), the Monitoring Board of the 
IFRS Foundation was established in 2009 and the IASB membership was 
expanded from 14 to 16 (IFRSF, 2012a). Three regional standard-setting bodies, 
the Asian-Oceanian Accounting Standard Setters Group (AOSSG), the Pan 
African Federation of Accountants (PAFA) and the Group of Latin American 
Standard-setters (GLASS), were also established after the onset of the crisis 
(AOSSG, 2011; GLASS, 2012;  IASB, 2012). The IASB embarked on a project to 
replace IAS 39 through the development of IFRS 9 Financial Instruments and 
IFRS 13 Fair Value Measurement (IASCF, 2009a).  
The expansion of governance structures and the establishment of regional 
standard-setting bodies suggest that there is heightened interest in IFRS due 
process. The criticism directed at IFRS and their perceived role in the financial 
crisis brought the legitimacy of IFRS into question. 
1.1.3 Conceptualising legitimacy  
Weber (1978) defines legitimacy as the obedience of a command induced only by 
its content. Franck (1988) defines it as the property of a rule that exerts voluntary 
compliance because of a perception that the rule has been set through a valid 
due process. A valid due process was defined as one that is capable of producing 
outcomes that are acceptable to all participants, even when the outcomes differ 
5 
 
from their preferences (Habermas, 1990). It is a process that brings a fair balance 
of interests and provides for equal rights to participation.   
Suchman (1995:574) defines legitimacy as a “generalised perception or 
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper or appropriate within 
some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions”. This 
definition of legitimacy hints at the difficulties likely to be encountered when 
managing legitimacy at transnational level. The word “transnational” is used 
throughout this study according to the definition of Zimmermann, et al (2008:19): 
“a combination of privatisation and internationalisation”. 
Specific to accounting standards, the International Federation of Accountants 
(IFAC), believes that legitimacy is achieved when due process gives the 
standards the level of authority necessary to generate confidence (IFAC, 2011). 
IFAC is the global standard-setter of International Standards on Auditing (ISA). 
The definition of legitimacy by IFAC (2011) implies that the legitimacy of 
standards can be inferred from assessing the structure of the standard-setter and 
its due process procedures. Due process in this context is the means through 
which discipline is maintained over the exercise of power (Richardson & Eberlein, 
2011). An assessment of the due process of the IASB therefore provides a 
framework for deducing the legitimacy of IFRS.  
1.2 Problem statement 
The main problem to be investigated in this study is the legitimacy of the financial 
reporting “law” developed by the IASB. The due process through which the “law” 
is brought about affects its legitimacy (Habermas, 1973). The same goes for the 
role of accounting in society (Perry & Nolke, 2006). The IASB has a technocratic 
structure (Richardson & Eberlein, 2011) that concentrates standard-setting 
decision-making in the hands of a small group of board members.  
The global financial crisis resulted in a new layer of accountability, the Monitoring 
Board and an expansion of the IASB membership to 16 (IFRSF, 2012a). The 16 
IASB board members are writing financial reporting “law” for more than 100 
countries without being mandated by the citizenry of those countries. The 
legitimacy of this “law” is potentially contested if the IASB due process is not valid. 
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The validity of due process can be evaluated according the conditions of practical 
discourse set by Habermas (1973). 
This study assesses the extent to which the standard-setting due process of the 
IASB gives IFRS the level of authority necessary to generate confidence. In order 
to address the legitimacy concerns highlighted in the main problem, the study 
investigates the following sub-problems: 
 The definition of legitimacy. 
 The motivations for states to require or permit the use of IFRS. 
 The legitimacy challenges of IFRS as global accounting standards. 
 Conditions under which IFRS can be considered legitimate. 
 The impact of the global financial crisis on the legitimacy of IFRS. 
 Representation and participation of affected parties in the due process of 
the IASB. 
 Participation of affected parties in the development of IFRS 9 Financial 
Instruments and IFRS 13 Fair Value Measurement.  
The IASB (IFRSF, 2011a) divides the world into five regions: Africa, Asia/Oceania, 
Europe, North America and South America. This study uses the same regional 
classification but pays particular attention to the perspective of the African region. 
1.3 Objectives of the study 
The objective of this study is to assess the legitimacy of IFRS by evaluating the 
IASB‟s standard-setting due process. To be considered legitimate, IFRS must 
reflect the interests of all affected parties instead of the particular interests of a 
specific region (Habermas, 1973).  
The IFRS standard-setting due process is assessed for representativeness and 
the extent to which affected parties participate in decision-making structures. The 
assessment also includes the availability of equal opportunities for affected parties 
to participate and influence the development of IFRS.  
The study builds on recent work by Richardson and Eberlein (2011) on the 
legitimacy of transnational standards. While their work shed light on the 
legitimation efforts of the IASB, it was more a comparison of IASB due process to 
US and UK practices. Its narrow focus on two countries limits its usefulness in 
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assessing the legitimacy of IFRS given that more than 100 countries require or 
permit the use of IFRS. The US and UK are both developed countries, so the 
study lacks a developing country‟s perspective.   
Wallace (1990) attempted to raise the concerns of developing countries but the 
study was conducted more than a decade before the establishment of the IASB. 
Since then, the standard-setting landscape has changed with the global adoption 
of IFRS and the global financial crisis. The work of Edwards, et al (2006), Lasmin 
(2011) and Zeghal and Mhedhbi (2006) only deals with the motivations and 
challenges of adopting IFRS but apparently shies away from addressing the issue 
of legitimacy. 
1.4 The importance of the study 
This study is important as it could: 
 Highlight the legitimacy challenges of IFRS especially from the perspective 
of the African region; 
 Offer insight into possible legitimation strategies employed by the IASB; 
 Highlight opportunities for participation in IFRS standard-setting due 
process; 
 Reveal information about the influences on the direction of IASB; and 
 Recommend possible ways of improving IASB due process. 
1.5 Scope of the study 
This study is about the assessment of the IASB‟s standard-setting due process in 
order to establish the legitimacy of IFRS. The IASB decision-making due process 
is critiqued in order to improve the understanding of the IFRS development 
process. It is a study of the application of legitimacy in due process.  
1.5.1 Standard-setting due process 
The focus of this study is on the legitimacy of IFRS, influenced by the standard-
setting structures and processes of the IASB. Suchman (1995) argues that 
structures and processes serve as easily monitored proxies for less visible 
legitimacy evaluation targets. Even IFAC (2011) identifies structures and 
processes as key to the legitimacy of standards.  The study of decision-making 
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structures and processes is concentrated on changes effected from 2008 
onwards particularly the introduction of the Monitoring Board and the expansion of 
membership on IFRS governance structures.  
1.5.2 Global financial crisis 
The discussion of the global financial crisis is intended to set the context for the 
development of IFRS 9 Financial Instruments and IFRS 13 Fair Value 
Measurement. Both standards address the accounting requirements for financial 
instruments, an issue that attracted much debate in the on-going global financial 
crisis (IASB, 2008a). 
IFRS 9 replaces IAS 39 which Camfferman and Zeff (2006) describe as one of 
the most controversial and most revised standards. The EC used its endorsement 
process to exclude the provisions for full fair value option and portfolio hedging of 
core deposits in IAS 39 from being applied within the EU (Alexander & 
Eberhartinger, 2010). It has not endorsed IFRS 9 for use within the EU (EFRAG, 
2012). Both IAS 39 and IFRS 9 were published as interim standards because of 
disagreement over how to measure financial instruments. Hoogervorst (2012:1) 
attributes such disagreement to the “inescapable judgement and subjectivity of 
accounting methods”. 
1.5.3 Participation in standard-setting projects 
The study of participation is limited to IFRS 9 Financial Instruments and IFRS 13 
Fair Value Measurement. The IASB uses various consultation methods including 
publishing discussion papers and exposure drafts for public comment, conducting 
field tests, public hearings and hosting round tables. Analysis of participation is 
limited to comment letters submitted following the publication of consultation 
documents. Comment letters are ideal as they are publicly available. The IASB 
refused a request to make available data on other forms of participation such as 
round tables, public hearings and field tests.  
1.6 Research methodology 
The research methodology is divided into literature review and the analysis of 
participation in the development of IFRS 9 Financial Instruments and IFRS 13 
Fair Value Measurement. All the research questions are answered through 
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literature review except for the participation of affected parties in the selected 
projects as explained in 1.6.1 and 1.6.2 below. 
1.6.1 Literature review 
The literature review in chapter two discusses the theoretical framework starting 
with the conceptualisation of legitimacy, identifying the major authors and 
evaluating their contributions. The review discusses the motivations for adopting 
of IFRS in Africa, Asia-Oceania, Europe, North America and South America. The 
challenges and sources of legitimacy are critically evaluated including their 
suitability to IFRS standard-setting.  
Chapter three analyses the legitimacy implications of the global financial crisis. 
The causes and impact of the crisis combined with the fair value debate that 
ensued is likely to affect the perception of IFRS. 
Chapter four discusses the due process of the IFRS standard-setting. Due 
process is assessed on the extent of representation on decision-making 
structures, due process procedures and the control of standard-setting resources.  
1.6.2 Participation in standard-setting projects 
The review of participation analyses general participation levels, geographical 
balance of participants with a particular focus on countries that have adopted 
IFRS and the participation of different interest groups. The analysis is limited to 
the IFRS 9 and IFRS 13 because they address the accounting requirements for 
financial instruments, a thorny issue in the context of the global financial crisis. 
1.7 Chapter layout 
Chapter two outlines the theory of legitimacy, discusses the globalisation of IFRS, 
evaluates the legitimacy challenges of IFRS and recommends possible 
legitimation strategies.  
Chapter three briefly analyses the causes and impact of the global financial crisis, 
the fair value debate and the IASB‟s response to the crisis. The discussion of the 
IASB‟s response focuses on the work of the FCAG and the project to replace 
IAS 39.  
The fourth chapter applies the theoretical framework developed in chapter two 
and three to critique the due process of IFRS standard-setting. The critique 
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focuses on due process procedures, decision-making structures and standard-
setting resources. 
The fifth chapter explains the research methodology and expands on how the 
development of IFRS 9 and IFRS 13 are analysed including any limitations. The 
findings on the development of IFRS 9 and IFRS 13 are discussed in chapter six.  
The last chapter summarises the key points. It also makes recommendations, 
where necessary, for improvements to strengthen the legitimacy of IFRS. The 
chapter also contains suggestions for future research work. 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the literature on legitimacy is reviewed and split into four parts. In 
the first part, the theory of legitimacy as championed by Weber (1978) and 
Habermas (1973) is explored. Both writers have influenced the literature on 
legitimacy in a broad range of fields including political science, social science, 
sociology, philosophy, law and international relations. The core of their theories is 
reviewed to contextualise legitimacy. A detailed critique of their works is 
impossible in a study of this nature given their deep and wide influence on the 
literature.  
In the second part of this chapter, the motivations behind the global adoption of 
IFRS are discussed. Emphasis is placed on the impact of the endorsement by 
IOSCO and the developments within the IASB regions of Africa, Asia/Oceania, 
Europe, North America and South America. 
The third part of the literature review exposes the legitimacy challenges of IFRS 
through an analysis of the work of Black (2008), Helleiner and Porter (2010), 
Kerwer (2005), Perry and Nolke (2006), and Porter (2005). The internal and 
external origins of the legitimacy challenges of IFRS are analysed.  Through the 
work of Zimmermann, et al (2008) it is demonstrated that the delegation of 
standard-setting responsibilities to the IASB leads to inherent legitimacy 
challenges. Through analysing the work of Esty (2006), it is revealed that 
legitimacy challenges are also exacerbated by the sensitivities of certain policy 
fields.  
The fourth part of literature review is dedicated to the legitimation of IFRS. A 
combination of the moral legitimacy by Suchman (1995), the global governance 
toolbox developed by Esty (2006) and the procedural legitimacy of Richardson 
and Eberlein (2011) is proposed to form a governance arrangement embodying 
the theory of legitimacy according to Habermas (1973).  It is argued that such a 
package of measures, properly and faithfully implemented, is capable of 
legitimating IFRS. The starting point is outlining the theoretical framework which is 
discussed in the next section. 
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2.2 Theory of legitimacy 
Franck (1988:542) classifies legitimacy philosophers into three groups. The first 
group includes Weber (1978) and is concerned about how rules are made and 
how rulers that enact them are chosen. According to this group, legitimacy is 
about following the right procedures and decisions being made by those properly 
authorised or delegated to do so. In this research this view is referred to as the 
Weberian conception of legitimacy. The second group, dominated by Habermas, 
defines legitimacy in terms of both the formulation process of rules and their 
content. The second group is referred to as the Habermasian view. The third 
group consists of what Franck (1988:543) refers to as neo-Marxists, philosophers 
concerned about the ability of rules to promote equality, fairness, justice and 
freedom. 
Borrowing from Franck (1988), the exponents of legitimacy are classified into two 
groups in this research as opposed to the three he suggested. The third group 
was discarded as it is argued that the equality and fairness they seek is capable 
of being produced by a process that meets the requirements of the first two 
groups. The legitimacy theories of Weber and Habermas are discussed in 
sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 respectively.  
2.2.1 Weberian conception 
Weber (1978) defines legitimacy as the probability that a command will be obeyed 
based only on its content. It was an attempt to exclude obedience strategically 
executed for self-interest reasons. Weber (1978) argues that obedience induced 
by anything other than a belief in the content of a command is compliance and 
would result in an unstable situation. The instability would result from a shift in 
interests that tend to affect simulated loyalty. Weber (1978) identifies rational, 
traditional or charismatic grounds for claiming legitimacy.  
Weber (1963) defines rational authority as a belief in the legality of enacted rules 
and the right of those properly elected into positions of power to issue commands. 
On the other hand, traditional authority is a belief in the sanctity of age-old 
traditions which legitimises commands.  Unlike rational authority, obedience is 
owed to the person in authority. Charismatic authority is different from the first two 
as it is derived from the heroism or exemplary character of an individual  
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(Weber, 1963). The personal nature of both traditional and charismatic authority 
renders them irrelevant for the purposes of this study. The remainder of this 
section is dedicated to the discussion of rational authority. 
According to the Weberian conception of legitimacy, any rule established by 
agreement is deserving of obedience and such obedience is only owed to the rule 
(Weber, 1963). If this conception of legitimacy is true, one should expect to see a 
general observance of properly enacted rules even when there is no coercive 
enforcement mechanism. Unfortunately, rules are subject to interpretation which 
can vary considerably across time and space.  
The consistency required to interpret and apply rules makes rational authority 
reliant on a bureaucracy to police procedures in order to achieve efficiency and 
stability (Weber, 1978). A bureaucracy in this context means an institution or 
administrative system as described by Habermas (1973). Efficiency comes from 
what Weber (1963) calls domination through knowledge while stability comes from 
strict policing of rules (Weber, 1978).  
Weber (1978) claims that the bureaucracy‟s role of generating knowledge and 
policing rules place its control in the hands of powerful interests that provide 
technical skills and funding. The bureaucracy becomes entrenched due to years 
of experience and specialised training to the extent that wrestling control is almost 
impossible. The battle for control of the bureaucracy is fertile ground for instability 
with the potential for legitimacy deficit. Habermas (1973) suggests separating the 
administrative system, which is the bureaucracy, from the process of discursive 
legitimation of outcomes, which is the due process. 
Steffek (2003) draws parallels between the bureaucracies alluded to by Weber 
(1978) and transnational institutions. If correct, then the Monitoring Board, the 
IFRS Foundation and the IASB can be viewed as bureaucracies exposed to the 
same battle for control.  
Despite its classical status in the study of legitimacy, Weber‟s conception is 
repeatedly criticised for confusing legitimacy with a submission to authority 
(Grafstein 1981). Steffek (2003:253) also repeats the same criticism, describing 
the Weberian conception as a “downgrading” of legitimacy. To the extent that the 
criticism holds, it would seem that Weber confused compliance with legitimacy. 
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The harshest criticism of Weber is from Habermas (1973) who singles out the 
failure to make a distinction between legality and legitimacy. Habermas (1973) 
derides rational authority as being legally formed and procedurally regulated with 
potential to generate an unstable belief in legitimacy. The instability would come 
from reducing legitimacy to a belief in legality and the unavoidable failure of the 
administrative system to consistently enforce procedures because of class 
struggles (Habermas, 1973). If legitimacy is about legality, this study is not 
necessary as legality is currently not possible at the transnational level.  
The focus of the next section is on the work of Habermas. The major difference 
between the views of Weber and Habermas on legitimacy is the free expression 
of the individual‟s interests (Salam, 2003). It is therefore important to discuss 
legitimacy according to the Habermasian view.  
2.2.2 The Habermasian view 
The point of departure for Habermas (1973) from the work of Weber is that all 
validity claims have a relation to the truth which can be discursively established. 
Building on Weber‟s conception of legitimacy, Habermas (1973) argues that 
legitimacy can be secured through engaging in a practical discourse. Affected 
parties, as free and equal, must participate in a practical discourse to reach a 
rationally motivated agreement about norms. Under this approach, legitimacy is 
acquired through the way in which consensus is reached with the understanding 
that any such consensus is subject to revision when new facts emerge 
(Habermas, 1973). 
The Habermasian view is anchored in the argument that all affected parties can 
accept the consequences of the consensus they reach on the satisfaction of 
everyone‟s interests (Habermas, 1990:65). The inclusion of all affected is to 
ensure that the interests of all are considered when consensus is reached. The 
interests of all are articulated through explanations and justifications required in a 
practical discourse to test the validity of claims (Habermas, 1973). 
In order to legitimate its outcomes, practical discourse must meet certain 
conditions in both procedural and substantive terms. Habermas (1973) suggests a 
discourse underpinned by the non-exclusion of those who can contribute; equal 
opportunities for all affected to participate; the absence of coercion other than the 
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force of a better argument; and that the only motive of participants is the 
cooperative search for the truth. The assumption is that any discourse that 
satisfies these conditions would result in a rational outcome because all affected 
put forth their arguments and only the better arguments prevailed. The conditions 
proposed by Habermas cover both the structural design of participation 
procedures and the intentions of the participants. 
Habermas (1990) argues that the inclusion of all affected creates the possibility of 
satisfying everyone‟s interests. It is only when the views of all affected are 
considered that consensus could be approved as valid. Practical discourse is 
presumed to be effective in preventing others from dictating what is good for 
everyone thereby achieving a fair balance of interests. As shall be discussed later, 
there are other factors that inhibit effective participation.   
Apart from inclusion of all affected, participants must have equal opportunities for 
participation (Habermas, 1990). All participants, with capacity and willing to take 
part, must have equal opportunities to contribute. Equal opportunities promote 
fairness and should make it possible for all participants to influence outcomes. 
The assumption is that participants have the capacity to clearly articulate their 
views and interests and to provide explanations and justifications when so 
requested. 
Explanations and justifications provide the rationale for certain viewpoints and 
should be the only means through which other participants must be convinced to 
change their positions (Habermas, 1990). Participants must be subjected only to 
the force of a better argument with no possibility of subtle or covert repression 
(Habermas, 1973). If a norm is conceived by the force of a better argument, 
participants should be willing to implement any outcome even when it may be 
against their own interests. The absence of force or coercion is intended to 
achieve freedom in making choices and adopting different positions in a discourse 
(Habermas, 1990). Participants are presumed to be rational and capable of 
shifting their standpoint when they are subjected to the force of a better argument.  
The presumed ability of participants to shift their standpoint when under the force 
of a better argument assumes that their sole aim is the cooperative search for the 
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truth (Habermas, 1973). Consensus reached under such conditions should be 
aligned with the interests of all participants. 
Habermas has his fair share of criticism, summarised by Cohen (1988) as the 
confusion regarding the object domain of discourse ethics. The question is asked: 
Is it a theory of morality or a theory of legitimacy? Like Cohen (1988), this study 
uses discourse ethics as a theory of legitimacy.  Another persistent criticism of 
Habermas is the practicality of satisfying the exerting conditions of a practical 
discourse especially defining “all affected” and facilitating their participation 
(Froomkin, 2003:773). Dryzek and Niemeyer (2008) propose representation of all 
discourses rather than participation of all individuals. Representation of 
discourses gives rise to the problem of mandates and the ability of 
representatives to shift their standpoint when moved by the force of a better 
argument.  
The practical discourse as advanced by Habermas (1973) provides an 
appropriate theoretical framework to assess IFRS due process as a typical 
practical discourse. The exerting conditions it demands may be discouraging, but 
they may serve as motivation for continuous improvement. Habermas‟ (1973) 
success in decoupling legitimacy from legal validity makes it possible to apply his 
theory at the transnational level. In the next section, the drivers behind the global 
adoption of IFRS and their legitimacy implications are discussed. 
2.3 The globalisation of IFRS  
There are over 145 countries that permit or require the use of IFRS as shown in 
annexure A. The distribution per region is shown in figure 2.1 below. Of the 145 
countries, 129 and 101 countries permit or require the use of IFRS by listed and 
unlisted companies respectively. There are 15 countries with no stock exchanges 
but permit or require the use of IFRS by domestic companies. 
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Figure 2.1 Use of IFRS by region 
 
Source: Adapted from IASPlus (No date). 
Several authors (Barbu & Barker, 2010; Camfferman & Zeff, 2006; Eaton, 2005; 
Edwards, et al; 2006; Lasmin, 2011; Martinez-Diaz, 2005; Porter, 2005; 
Zimmermann, et al; 2008) have tried to explain the worldwide acceptance of 
IFRS. The reasons they proffer fall into two categories: globalisation and the 
IASB‟s relationship with key stakeholders.   
International trade, the global expansion of multinationals and cross-border 
listings are often cited as consequences of globalisation that have necessitated 
the need for a single set of accounting standards (Barbu & Barker, 2010; 
Camfferman & Zeff, 2006; Martinez-Diaz, 2005). Globalisation is used in this 
context to mean international integration. 
Barbu and Barker (2010) analyse the role of multinationals in the diffusion of IFRS 
from both a preparer and external auditor perspective.  Multinationals as 
preparers of financial statements have a need to prepare consolidated financial 
statements and compare the performance of subsidiaries operating in different 
countries. On the other hand, the dominance of the external audit market by a few 
multinationals has played a key role in the harmonisation of accounting standards 
to ensure consistent audit procedures across all their country offices. 
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The expansion of multinationals together with the liberalisation of capital flows 
and technological advancement have made cross-border listings and investments 
possible (Zimmermann, et al; 2008). Cross-border investments have resulted in 
integrated capital markets that depend on comparable financial information 
(Martinez-Diaz, 2005). The downside of integrated capital markets is the risk of 
contagion when a problem in one market can quickly spread across all markets 
as experienced during the global financial crisis (FCAG, 2009).  
The Asian financial crisis of 1997 (Martinez-Diaz, 2005) and the Enron accounting 
scandal in the US (Eaton, 2005) are two examples of crises that are thought to 
have spurred the acceptance of IFRS. Martinez-Diaz (2005) argues that the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank include the adoption of 
IAS by developing countries as a condition for aid. Eaton (2005) credits the Enron 
accounting scandal, which exposed the weaknesses of US GAAP, with paving the 
way for partial acceptance of IFRS in the US.  
In developing countries, it‟s a tale of two stories. Edwards, et al (2006) reveal how 
South Africa sought to strategically position itself through implementing a raft of 
reforms including IFRS adoption. On the other hand, Lasmin (2011) and Zeghal 
and Mhedhbi (2006) prove that some developing countries are being pressured 
into accepting IFRS. 
Apart from globalisation, the Trustees of the IFRS Foundation, the body that 
funds and appoints members of the IASB, argue that the acceptance of IFRS has 
more to do with their actions (IFRSF, 2011b). The 2011 strategy review of the 
Trustees concluded that the quality of IFRS, the strength of the IASB and the 
support of the EC and the US were key drivers behind the global adoption of 
IFRS. The Trustees claim that the independence and professionalism of the IASB 
has freed it from undue influence and enhanced the credibility of IFRS. They also 
argue that the endorsement by the EC made IFRS a competitive alternative to US 
GAAP while convergence with US GAAP improved the quality of IAS inherited 
from the IASC.  
In the next section, the use of IFRS across the world, including the motivations for 
doing so, is reviewed. First, the endorsement by IOSCO is discussed as it was a 
key milestone in the globalisation of IFRS. The analysis is done according to the 
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IASB regions of Europe, North America, South America, Asia/Oceania and Africa 
(IFRSF, 2011a).  
2.3.1 The endorsement by IOSCO 
The decision by IOSCO in 2000 to endorse IAS for use when raising capital in 
global capital markets was a pivotal moment in the globalisation of IFRS 
(Camfferman & Zeff, 2006; Martinez-Diaz, 2005). The endorsement was 
necessitated by an increase in cross-border listings which forced IOSCO 
members to seek common accounting standards. The agreement was such that 
the IASC had to improve the quality of IAS to a level acceptable to IOSCO in 
exchange for endorsement. The finding of Zeghal and Mhedhbi (2006) that 
countries with stock exchanges were the most likely to adopt IFRS confirms the 
significance of the endorsement. 
Martinez-Diaz (2005) believes that the endorsement by IOSCO was achieved at a 
high price. He claims that the agreement gave the SEC, the most powerful 
member of IOSCO, an opportunity to indirectly influence the IASC through 
threatening to withhold endorsement. Desperate for endorsement, the IASC 
complied through its use of US GAAP as base documents for certain IAS and the 
restructuring of the IASC into the IASB along SEC preferences. 
IOSCO has gained significant influence over IFRS standard-setting due process 
as it appoints half of the IFRS Monitoring Board members (IFRSF, 2012a). The 
Monitoring Board appoints Trustees of the IFRS Foundation who in turn appoint 
IASB board members. Effectively IOSCO has influence over the development of 
IFRS. The endorsement of IAS by IOSCO was followed a month later, June 2000, 
by the EC decision to adopt IFRS (Martinez-Diaz, 2005). 
2.3.2 Europe 
The adoption of IAS within the EU was achieved through Regulation No 
1606/2002 which was passed by the European Parliament (Camfferman & Zeff, 
2006). The regulation required the more than 7,000 companies listed on EU stock 
exchanges to use IAS when preparing their consolidated financial statements 
beginning in 2005. The decision to adopt IAS was influenced by the need to meet 
the accounting requirements of large European multinationals and to boost the 
20 
 
profile of IAS as a viable option over US GAAP (Alexander & Eberhartinger, 2010; 
Camfferman & Zeff, 2006). 
The decision to adopt IFRS was not without controversy. Each standard has to be 
endorsed individually after having been assessed for technical and political 
suitability (Alexander & Eberhartinger, 2010:42). The technical assessment of 
IFRS is carried out by the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group 
(EFRAG), a body made up of private sector experts. The political assessment is 
conducted by the Accounting Regulatory Committee (ARC), a political body with 
representatives of all EU member states. 
Several authors (Alexander & Eberhartinger, 2010; Benston, et al; 2006; 
Camfferman & Zeff, 2006; Martinez-Diaz, 2005) argue that the endorsement 
process gave the EC what it lost when its proposal to restructure the IASC into a 
body more representative of national standard-setters was rejected. The 
endorsement process has been used successfully to force the IASB to revise 
IAS 39 (Benston, et al; 2006; FCAG, 2009). IAS 39 was initially endorsed for use 
within the EU without the provisions for full fair value and portfolio hedging of core 
deposits. At the time of writing, IFRS 9, the successor to IAS 39, had not been 
endorsed for use within the EU even though four other standards (IFRS 10 – 
IFRS 13) published afterwards had been endorsed (EFRAG, 2012). 
Apart from using the endorsement process to influence content, an EC 
Commissioner now serves as one of the six members of the Monitoring Board of 
the IFRS Foundation (IFRSF, 2012a). In addition, the EC serves as an observer 
on the IFRIC and IFRS Advisory Council 
2.3.3 North America 
The North America region is dominated by the US with the other significant 
country being Canada which adopted IFRS in 2011 (IFRSF, 2012a). The US is a 
founder member of the IASC but remains one of the major economies yet to 
adopt IFRS for domestic companies (Pacter, 2005). For a while, the US was 
known to present its accounting standards as of the highest quality until the Enron 
scandal damaged its credibility and exposed weaknesses (Eaton, 2005; IFRSF, 
2012a). The scandal, coupled with the IOSCO endorsement and the EU adoption, 
made IFRS a viable alternative to US GAAP. Enron was a large US energy 
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company that exaggerated its earnings by over $600 million through exploiting 
loopholes in US GAAP (Eaton, 2005). Enron concealed operating losses by 
creating over 3 000 special purpose entities (SPEs) and structuring them in such 
a way that they were excluded from its financial statements without violating US 
GAAP.  
The US, through FASB, then signed the Norwalk Agreement with the IASB 
committing to converging US GAAP and IFRS (Eaton, 2005). The agreement has 
resulted in several projects being accomplished and several IASB-FASB joint 
meetings (IFRSF, 2012a). The Chair of the SEC also serves as one of the six 
members of the Monitoring Board of the IFRS Foundation (IFRSF, 2012a). 
The Trustees of the IFRS Foundation have expressed concern at the level of 
effort being dedicated to convergence with US GAAP (IFRSF, 2011b). It is 
probably a result of frustration over the delay by the US in setting a date for IFRS 
adoption.  
2.3.4 South America 
The South America region established the Group of Latin American Standard-
setters (GLASS) in 2012 with a membership of 12 (GLASS, 2012). GLASS is the 
brainchild of Brazil, a country currently serving on a number of IFRS standard-
setting structures. GLASS aims to improve participation of South American 
countries in IFRS development. Apart from Brazil, most South American countries 
have not been active participants in IFRS due process probably because they 
have no links to Anglo-American culture, which Zeghal and Mhedhbi (2006) found 
to play a key role in the adoption of IFRS. 
2.3.5 Asian-Oceania 
The Asian-Oceanian Standard-setters Group (AOSSG) was established in 2009 
(AOSSG, 2011). It describes itself as a 25 member organisation covering a region 
accounting for 60% of the world‟s population, 30% of world gross domestic 
product (GDP) and capital markets with a $21 trillion capitalisation (AOSSG, 
2011). Its vision paper expresses displeasure at the dominance of IFRS standard-
setting due process by the US and the EC.  
The vision paper (AOSSG, 2011) infers that major economies of AOSSG such as 
Japan, China and India may have chosen to converge rather than adopt because 
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of a lack of confidence in the credibility of IFRS. Convergence means a country 
does not use IFRS but narrows differences between IFRS and national GAAP. 
The IASB, acknowledging AOSSG, is concerned that a number of countries may 
opt for convergence rather than adoption (IFRSF, 2012a:23).  
AOSSG (2011) hopes to influence IFRS by coordinating its comments to draft 
standards, participating in IASB round tables and field tests, and working closely 
with the IFRS Foundation liaison office to be opened in Tokyo. Not all countries or 
regions have the same clout to extract such concessions from the IASB. Japan 
funded the establishment of the liaison office (IFRSF, 2012a). 
2.3.6 Africa 
The Africa region recently established the Pan African Federation of Accountants 
(PAFA), representing 39 African countries, which took a decision to adopt IFRS 
(IASB, 2012). PAFA was established with the assistance of IFAC and the World 
Bank. The work of Lasmin (2011) reveals the role of the World Bank and the IMF 
in pressuring developing countries to adopt IFRS as a condition for aid. It 
confirms the finding of Martinez-Diaz (2005) that both the World Bank and the 
IMF included adoption of IAS as a condition for aid to developing countries after 
the Asian financial crisis. Most developing countries agree to adopt IFRS out of 
rational self-interest calculation. Their adoption decision has nothing to do with 
the legitimacy of IFRS: it is what Habermas (1973) regards as a submission to 
authority. 
Lasmin (2011) does not entirely attribute adoption of IFRS to external pressure, 
as lack of technical capacity to write own standards is also cited as another 
reason. While adoption of IFRS can place poor countries on par with their 
developed counterparts in as far as the quality of financial reporting is concerned, 
it has implications for participation in IASB due process. The capacity of 
participants to articulate their interests and position is compromised when they 
lack technical capacity.  
Research by Zeghal and Mhedhbi (2006) concludes that high literacy rates, a 
stock exchange and links to Anglo-American culture were the factors most likely 
to influence voluntary adoption of IFRS in the Africa region. Education improves 
the competence of professional accountants and affects a country‟s readiness to 
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adopt IFRS. The impact of stock exchanges is not surprising given the IOSCO 
endorsement and the IASB‟s focus on information needs of investors. The 
influence of Anglo-American culture is a residue of colonialism which has left 
former colonies with education, legal, tax and political systems resembling those 
of their former colonial masters. The accounting needs of a former colony may be 
met if IFRS reflect the preference of a former colonial master such as the UK. 
The adoption of IFRS by South Africa in 2005 presents a totally different angle to 
why countries in the Africa region adopt IFRS. Edwards, et al (2006) claim that 
the decision to adopt IFRS was made in 1993 as part of the new government‟s 
reform agenda. The reforms package included the restructuring of public 
accounts, reform of corporate practices, attraction of FDI, good governance, 
foreign policy considerations and reforming the accountancy profession as 
motivations for adopting IFRS. According to this view, the adoption of IFRS was 
an attempt to end South Africa‟s isolation under apartheid. It is claimed that the 
South African government had embraced globalisation as inevitable and sought to 
strategically position the country as a global player.   
While the motivations for adoption of IFRS seem noble, the work of Edwards, et al 
(2006) also reveals challenges. The constant publication of new and amended 
IFRS means a commitment to constantly adapting. A shortage of accountants 
with IFRS competence undermines comparability implying that some financial 
statements are not fully IFRS compliant. The inability of a large number of small 
firms to cost-effectively apply IFRS is forcing countries to retain national GAAP. In 
the case of South Africa, additional guidance had to be provided for national 
imperatives such as black economic empowerment (BEE) transactions which 
were not covered by IFRS (Edwards, et al; 2006).  
The case study of South Africa (Edwards, et al; 2006) demonstrates the strategic 
reasons of why a country can decide to adopt IFRS. Such considerations may be 
true for a number of countries (Zeghal & Mhedhbi, 2010) even in cases where 
such reasons may not be the dominant ones. In the next section, the legitimacy 
challenges of IFRS are reviewed. 
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2.4 The legitimacy challenges of IFRS 
The legitimacy challenges of IFRS can be divided into internal and external 
challenges. The internal challenges emanate from the standard-setting due 
process (Richardson & Eberlein, 2011). The external challenges are the state‟s 
responsibilities (Zimmermann, et al; 2008) and the sensitivities of certain policy 
fields (Esty 2006). Suzuki (2012) highlighted the sensitivities in Japan regarding 
the focus of IFRS on the needs of investors and the possibility of encouraging 
short-termism. He argues that such a shift in managerial behaviour could 
undermine innovation and long-term investment which have been the hallmark of 
Japanese management philosophy. 
2.4.1 The standard-setting due process 
For all its perceived benefits of comparability of information and the attraction of 
FDI, the adoption of IFRS has costs. One of the costs is what Esty (2006) 
identifies as the need for states to partially surrender sovereignty and delegate 
their policy-making responsibilities to unelected transnational officials. The 
Trustees (IFRSF, 2011b) agree that delegation of IFRS standard-setting 
responsibilities creates governance and accountability problems for the IASB. The 
dilemma is that improved governance and accountability enhances the legitimacy 
of IFRS but is at variance with the technocratic nature of the IASB.  
According to Black (2008), accountability problems deepen because the IASB is 
not officially mandated by any state and there are no independent recourse 
structures for aggrieved parties. The absence of a formal mandate creates 
uncertainty over the IASB‟s accountability chain and poses the challenge of how 
its performance should be evaluated. Buchanan and Keohane (2006) argue that 
an institution such as the IASB can face legitimacy challenges if there is wide 
variation between expected and actual performance. A misunderstanding of its 
mandate, which Black (2008) alludes to, can hamper an objective assessment of 
its performance.  
An affected party unhappy with the IASB‟s performance cannot appeal to an 
independent recourse structure such as transnational courts or legislative 
committees (Black 2008). Such a scenario creates a perception of an IASB 
accountable only to itself. The absence of checks and balances provided by 
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recourse structures is a major departure from domestic practices. The role of 
recourse mechanisms, as an incentive for decision-making rigour, is rendered 
ineffective.  
Even without recourse structures, Porter (2005) argues that states still delegate 
standard-setting responsibilities to the IASB because of the expertise it possess. 
He refers to such expertise as technical authority which he argues is necessary 
but not sufficient to legitimate IFRS. Perry and Nolke (2006) agree that technical 
considerations are not sufficient to legitimate accounting standards because 
accounting has wide social consequences. The narrowness of experts‟ focus on 
technical issues, without considering the broader policy implications, is therefore 
problematic. The narrowness of IFRS scope, focusing on investor needs, is raised 
in the report of the FCAG (2009) which questions the purpose of the standards. 
In an analysis of transnational institutions, Helleiner and Porter (2010) identify 
uneven representation of countries and capture by vested interests as common 
legitimacy challenges arising from IASB due process. The exclusion of affected 
parties from due process relegates them to the role of standards takers and 
deepens legitimacy challenges as it violates the requirement for equal 
opportunities for participation demanded by Habermas (1973). The legitimating 
power of due process is compromised when vested interests manipulate the 
process (Helleiner & Porter, 2010).  
The lobbying of standard-setters by vested interests is well documented. Helleiner 
and Porter (2010) credit the global financial crisis for bringing political lobbying 
into the open and testing the integrity of the IFRS standard-setting due process. It 
is now common knowledge that the EC forced the IASB to waive due process and 
effect an amendment to IAS 39 that permitted the exclusion of certain financial 
instruments from being measured at fair value (FCAG, 2009).  
Another source of legitimacy challenges for IFRS is that they are mostly required 
or permitted to be used only by listed companies and/or those with public 
accountability such as financial institutions (Benston, et al; 2006). For this reason, 
countries that adopt IFRS still maintain national GAAP for use by other reporting 
entities. The continued development of national GAAP creates an alternative to 
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IFRS and has the effect of tempting states to consider rejecting IFRS or 
introducing unilateral amendments.  
In seeking to understand why IFRS has been widely accepted, Kerwer (2005) 
concludes that it has been in part due to their perceived “soft law” nature: 
voluntary best practice. The “soft law” characteristic of IFRS is supposed to make 
them compatible with the principle of national sovereignty because national 
standard-setters should retain autonomy over their application in their own 
jurisdictions. However, endorsement by IOSCO and the EC (Kerwer, 2005) as 
well as the role of the IMF and World Bank (Lasmin, 2011) made them mandatory 
“hard law.” The irony is that what made adoption of IFRS attractive is also their 
source of legitimacy challenges. The legitimacy challenges of IFRS are best 
understood through the state responsibility theory of Zimmermann, et al (2008) 
and the sensitivity inherent in certain policy fields as defined by Esty (2006). 
2.4.2 The state’s responsibility theory 
According to Zimmermann, et al (2008), the state has operation, supervision and 
outcome responsibilities in any policy field. The state assumes operation 
responsibility when it performs a function such as law and order maintenance. 
The supervision responsibility entails partial delegation to non-state actors. The 
outcome responsibility, forever the responsibility of the state, requires intervention 
when anticipated policy outcomes are in jeopardy. The state‟s governance 
responsibilities are best illustrated by figure 2.2 adapted from Zimmermann, et al 
(2008). 
Figure 2.2 The governance responsibilities of the state  
Responsibility of the 
state 
Influence of the state 
and non-state actors 
International actors 
Operation                   
 
Private 
Sector 
          
 
Supervisory 
Outcomes 
Source: Adapted from Zimmermann, et al (2008:20) 
 
Transnational 
Supranational State 
actors 
Non-state 
actors 
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The choice of the state‟s role is influenced by the extent of public interest in any 
policy field. Zimmermann, et al (2008) predicts that in times of crisis, the state is 
likely to intervene if outcomes are uncertain because politicians have to 
demonstrate to the electorate that they have done everything in their power to 
avert a crisis. 
At the international level, the probability of state intervention is also influenced by 
the type of governance arrangement which can either be supranational or 
transnational (Zimmermann, et al; 2008). Supranational governance involves only 
state actors and is normally underpinned by treaties or protocols formally acceded 
to by states. In contrast, transnational governance depends on non-state actors 
with no formal mandate: only tacit approval to the extent that outcomes remain 
satisfactory. Zimmermann, et al (2008) argues that the sharing and delegation of 
responsibilities inherent in transnational governance is a natural source of 
legitimacy challenges.  
2.4.3 The sensitivity of policy fields 
The matrix proposed by Esty (2006:1513) can be used to understand how 
sensitivities around certain policy fields have legitimacy implications.  The matrix 
in table 2.1 below shows how the level of interdependence and the nature of the 
policy field affect legitimacy. The level of interdependence influences the appetite 
of states to collaborate at the international level. States only prefer supranational 
or transnational collaboration when they believe that the policy field exhibits deep 
interdependence. Everything else is better handled in a manner that preserves 
national sovereignty. This means that legitimacy challenges are likely when a 
policy field of low interdependence is dealt with at the transnational level. This is 
independent of whether due process satisfies the exerting conditions of 
Habermas (1973). 
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Table 2.1 The sensitivity of policy fields 
Nature of policy field 
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Source: Adapted from Esty (2006:1512) 
The nature of a policy field could either be scientific/technical or politically 
sensitive/value laden (Esty 2006). Technical or scientific policy fields are likely to 
require solutions that have universal appeal hence experts have a better chance 
of reaching consensus on an appropriate solution. On the other hand, politically 
sensitive or value-laden policy fields generally lend themselves to interpretations 
which makes it difficult to reach consensus on possible solutions. Difficulties in 
reaching consensus on appropriate solutions leave due process in need of 
legitimation. According to Esty (2006), one should generally expect heightened 
legitimacy concerns when dealing with a politically sensitive policy field that has 
deep interdependence. It seems that IFRS are no longer technical and voluntary 
but politically sensitive and mandatory. Apparently their due process is in need of 
higher levels of legitimation. 
The reluctance of states to delegate policy-making responsibilities for politically 
sensitive policy fields (Esty, 2006), the IASB‟s lack of formal mandate and the 
absence of recourse mechanisms for aggrieved parties (Black, 2008), the uneven 
representation of countries in standard-setting due process (Helleiner & Porter, 
2010), the limited legitimating ability of the IASB‟s technical authority (Porter, 
2005) and the outcome responsibility of the state (Zimmermann, et al; 2008) are 
all factors likely to affect the legitimacy of IFRS. 
It seems as if IFRS have very little scope of being perceived as legitimate. One 
could argue that the debate about the legitimacy of IFRS is not necessary: states 
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must resort to national GAAP. However, earlier discussions on the globalisation of 
IFRS have highlighted their inevitability. The next section is a rescue mission: an 
evaluation of possible legitimation strategies. 
2.5 The legitimation of IFRS 
The legitimation of IFRS is likely to happen at two levels: the institutional and 
process level which is what the Trustees (IFRSF, 2011b) refer to as the strength 
of the IASB and the quality of IFRS respectively. The policy paper of IFAC (2011) 
also identified the independence of structures and decision-making processes as 
key to achieving legitimacy. Zimmermann, et al (2008) argue that the 
organisational structures should facilitate accountability and control while due 
process procedures should be ideal for the participation and deliberation of 
affected parties.  The work of Suchman (1995) offers possible institutional 
legitimation strategies, the global governance toolbox of Esty (2006) deals with 
transnational governance in general and the procedural legitimacy of Richardson 
and Eberlein (2011) is ideal for standard-setting due process. 
2.5.1 Institutional legitimation 
In his seminal work on strategic and institutional approaches to managing 
legitimacy, Suchman (1995) identifies three primary forms of legitimacy: 
pragmatic, moral and cognitive. He describes strategic approaches as the actions 
of institutions in manipulating audiences to view the institution‟s actions as 
appropriate, desirable and acceptable. In contrast, institutional approaches 
assume that society‟s beliefs transform the institution into what is acceptable. Put 
differently, a strategic approach would result in the IASB manipulating states to 
adopt IFRS as legitimate standards while an institutional approach would result in 
states influencing the IASB to be the ideal standard-setter whose output they can 
accept. 
Suchman (1995) crafts a complex web of independent but related variables that 
can be used to determine legitimacy. The complexity arises from his definition of 
legitimacy: “…a generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an entity 
are desirable, proper or appropriate within some socially constructed system of 
norms, values, beliefs and definitions” (Suchman, 1995:574). In this definition, 
words that are believed to pose challenges for managing legitimacy of IFRS are 
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underlined. It is difficult to achieve a generalised perception of propriety, 
desirability and acceptability for IFRS from an audience in over 100 countries. 
Moreover, different cultural backgrounds mean divergent norms, values, beliefs 
and definitions. If a global survey was to be undertaken, one should expect to find 
very divergent perceptions of the legitimacy of IFRS.  
The question may be asked: Should one lose hope and assume that IFRS will be 
forever illegitimate due to the difficulty of achieving a generalised perception of 
propriety, desirability and acceptability? The pragmatic, moral and cognitive forms 
of legitimacy suggested by Suchman (1995) are likely to be visible in the 
relationship between the IASB and its constituents.  
Suchman (1995) defines pragmatic legitimacy as based on self-interest 
calculations and can be acquired through responding favourably to the interests of 
constituents. Managing pragmatic legitimacy depends on manipulation of 
constituents or conforming to their demands. In the case of the IASB, pragmatic 
legitimacy could include the co-option of powerful stakeholders into decision-
making structures and/or responding favourably to their needs. However, 
Suchman (1995) views pragmatic legitimacy as an unstable form since it can 
become unsustainable to manage its legitimation tactics.  
Another legitimacy type proposed by Suchman (1995) is moral legitimacy which is 
based on an evaluation of outputs and consequences, procedures and structures. 
It is similar to the Habermasian view, appropriately described by Froomkin (2003) 
as bringing moral philosophy into the realm of political science. According to 
Suchman (1995), structures and procedures are important in managing legitimacy 
as they serve as proxies for less visible legitimacy evaluation targets. The 
expectation is that when IASB due process is perceived as appropriate and 
acceptable, constituents are likely to perceive IFRS as legitimate. The difficulty 
with moral legitimacy is the lack of agreement on moral standards which varies 
sharply across individuals, geographical areas and cultures. 
Cognitive legitimacy, which Suchman (1995) considers to be the most subtle and 
powerful type, is based on how an institution or its activities are understood. It 
emanates from belief systems connected with the practical experiences of 
audiences and is achieved when an institution and its activities have gained a 
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higher level of acceptance and comprehension. The difficulty with cognitive 
legitimacy in relation to IFRS is the lack of a formal mandate for the IASB (Black, 
2008) and contestation over the purpose of IFRS (FCAG, 2009). Such 
disagreements and contestations impair comprehensibility.  
Suchman (1995) argues that institutions can attempt to achieve cognitive 
legitimacy by changing their structures and processes to resemble those of the 
most secure and prominent entities in their fields. One could therefore argue that 
the restructuring of the IASB to resemble the FASB, in both structure and 
procedures (Richardson & Eberlein 2011), was in part an attempt to achieve 
cognitive legitimacy. Unfortunately, the IASB does not have a formal mandate as 
is the case with the FASB (SEC, 2009). 
The pragmatic legitimacy of Suchman (1995) is what Weber (1978) condemns as 
obedience strategically executed for self-interest reasons. It is not legitimacy but 
compliance. Cognitive legitimacy resides in individuals and is difficult to measure. 
To apply it in a study would require the polling of individuals to understand their 
perceptions. Even then, their responses are likely be influenced by their belief 
systems (Suchman, 1995) which are influenced by their motivations to adopt 
IFRS. This leaves moral legitimacy to be discussed. Reliance on the evaluation of 
consequences, structures and processes (Suchman, 1995) makes moral 
legitimacy viable. The drawback is disagreement over moral standards to be met. 
In this section, a different perspective is taken by discussing the global 
governance toolbox of Esty (2006) which may be ideal for legitimating due 
process. 
2.5.2 The governance toolbox 
The global governance toolbox developed by Esty (2006) is built around 
administrative law provisions normally available at national level. The toolbox is 
anchored on four dimensions: control on corruption; systematic and sound 
rulemaking; transparency and public participation; and power sharing. Esty (2006) 
argues that constituents are already familiar with domestic administrative law 
provisions and would find them acceptable at the transnational level. 
Esty (2006) proposes controls on corruption, self-dealing and the influence of 
special interests to prevent potential conflict of interest and the abuse of power. 
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Typical controls include the disclosure of personal interests, recusal from 
deliberations when conflicted, disclosure of material gifts, limits on the activities of 
special interests lobbyists and independent inspections to confirm compliance 
with due process. The assumption is that public disclosure by IASB board 
members could prevent abuse of power. 
Systematic and sound rule making requires procedures that interrogate theory, 
scrutinise assumptions and consider practical implications (Esty, 2006:1527). 
Sound rule making partially resonates with the rational authority of Weber (1978) 
but is more in synchronisation with the practical discourse favoured by Habermas 
(1973). The tools suggested by Esty (2006) include drafts published with notice 
and comment period, public profiling of decision makers, public and open 
deliberation process, and written decisions accompanied by justification. The 
publication of decision makers is intended to prevent inappropriate and 
unaccountable exercise of authority.  
Transparency and public participation are important in two respects: transparency 
enables good governance while participation improves the comprehension of the 
institution and its outputs (Esty, 2006; Zimmermann, et al; 2008). The outcome 
sought by Esty (2006) is that due process should afford those with input an 
opportunity to advance their ideas. It is a requirement crafted along the 
Habermasian view of legitimacy guided by the belief that transparency and 
participation can improve the willingness of constituents to accept the outcome if 
they judge due process to be fair.  
The last element in Esty‟s (2006) toolbox is power-sharing, which advocates for 
divided authority and review mechanisms. Power-sharing should enhance 
accountability and strengthen deliberation while review mechanisms should 
provide opportunities for second opinion and correction of mistakes. The review 
mechanisms inherent in power-sharing are an attempt to enforce the rigour of 
decision-making and compensate for the absence of independent recourse 
structures that Black (2008) identified as a concern. While power-sharing seems 
plausible, Black (2008) identified coordination challenges to be a drawback.  
Esty‟s (2006) toolbox is relevant to managing the legitimacy of both the IASB and 
IFRS. The toolbox draws heavily from administrative law and the legitimacy 
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perspective of Habermas (1973). In the next section, the procedural legitimacy as 
proposed by Richardson and Eberlein (2011) is discussed.  
2.5.3 Procedural legitimacy 
Richardson and Eberlein (2011) argue that the legitimacy of due process is a 
three stage process: input, throughput and output legitimacy. Input legitimacy is 
concerned with the participation of affected parties, throughput legitimacy refers 
to the fairness of transforming inputs into outputs and output legitimacy is about 
the successful discharge of appropriate outcomes.  
Uhlin (2010) proposes elements that constitute input, throughput and output 
legitimacy at transnational level (see adapted table 2.2 below). 
Table 2.2 The elements of procedural legitimacy 
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Input legitimacy Throughput legitimacy Output legitimacy 
1. Participation 
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2. Representation 
 Representativeness 
 Selection process 
2. Deliberation 
 Critical reflection 
 Rational argumentation 
 Rigour of decision-making 
2. Consequences 
 Redistributive effects 
 Costs and benefits 
 3. Transparency 
 Openness of decision-
making 
 Availability of information 
 
Source: Adapted from Uhlin (2010:33) 
Input legitimacy depends on the participation and representation of all affected 
parties (Richardson & Eberlein, 2011). The participation of all affected is a 
condition to be met by a practical discourse capable of legitimating its outcomes 
(Habermas, 1973). Participants, as free and equal, must be afforded the 
opportunity to submit inputs. According to Uhlin (2010), the interest should not 
only be in the quantity and equal opportunities for participation, but also in the 
quality and cost of participation. The lack of technical skills (Lasmin, 2011) and 
the location of the IASB office in London (AOSSG, 2011) are factors that can 
negatively impact participation. Unfortunately, broad participation is at variance 
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with the efficiency and expertise-based thinking that informed the structure of the 
IASB (Richard & Eberlein, 2011). 
Black (2008) identifies the IASB‟s lack of formal mandate as an impediment when 
attempting to ascertain the ideal participants in its due process. It is a challenge of 
identifying all affected parties who are eligible to participate in a practical 
discourse. The participation of representatives (Dryzek & Niemeyer, 2006; 
Richardson & Eberlein, 2011) is suggested as an alternative when all affected 
parties cannot participate directly. Uhlin (2010) admits that the participation of 
representatives seems practical but questions their representativeness and how 
they are selected. The use of representatives requires mandates which in turn 
limit the authority of individuals to alter the level of discourse and shift 
standpoints. When representatives participate in discourse with a limited 
mandate, their ability to be moved by the force of a better argument as proposed 
by Habermas (1973) is compromised. 
Throughput legitimacy is defined by Richardson and Eberlein (2011) as the 
fairness of the process of transforming inputs into outputs and the rigor of 
decision-making. The power-sharing in Esty‟s (2006) toolbox, coupled with the 
decision-making structures of the IASB, should promote the decision-making 
rigour which is crucial to the legitimacy of IFRS. The deliberation inherent in 
throughput legitimacy promotes rationality and improves outcomes through the 
clarification of underlying issues, careful analysis of facts and the evaluation of 
options. It is a combination of the practical discourse of Habermas (1973) and the 
rational authority of Weber (1978).  
Outcome legitimacy is achieved from the successful discharge of policy objectives 
(Richardson & Eberlein, 2011). It emanates from the outcome responsibility of the 
state that Zimmermann, et al (2008) suggest attracts state intervention when 
outcomes are in jeopardy. The IASB can claim legitimacy to the extent that IFRS 
successfully discharge policy outcomes. States are unlikely to easily agree on the 
policy outcomes to be pursued by the IASB as their decisions to adopt IFRS were 
motivated by divergent policy outcomes such as crisis avoidance (Eaton, 2005), 
accounting reforms (Edwards, et al; 2006), condition for aid (Lasmin, 2011) and 
pressure from the stock exchanges (Martinez-Diaz, 2005). The FCAG (2009) 
questioned whether IFRS should meet the information needs of investors or that 
35 
 
of regulators. To the extent that the two needs are mutually exclusive, legitimacy 
is almost impossible to achieve.   
Output legitimacy also depends on the costs and benefits imposed by outcomes 
(Richardson & Eberlein, 2011).  In the case of IFRS, adoption must not impose an 
unnecessary burden in excess of the benefits accrued. 
It is possible to combine Richardson and Eberlein‟s (2011) procedural legitimacy 
with Suchman‟s (1995) moral philosophy and Esty‟s (2006) governance toolbox 
into a cocktail of governance measures capable of legitimating IFRS. Procedural 
legitimacy is anchored on rigorous due process procedures and also allows for 
due consideration of the impact of accounting standards. Moral legitimacy allows 
for the evaluation of outputs and consequences, procedures and structures.  
The governance toolbox facilitates controls on corruption; enables systematic and 
sound rule-making; improves transparency and public participation; and allows for 
power sharing. It seems that such a combination of measures is capable of 
producing legitimate outcomes. The combination has the potential to meet the 
exerting conditions set by Habermas (1973). 
2.6 Summary and conclusions 
In this chapter, legitimacy was conceptualised and defined. Literature review 
indicated that the conditions under which IFRS can be considered legitimate 
include: 1) the non-exclusion of affected parties; 2) equal opportunities for all 
affected to participate; 3) the absence of coercion other than the force of a better 
argument; and 4) the absence of ulterior motives on the part of participants. 
The analysis of the Weberian conception of legitimacy seems to suggest that it is 
of little empirical value given its criticism of conflating legitimacy with legality. To 
the contrary, in this study it is argued that rational authority provides an 
opportunity to assess the role of technical skills and funding in the standard-
setting process.  
An analysis of the motivations for adopting or converging with IFRS across the 
IASB regions of Africa, Asia/Oceania, Europe, North America and South America 
reveals a wide range of reasons. They include the need by poor countries to meet 
the aid conditions of the IMF and the World Bank, the expansion of multinationals, 
cross-border listings, crisis avoidance, accounting reforms and a lack of technical 
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and financial resources to write own standards. The diversity of the motivations is 
not surprising but it reveals potential differences in the way constituents perceive 
IFRS. It is likely that perceptions about the legitimacy of IFRS will be distorted by 
self-interest calculations.  
It seems that the future of IFRS is likely to be influenced by IOSCO, the EC and 
the SEC. The endorsement by IOSCO and the adoption by the EC gave IFRS the 
credibility and political clout they needed. The fact that both events occurred 
within a month of each other may be coincidental but suggests a lot of 
manoeuvring on the part of the EC and the SEC through IOSCO. The EC process 
of endorsing IFRS ensures that it exerts influence on the IASB due process.  
The case of IAS 39, and its successor, IFRS 9, are prominent examples of the 
effectiveness of the endorsement process. 
The US tactic of convergence over adoption has been adopted by China, India 
and Japan. The IASB seems uneasy with the convergence route but the growing 
economic stature of China and India, combined with that of Japan, will guarantee 
AOSSG influence in IFRS standard-setting to rival the US and the EC. The 
formation of AOSSG, PAFA and GLASS is likely to exert more pressure on the 
IFRS standard-setting due process to be more representative of its global 
audience. 
The legitimacy challenges of IFRS that are internal to the IASB include a lack of a 
formal mandate and the absence of independent recourse structures, capture of 
due process by vested interests and the narrow scope of IFRS‟ focus on 
investors‟ needs which limits consideration of other policy implications. The 
challenges external to the IASB are mostly the existence of national GAAP and 
the emergence of regional standards bodies such as EFRAG, AOSSG, PAFA and 
GLASS that could serve as alternatives. The formation of regional bodies may be 
an attempt by the IASB to contain rebellion by getting countries into groups and 
appeasing the lead member. Alternatively, it may be a way of the IASB trying to 
free itself from the US and EC influence by strengthening other regions.  
The outcome responsibility of the state which requires intervention when policy 
outcomes are threatened and the sensitivities around certain policy fields are 
likely to continuously threaten the legitimacy of IFRS. It is not all doom and gloom 
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as a combination of moral legitimacy, the global governance toolbox and 
procedural legitimacy can result in an IASB due process capable of legitimating 
IFRS. Such a combination of moral legitimacy, good governance and the 
participation of affected parties should create conditions under which the resultant 
IFRSs can be considered legitimate. The next chapter analyses the legitimacy 
implications of the global financial crisis. 
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3 THE LEGITIMACY IMPLICATIONS OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 
3.1 Introduction 
The legitimacy challenges of IFRS were identified in chapter two as emanating 
from the due process of standard-setting, the state‟s responsibilities and the 
sensitivities of certain policy fields. The legitimacy implications of the due process 
of IFRS standard-setting are dealt with in the next chapter. This chapter 
discusses the legitimacy implications of the global financial crisis in the context of 
the state‟s responsibilities (Zimmermann, et al; 2008) and the sensitivities of 
certain policy fields (Esty, 2006).  
Zimmermann, et al (2008) argue that the state has operation, supervision and 
outcome responsibilities in any policy field. The state‟s outcome responsibility 
requires it to intervene whenever anticipated policy outcomes are in jeopardy. 
According to the outcome responsibility theory, heightened public interest and the 
need by politicians to demonstrate that they have done everything in their power 
to minimise impact, guarantees state intervention in times of crisis. 
Esty (2006) argues that politically sensitive or value-laden policy fields have 
legitimacy challenges because potential solutions lend themselves to 
interpretations which lead to disagreements among stakeholders. Difficulties in 
reaching consensus on appropriate solutions leave the due process in need of 
legitimation. One should expect heightened legitimacy concerns when dealing 
with a politically sensitive policy field that has deep interdependence: when an 
appropriate solution requires collaboration of different parties. 
According to Arnold (2009), studying the global financial crisis makes it possible 
to analyse and interpret the relationship between accounting and the macro 
political and economic environment. She argues that conventional accounting 
research remains bound to the “narrow view of accounting as a neutral 
technology” (Arnold, 2009:805). Accounting standards have redistributive effects; 
they shape and are shaped by power relations, and are influenced by ruling elites 
and dominant ideologies.  
This chapter discusses the legitimacy implications of the global financial crisis in 
three parts. The first part discusses the causes and impact of the crisis. The 
global scale of the crisis highlights the collective action problem and its impact on 
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the state‟s responsibilities. The conclusions on the causes and impact of the crisis 
have legitimacy implications for the due process of IFRS standard-setting.  
The second part discusses the role of accounting standards in the global financial 
crisis. The focus is on the “fair value debate”, a discussion of whether fair value 
accounting requirements caused or exacerbated the global financial crisis. The 
use of rhetoric in lobbying for the suspension of fair value accounting is also 
discussed. 
The third part analyses the IASB‟s response to the crisis split into three: the 
improvement and simplification of accounting requirements for financial 
instruments, the October 2008 amendment of IAS 39 to allow limited 
reclassification of financial assets and the report of the Financial Crisis Advisory 
Group. The project to simplify accounting requirements provides the background 
to the development of IFRS 9 and IFRS 13 which is analysed in detail in chapter 
six. The amendment of IAS 39 provides a practical example of the state‟s 
response when policy outcomes are in jeopardy. In addition, it tests the 
legitimating power of the rhetoric of due process. 
The report of the FCAG (2009) discusses the standard-setting implications of the 
crisis which lays the foundation for the assessment of IFRS standard-setting due 
process in chapter four. The work of the FCAG (2009) is likely to influence current 
and future thinking around the IFRS standard-setting structures and procedures. 
3.2 The global financial crisis 
The global financial crisis began in 2007 triggered by a liquidity crisis at two 
hedge funds owned by Bear Sterns (Krohn & Gruver, 2009). Some observers 
have likened the crisis to the great depression of the late 1920s (SEC, 2009) in 
order to demonstrate the extent of the perceived impact of the crisis. 
The boom in US housing prices experienced in the early 2000s started to reverse 
in 2006 which led to an increase in the number of subprime mortgages customers 
failing to repay their loans.  IOSCO (2008:2) describes subprime mortgages as 
“loans to home-buyers who do not qualify for low interest mortgages”. In other 
words, customers with a higher risk of default are induced into borrowing by 
offering them favourable credit terms normally applicable to creditworthy clients.  
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3.2.1 The causes of the crisis 
IOSCO (2008) blames the crisis on market share competition among loan 
originators that resulted in a relaxation of underwriting standards and loose credit 
practices. Subprime loans originated by brokers were packaged into structured 
credit products that were sold mostly to institutional investors. This originate-to-
distribute lending model incentivised loan originators to sign up more clients 
without conducting proper credit checks (IOSCO, 2008). 
The demand for structured credit products was spurred by the high economic 
growth and low interest rates that prevailed just before the onset of the crisis 
which resulted in buoyancy among investors (IMF, 2008). Investors went in 
search for higher yields in poor credit-quality investments and this spurred the 
origination of more loans. The result was a proliferation of “opaque and complex 
structured credit products” such as collateralised debt obligations (CDOs), 
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) and credit default swaps (CDS) 
(Krohn & Gruver, 2009:34). These structured credit products are the result of 
securitisation, the pooling and packaging of loans into marketable financial 
instruments.  
Securitisation transformed low-rated investments into AAA-rated investment 
products to meet the needs of institutional investors (IMF, 2008).  Figure 3.1 
below shows how subprime loans of BBB rating and below were securitised into 
several tranches of AAA-rated investments. AAA is the safest rating possible with 
almost no risk of default (IMF, 2008:55).  
Figure 3.1 A typical securitisation process 
 
Source: IMF (2008:60) 
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Institutional investors were accused of outsourcing due diligence to credit rating 
agencies and investing in complex structured credit products they rarely 
understood (IMF, 2009). According to IOSCO (2008), credit rating agencies lack 
transparency and are conflicted because they issue ratings while advising the 
same clients on structuring credit products.  
The IMF (2009) also attributes the cause of the crisis to the exemption of 
investment banks, hedge funds and off-balance sheet structured investment 
vehicles (SIVs) from regulatory oversight. The IMF (2009) refers to these market 
participants as the shadow financial sector. The exemption allowed for a build-up 
of unnoticed systemic risks as the shadow financial sector grew to rival the formal 
banking system. The unregulated shadow financial sector was used by banks as 
a means of evading capital requirements by pushing risk to SIVs. Banks 
misjudged their commitments to SIVs which resulted in poor management of 
liquidity and concentration risks (FSF, 2008). Compensation schemes in financial 
institutions were also cited for encouraging excessive risk taking by focusing on 
short term targets. 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) credits the crisis for 
revealing the extent of the interconnectedness of markets which had not been 
previously understood. The ECB (2008) and IOSCO (2009) acknowledge the 
same and attribute it to the activities of the shadow financial sector. Aware of the 
extent of the crisis, the BCBS had to double its membership to 27 jurisdictions to 
enhance its legitimacy (BIS, 2010). The extent of the interconnectedness is 
demonstrated by the spread of the impact of the crisis across the globe. 
3.2.2 The impact of the crisis 
The IMF (2008) estimated potential losses of over US$1.4 trillion to financial 
institutions. Repercussions to the rest of society included the repossession of 
mortgaged houses, rising unemployment, unavailability of loans for businesses, 
economic contraction (recession), and diminished investor risk appetite that 
slowed investment.  
In the US, the crisis forced Lehman Brothers to file for bankruptcy, Merrill Lynch 
was acquired by Bank of America, Bear Sterns was bought by JP Morgan Chase 
and the US government ended up being an 80% shareholder of American 
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International Group Inc. (AIG) (Krohn & Gruver, 2009). The Federal Reserve 
expanded its lending program and the US Congress availed US$700 billion to 
purchase illiquid assets from financial institutions. 
In Europe, banks had to absorb valuation write-downs on structured credit 
products which had accumulated to €73 billion by November 2008 (ECB, 2008).  
In addition, the market value of banks declined by a cumulative €450 billion within 
a year up to November 2008. Just like in the US, liquidity dried up and the ECB 
(2008) had to extend loans to banks beyond its normal mandate. EU governments 
pledged €2 trillion of support to banks and the ECB (2008) had to coordinate with 
other central banks to cut lending rates and loosen money supply. The liquidity 
crisis served to accelerate the eurozone debt crisis which is still unresolved (ECB, 
2008). 
A study by IOSCO (2009) concluded that emerging markets had suffered from the 
crisis through the repatriation of capital by foreign investors, withdrawal of 
international lines of credit and exchange volatility. Unemployment rose sharply 
and export markets were lost due to heightened protectionism. The IOSCO (2009) 
study also concluded that emerging markets were more interlinked with the rest 
and called for their inclusion in decision-making processes of global governance 
structures. 
The most notable impact of the global financial crisis was on GDP growth rates. 
Figure 3.2 presents ten year (2002 to 2011) GDP growth rates for all IASB 
regions including figures for South Africa. A ten-year view makes it possible to 
analyse growth trends prior to the crisis and after the onset of the crisis. The 
graph below shows that GDP growth in all regions was affected by the global 
financial crisis. GDP growth in Africa and Asia/Oceania receded while all other 
regions suffered economic contraction. The worst growth rates were experienced 
in 2009 suggesting that the full impact of the crisis was felt in that year. None of 
the regions has recovered to its pre-crisis GDP growth rates.  
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Figure 3.2 Gross domestic product growth rates by IASB region 
 
Source: The World Bank (no date) 
The valuation write-downs on structured credit products and the contraction in 
GDP growth led to a debate on the role of accounting standards in causing or 
exacerbating the crisis (IASCF, 2009a). Critics blamed fair value accounting for 
requiring inappropriate write-downs at a time when markets were “inactive, illiquid 
or irrational” (SEC, 2009:1). The arguments on the role of accounting standards‟ 
fair value measurement requirements in the crisis led to what is generally referred 
to as the fair value debate.  
3.3 The fair value debate 
Under instruction from the US Congress, the SEC (2009) undertook a study on 
the role of fair value accounting in the crisis. It found that only 45% and 15% of 
US financial institutions‟ assets and liabilities respectively were valued at fair 
value, mainly for trading and derivative instruments. The study also found that 
only 25% of assets had changes in fair value that affected the income statement 
but in such cases the fair value movements were significant. Fair value 
accounting was absolved of any responsibility for the collapse of US banks but 
the SEC (2009) recommended the development of application guidance.  
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The absence of application guidance led to doubts about the validity of the 
carrying values of financial instruments disclosed in financial statements (IMF, 
2008). The complex nature of structured credit products impeded valuations while 
the use of models undermined market confidence in the published results. The 
IMF (2008) faulted accounting disclosure requirements for providing summarised 
information which left users of financial statements unsure about the extent of the 
subprime exposure of the reporting entity.  
According to research commissioned by the Association of Certified Chartered 
Accountants (ACCA, 2010), there were always concerns among financial 
institutions about IAS 39 even before the crisis. The concerns centred on the 
impact of fair value accounting on risk management practices because of the 
inconsistencies in the valuation of hedge positions, fluctuations of market values 
in illiquid markets and the tainting rules for hold-to-maturity assets. The tainting 
rules had the unintended consequence of discouraging the disposal of specific 
hold-to-maturity assets even when it was prudent to do so (ACCA, 2010). The 
other concerns were earnings volatility caused by the positive correlation of asset 
values to economic cycles, the inadequacy of recognising credit losses when 
incurred and failure to align with the banking business model.  
Smith, Boje and Melendrez (2010) attribute the criticism of fair value accounting 
to the use of rhetoric by the media and lobbyists. They define rhetoric as an 
attempt to persuade audiences in the authority and legitimacy of an argument. 
Smith, et al (2010) argue that the media used emotion (pathos), the character of 
the speakers (ethos) and logic (logos) in an attempt to apportion blame and force 
politicians to suspend fair value accounting. Pathos was employed when the 
media reported on emotional issues such as the erosion of pension savings and 
the repossession of houses. Ethos was utilized when the media used high-profile 
and influential characters such as Newt Gingrich, the former speaker of the US 
congress, and Steve Forbes, the billionaire owner of Forbes Magazine, to lobby 
for the suspension of fair value accounting (Smith, et al; 2010). 
Selected global political leaders, under the aegis of the Group of Twenty (G-20), 
recommended that the IASB and FASB accelerate their convergence of 
accounting standards and simplify accounting standards for financial instruments 
(FCAG, 2009). The call by the political leaders may have been in keeping with the 
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outcome responsibility of the state as advanced by Zimmermann, et al (2008). 
The BCBS requested the IASB to consider the impact of IFRS on the 
effectiveness of regulatory activities (BIS, 2010). The impact of the crisis and the 
fair value debate placed significant pressure on the IASB to act. 
3.4 The IASB’s response to the crisis 
The IASB responded by reviewing the accounting requirements for financial 
instruments and enhancing governance and accountability mechanisms. The 
IASB initiated a process of simplifying and improving the accounting requirements 
for financial instruments through a revision and ultimate replacement of IAS 39. 
Together with the FASB, it commissioned the FCAG (2009:1) to advise on the 
standard-setting implications of the financial crisis and potential changes to the 
global regulatory environment. The improvement and simplification of accounting 
requirements for financial instruments are discussed in sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 
while the recommendations of the FCAG (2009) are discussed in section 3.4.3.  
3.4.1 Improving accounting standards for financial instruments 
Until the publication of IFRS 9 in November 2009, the international accounting 
requirements for financial instruments were outlined in three standards, namely 
IAS 32 Financial Instruments: Presentation, IAS 39 Financial Instruments: 
Recognition and Measurement and IFRS 7 Financial Instruments: Disclosures. 
Before the publication of IFRS 9, IAS 39 was the standard that outlined the 
measurement requirements for financial instruments.  
IAS 39 was published in 1999 as an interim solution as the IASB‟s predecessor, 
the IASC, was under pressure to meet the deadline for the completion of a core 
set of standards required to enable IOSCO to endorse IAS (Camfferman & Zeff, 
2006). The development of IAS 39 took eleven years as there was no existing 
guidance at the time and the IASC board members lacked financial instruments 
accounting expertise (Camfferman & Zeff, 2006). The rapid pace in financial 
innovation (IMF, 2008) also led to serious disagreements among stakeholders on 
the appropriate way of accounting for financial instruments.  
Camfferman and Zeff (2006) chronicle how the development of IAS 39 had a 
lasting impact on international accounting standard-setting. Japan was concerned 
about the use of fair value accounting, the BCBS was worried about the impact of 
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accounting on banks‟ capital adequacy ratios, France argued for macro-hedging 
and Australia, the UK and the US wanted full fair value accounting.  
The prominent role of staff seconded by Canada and the US chairing of steering 
committee meetings created a perception of a North American alliance 
(Camfferman & Zeff, 2006). The final text of IAS 39 was based mostly on US 
GAAP, a fact resented by other IASB regions. The EC endorsed IAS 39 for use 
within the EU but with modified fair value option and hedge accounting 
requirements (Camfferman & Zeff, 2006). The IASB subsequently revised IAS 39 
several times after its publication to issue additional guidance and address 
drafting inconsistencies (IASB, 2008a).  
In 2004, the IASB set up a working group to address the difficulties faced by 
constituents in applying IAS 39 (IASB, 2008a). The global financial crisis forced 
the IASB to accelerate the project resulting in the issuance of a discussion paper 
(IASB, 2008a) in March 2008. The discussion paper (IASB, 2008a) solicited 
constituents‟ views on how financial instruments should be measured. The 
publication of a discussion paper (IASB, 2008a) is a voluntary step in IASB 
standard-setting due process.  
In the discussion paper (IASB, 2008a), the IASB argues that stakeholders 
complain that the many ways in which financial instruments are measured have 
made IAS 39 a very complex standard. IAS 39 requires most financial instruments 
to be measured at fair value but subsequent measurement depends on how the 
instrument has been classified (IASCF, 2009b). Financial instruments classified 
as loans and receivables and held-to-maturity assets are subsequently measured 
at amortised cost using the effective interest rate method. Financial instruments 
classified as available-for-sale and fair value through profit and loss are 
subsequently measured at fair value but with different treatments of gains and 
losses (IASCF, 2009b).  
The discussion paper (IASB, 2008a) solicited views on the measurement of 
financial instruments, immediate approaches to addressing measurement 
challenges and long-term solutions. The IASB expressed preference for full fair 
value accounting as a long-term solution while acknowledging the complexity of 
financial instruments. The commenting period on the discussion paper (IASB, 
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2008a) closed in September 2008. In October 2008, before the IASB could 
consider the comment letters to the discussion paper, the EC requested that 
IAS 39 be urgently amended to bring IFRS into line with US GAAP (IASB, 2008b; 
IASCF, 2009a). 
3.4.2 The amendment of IAS 39 - reclassification of financial assets  
According to Bengtsson (2011), the global financial crisis re-ignited the EC‟s 
interest in standard-setting because of its impact on financial stability. The 
September 2008 collapse of Lehman Brothers, a large US financial institution, 
forced the EC to focus on asset classification requirements in IFRS. The EC 
requested the IASB to amend IAS 39 to provide a “more level playing field” 
(IASCF, 2009a:25). The EC wanted the IASB to amend IAS 39 to match the 
reclassifications allowed in US GAAP through Statements of Financial Accounting 
Standards (SFAS) 115 Accounting for Certain Investments in Debt and Equity 
Securities and SFAS 65 Accounting for Certain Mortgage Banking Activities 
(IASB, 2008c).  
SFAS 115 permits a financial instrument to be reclassified out of the trading 
category in rare situations while SFAS 65 permits a loan to be classified out of the 
held for sale category if the entity has the intention and ability to hold the loan for 
the foreseeable future or until maturity (IASB, 2008c: 10). The provisions of US 
GAAP make it possible for an entity to minimise its fair value losses through 
reclassifications. IAS 39 did not permit such reclassifications (IASB, 2008c) hence 
the EC argued that financial institutions applying IFRS were being forced to 
absorb more fair value losses than their US counterparts. 
The IASB effected an amendment to IAS 39 that permitted reclassification of non-
derivative financial assets out of the fair value through profit and loss category 
under certain conditions (IASB, 2008c). The amendment also permitted the 
reclassification of available-for-sale assets to the loans and receivables category 
if the assets met the definition of loans and receivables and the entity had the 
intention and ability to hold them to maturity. Although the amendment did not 
completely align IFRS with US GAAP because of differences in scope and 
impairment requirements (IASCF, 2009a; IASB, 2008c), it created the possibility 
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that an entity applying IFRS could minimise its income statement losses by 
reclassifying qualifying assets out of the fair value category.  
The amendment was effected without following due process (FCAG, 2009). No 
exposure draft was issued and no comments from constituents were invited 
because the IASB wanted to address “this issue urgently in the light of market 
conditions” (IASB, 2008c:11). The IASB only requested permission from the 
Trustees of the IFRS Foundation to waive due process requirements. The waiving 
of due process procedures was not provided for in the IFRS governance 
procedures at the time (FCAG, 2009). The IASB feared that the EC was going to 
unilaterally amend IAS 39 using its endorsement process (IASCF, 2009a). Two 
IASB board members dissented to the amendment of IAS 39 in part because of 
concerns regarding due process violation (IASB, 2008c). 
The amendment was issued in October 2008 with a July 2008 retrospective 
effective date (IASB, 2008c). The retrospective effective date is contrary to the 
IASB practice of normally allowing a period of early prospective adoption with the 
mandatory effective date being around one year after publication (IASCF, 2009b).  
Following the amendment of IAS 39, the EC requested further guidance on the 
application of fair value (IASCF, 2009a). The IASB responded by publishing an 
expert advisory panel report providing guidance on how to measure and disclose 
fair values in inactive markets (IASB, 2008b).  
The action of the EC in pressuring the IASB is in keeping with the state‟s outcome 
responsibility as explained by Zimmermann, et al (2008). The waiving of due 
process requirements by the Trustees demonstrated the importance of oversight 
structures in standard-setting due process. The overriding of due process 
procedures damaged the credibility of the IASB and raised questions about the 
integrity of IFRS standard-setting due process (FCAG, 2009). The IASB and 
FASB established an advisory group to advise on the standard-setting 
implications of the global financial crisis. 
3.4.3 The standard-setting implications of the crisis  
The FCAG (2009) dealt with four thematic areas covering the effectiveness of 
financial reporting; the limitations of financial reporting, convergence of 
accounting standards and the independence and accountability of a standard-
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setter. The FCAG (2009) absolved accounting standards of blame for causing the 
crisis but noted weaknesses that included difficulties in applying fair value 
accounting in illiquid markets, delayed recognition of losses and complexity of 
accounting standards for financial instruments. It recommended the improvement 
and simplification of accounting standards for financial instruments. 
On the limitations of financial reporting, the FCAG (2009) urged users of 
accounting information to supplement it with their own judgement and due 
diligence. The FCAG (2009) also urged the IASB and FASB to accelerate 
convergence of IFRS with US GAAP as a way of improving comparability of 
financial information. 
The FCAG (2009) recommended improvements to the independence and 
accountability of the IASB to enhance the legitimacy of IFRS. It defined 
independence as the freedom from the undue influence of special interests and 
policy-makers. In this regard, the FCAG (2009) expressed concern that the EC 
had pressured the IASB to amend IAS 39 after the FASB had also amended 
SFAS 157: Fair Value Measurement also under pressure from the US Congress. 
The FCAG (2009:15) concluded that such “rapid, piecemeal, uncoordinated and 
prescribed changes to standards” undermine the legitimacy of IFRS. 
In terms of accountability, the FCAG (2009:14) argued for oversight conducted in 
the “public interest” supported by appropriate due process procedures. It 
emphasised that failure in either oversight or due process is likely to call the 
legitimacy of IFRS into question. The FCAG (2009) welcomed the establishment 
of the Monitoring Board with the hope that it would provide the IASB with the 
same oversight that the SEC (2009) provides to the FASB. The FCAG (2009) also 
called for a permanent and independent funding structure to enhance the 
independence of the IASB. It recommended due process improvements to ensure 
that “all voices in all geographic regions have an adequate opportunity to make 
their views known” (FCAG, 2009:14).  
The remainder of this study focuses on the oversight and due process of the IASB 
including their ability to enhance the legitimacy of IFRS. Oversight and due 
process mechanisms are discussed in the next chapter. The participation of 
stakeholders in due process is assessed in chapter six. 
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3.5 Summary and conclusions                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
The global financial crisis started in the US housing market and spread to the rest 
of the world because of the interconnectedness of financial markets. The causes 
of the crisis included weak regulatory oversight, poor capital buffers, poor liquidity 
management, excessive risk taking and financial institutions‟ compensation 
schemes based on short-term targets. The lack of regulatory oversight over the 
activities of the shadow financial sector led to a build-up of unnoticed systemic 
risks. The formal banking system evaded capital adequacy ratio requirements by 
investing through SIVs. 
The growth of the shadow financial sector was spurred by a search for high yields 
in low credit quality investments which resulted in the creation of complex, 
structured credit products. As the products were difficult to understand, investors 
based their investment decisions on credit ratings. As liquidity dried up, the 
market for structured credit products became inactive and asset prices declined 
leading to valuation write-downs estimated at over US$1,4 trillion.  
Several financial institutions collapsed and others were forcibly acquired under 
the weight of mounting losses and reduced market capitalisation. True to their 
outcome responsibility, governments and their central banks had to guarantee the 
obligations of financial institutions to save them from bankruptcy. Economic 
growth contracted, unemployment rose, international trade shrank and emerging 
markets were disrupted by currency volatility. 
The inactive and illiquid markets led to questions about the validity of observable 
market prices. The complexity of most structured credit products led to valuation 
challenges. The use of valuation models also led to suspicion among participants 
about the exposure of entities to subprime mortgages. Critics, employing logic 
and rhetoric, blamed accounting standards for exacerbating the crisis and 
lobbyists found an opportunity to influence standards. The fair value debate 
changed the macroeconomic and -political environment in which IFRS standard-
setting takes place. Pressure was brought to bear on the IASB to act. 
The IASB published a discussion paper on financial instruments as well as an 
application guide for when markets are no longer active. Together with FASB, it 
set up the FCAG which recommended several improvements to IFRS governance 
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and due process procedures.  The FCAG exonerated IFRS for causing the crisis 
but recommended improvements to both IFRS and the governance and 
procedures of the IASB. The FCAG also urged the IASB to consider the 
information needs of regulators. 
Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the EC forced the IASB to amend 
IAS 39 to allow the reclassification of financial assets out of the fair value 
category. The amendment was intended to bring IFRS into line with US GAAP. 
The amendment was issued without following due process which damaged the 
credibility of the IASB and its due process. The actions of the EC demonstrated 
the response of states when anticipated policy outcomes are in jeopardy. The 
financial crisis therefore transformed the development of IFRS from being a 
technical process to a politically sensitive one in need of higher levels of 
legitimation. The due process of IFRS standard-setting is assessed in the next 
chapter. 
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4 THE LEGITIMACY IMPLICATIONS OF THE IFRS STANDARD-SETTING DUE 
PROCESS 
4.1 Introduction 
The legitimacy challenges of IFRS were identified in chapter two as partly 
emanating from the standard-setting due process, the state‟s responsibilities and 
the sensitivity of certain policy fields. In search of legitimation, chapter two 
concluded with a proposal to combine moral legitimacy, the global governance 
toolbox and procedural legitimacy to create an ideal IASB due process capable of 
legitimating IFRS.  
Chapter three dealt with the legitimacy implications of the global financial crisis 
and concluded that the outcome responsibilities of the state and the need to 
respond to the crisis have heightened sensitivities around the development of 
IFRS. The likely impact is that stakeholders from all regions will pay more 
attention to IFRS standard-setting due process. The global financial crisis has 
changed the macro environment in which IFRS standard-setting takes place. 
Such a change requires that the IASB be proactive in strengthening its due 
process. 
The European Parliament (2008) argues that the financial crisis highlighted the 
importance of accounting standards to financial stability. It recommended that the 
oversight of IFRS standard-setting structures be representative of jurisdictions 
using or intending using IFRS and standard-setting procedures be improved to 
take all views into account. The European Parliament (2008) also recommended 
a broad-based funding structure to eliminate conflict of interest and prevent due 
process capture by funders.  
Mattli and Buthe (2005) characterise the IASB as an agent with multiple 
principals, hence oversight structures play a critical role in enhancing 
accountability. In addition, they argue that technical expertise and funding impact 
on the operational and financial viability of the IASB. They also note that expertise 
is unevenly distributed geographically, dominated by the UK and the US. Mattli 
and Buthe (2005) also express concern regarding the voluntary nature of financial 
contributions to the IASB and their dominance by large accounting firms.  
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Structures, procedures and resources are a codification of power relations and 
due process is a trade-off relationship among them (Botzem & Quack, 2009). Due 
process can be viewed as a means of handling standard-setting disputes while 
attempting to demonstrate the transparency of the process. Botzem and Quack 
(2009) argue that due process allows the IASB to consult without constraining its 
decision-making authority as comment letters are summarised by staff who 
reframe their content when aggregating comments. 
This chapter assesses the extent to which the IFRS standard-setting due process 
enhances the legitimacy of IFRS by meeting the conditions of a practical 
discourse. The assessment is according to Suchman‟s (1995) moral legitimacy, 
Esty‟s (2006) global governance toolbox and Richardson and Eberlein‟s (2011) 
procedural legitimacy. Moral legitimacy requires an evaluation of structures and 
procedures as proxies for less visible legitimacy evaluation targets. The toolbox is 
anchored on controls on corruption, systematic and sound rulemaking, 
transparency and public participation, and power-sharing. Procedural legitimacy 
requires the appropriate participation and representation of affected parties, 
accountability of the standard setter, deliberation of alternatives, transparency of 
proceedings, and an evaluation of outcomes and consequences. 
This chapter is divided into three parts: standard-setting structures, procedures, 
and resources. The first part discusses the standard-setting structures focusing 
on the introduction of the Monitoring Board, the evolving role of the IFRS 
Foundation and the expansion of IASB membership. The allocation of seats on 
the Monitoring Board, the IFRS Foundation and the IASB are also assessed for 
representativeness.  
The second part of the chapter focuses on the standard-setting procedures: the 
steps followed to publish an IFRS. The assessment begins from the agenda- 
setting stage to the post-implementation review of completed projects. The 
requirements of procedural legitimacy supplemented by the tools in Esty‟s (2006) 
toolbox provide a framework to assess due process procedures.  
The third part discusses the standard-setting resources of the IASB focusing on 
technical skills and funding. Weber (1978) identified technical expertise and 
funding as critical to the survival of bureaucracy. He argued that those who 
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provide such expertise and funding are likely to control the bureaucracy. Such an 
argument, if true, has serious implications for the legitimacy of IFRS. It would 
violate the requirement of a practical discourse that there be no other force than 
that of a better argument. The chapter concludes with a summary and 
conclusions on the extent to which standard-setting due process enhances the 
legitimacy of IFRS.  
4.2 The standard-setting structures 
The oversight of the standard-setting process is outlined in the constitution of the 
IFRS Foundation (IFRSF, 2010b) which provides for a three-tier governance 
structure: the Monitoring Board, the IFRS Foundation and the IASB as shown in 
figure 4.1 below. The numerical values in the boxes refer to the maximum number 
of seats available in each structure.  The constitution (IFRSF, 2010b) has been 
amended six times since its initial adoption in 2000 with the last three changes 
being made after the onset of the crisis. The changes include the establishment of 
the Monitoring Board, the enhancement of the role of the Trustees, the expansion 
of IASB and IFRIC membership and the establishment of additional advisory 
committees (IFRSF, 2011a; IFRSF, 2011b; IFRSF, 2012a). 
Figure 4.1 Oversight of IFRS standard-setting 
 
Source: IFRSF (2012a:2) 
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4.2.1 The Monitoring Board 
The Monitoring Board was established in January 2009 with an initial membership 
of six (IFRSF, 2010b). The members include the two chairs of the IOSCO 
Technical and Emerging Markets Committees, the EC Commissioner responsible 
for securities markets, the Commissioner of Japan Financial Services Agency 
(JFSA) and the Chair of the SEC. The chair of the BCBS serves as an “observer” 
on the Monitoring Board. The main responsibility of the Monitoring Board is to 
appoint and supervise the Trustees of the IFRS Foundation (IFRSF, 2010b). 
The rationale for the establishment of the Monitoring Board is to create a “formal 
link” of IFRS governance to those capital market authorities serving the “public 
interest” (IFRSF, 2011b:13). The “public interest” phrase is used eight times in the 
constitution (IFRSF, 2010b) without defining it. The repeated invocation rather 
than definition of the “public interest” phrase may be a deliberate use of rhetoric 
as defined by Smith, et al (2010). The report of the FCAG (2009) reveals the 
reason for establishing the Monitoring Board as the need to align the governance 
of the IASB with that of the FASB. The oversight of IFRS standard-setting is 
compared to that of the US GAAP in figure 4.2 below. 
Figure 4.2 A comparison of IFRS-US GAAP oversight structure  
 
Source: Adapted from IFRSF (2010b) and SEC (2009).   
The purported alignment is flawed because the SEC (2009) is mandated by the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 while the Monitoring Board is not a legal entity 
(IFRSF, 2012b). The Monitoring Board has no mandate from any of the over 100 
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jurisdictions using IFRS, and its membership is too restricted to afford all affected 
parties equal opportunities to participate. Even respondents to its governance 
review proposals preferred expansion of its membership beyond capital market 
authorities (IFRSF, 2012b). The Monitoring Board dismissed the views of these 
respondents citing “miscomprehension” of its role and instead opted to add two 
rotating seats and a maximum of four new members from major emerging 
markets based on market capitalisation, “domestic use of IFRS” and financial 
contribution (IFRSF, 2012b:13).  
The Monitoring Board effectively replaced the Trustees Appointments Advisory 
Group (TAAG) in as far as the appointment of Trustees is concerned (IASCF, 
2008:35). The TAAG was chaired by Paul Volcker, former chair of the US Federal 
Reserve and included the chair of the IOSCO Executive Committee, chair of the 
FSF, the managing director of the IMF and the presidents of the African 
Development Bank (AfDB), Asian Development Bank (ADB), Inter-American 
Development Bank (IADB), ECB and the World Bank. Unlike the Monitoring 
Board, TAAG had nine members drawn from across the economic spectrum with 
each region represented by the head of the respective development bank (IASCF, 
2008). 
The attempt to align the governance of IFRS with that of US GAAP may be an 
attempt to achieve Suchman‟s (1995) cognitive legitimacy albeit under flawed 
assumptions. Before the establishment of the Monitoring Board, the four 
organisations constituting its membership (IOSCO, the EC, JFSA and SEC) had 
issued a joint press release in 2007 questioning the public accountability of the 
IASB (IASCF, 2009a:3). Their co-option into the Monitoring Board appears to be 
an attempt by the IASB to achieve pragmatic legitimacy by bowing to the 
demands of powerful stakeholders. Pragmatic legitimacy is unstable and it is 
difficult to sustain its legitimating tactics (Suchman, 1995).  
4.2.2 The IFRS Foundation 
The Trustees of the IFRS Foundation are appointed by the Monitoring Board for a 
term of three years renewable once (IFRSF, 2010b). Their composition is 
supposed to reflect the world‟s capital markets combined with geographical and 
professional diversity. The constitution (IFRSF, 2010b) currently provides for 22 
57 
 
Trustees distributed as follows: six each from the Asia/Oceania, Europe and 
North America regions; one each from Africa and South America; and two from 
any other region. 
The main duties of the Trustees include the appointment and supervision of 
members of the IASB, the establishment of due process procedures and the 
financing of standard-setting activities (IFRSF, 2010b). The Trustees also appoint 
members of the International Financial Reporting Interpretations Committee 
(IFRIC) and other advisory committees. 
The Trustees have a Due Process Oversight Committee (DPOC) which is not 
provided for in the constitution (IFRSF, 2010b) but referenced in the Due Process 
Handbook (IFRSF, 2012c). The main responsibility of the DPOC is to review, 
amend and monitor due process procedures. The DPOC also reviews the 
composition of working groups for “balance of perspectives” (IFRSF, 2012c:20). 
The composition of the Trustees raises two fundamental questions. The first is 
whether reflecting the world‟s capital markets is a better way of determining the 
number of Trustees from each region. AOSSG (2011) uses its share of the 
world‟s population and GDP as justification for demanding better representation in 
oversight structures. The Trustees have suggested that contributions to IFRS 
funding be aligned with a country‟s proportion of GDP (IFRSF, 2012a:58) and not 
the size of its capital market. Some stakeholders are advocating for 
representation on oversight structures to be limited to those jurisdictions “using 
IFRS” (IFRSF, 2011b:10) as they can be defined as the affected parties. 
A second fundamental question is how countries are selected from regions. For 
example, South Africa is the only African country with a seat among the Trustees. 
There is no evidence that South Africa was selected by other African countries to 
represent their interests and views. The process of selecting representatives is 
critical when it is not practical that all affected parties can participate in a practical 
discourse (Uhlin, 2010). The legitimacy of regional representatives, and by 
extension that of IFRS, can be enhanced if affected regions have the right to 
nominate their own representatives. 
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4.2.3 The IASB 
The IASB is the IFRS standard-setting body whose members are appointed by 
the Trustees (IFRSF, 2010b). It is supposed to have 16 members with four each 
from the Asia/Oceania, Europe and North America regions; one each from Africa 
and South America; and two from any other region. Its membership was 
expanded from 14 to 16 members after the onset of the global financial crisis. The 
current distribution of seats shows that the two extra seats, apart from those 
specifically assigned to IASB regions, have been allocated to Asia/Oceania and 
Europe.  
Figure 4.3 The allocation of IASB seats 
 
Source: IFRSF (2010b, 2012a) 
The IASB is supported by the IFRIC which is provided for in the constitution 
(IFRSF, 2010b) as a separate committee. This study considers IFRIC as an 
extension of the IASB as its main role is to interpret IFRS and provide guidance to 
users of IFRS. IFRIC members are appointed by the Trustees but with no 
prescription of geographical distribution.  Its membership was expanded from 12 
to 14 in 2007 and the current composition is seven from Europe, four from North 
America and three from the Asia/Oceania region (IFRSF, 2012a).  
The table below shows a different allocation of IASB seats based on two 
assumptions: 1) that the IASB and IFRIC are one committee and 2) that the 
prescribed geographical allocation applicable to IASB membership applies to 
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IFRIC as well. The result is that Europe is over-represented by four seats through 
taking one each from Africa and South America and taking the other two seats 
that could go to any region. The Asia/Oceania and North America regions have 
commensurate representation. 
Table 4.1 The allocation of IASB and IFRIC seats 
 
Source: IFRSF (2010b, 2012a) 
The constitution (IFRSF, 2010b) empowers the Trustees to appoint 
representatives of regulatory bodies as IFRIC observers. The EC and IOSCO 
currently serve as the two observers on IFRIC (IFRSF, 2012a). By assuming that 
the IFRIC is part of the IASB, the inclusion of IOSCO and the EC raises concerns 
about the independence of the standard-setting due process. Although observer 
status does not give voting rights, it enables the opportunity to speak at meetings 
and grants access to the decision makers. Such access provides opportunities for 
lobbying decision makers. 
Another observation is that all three tiers of IFRS governance are all chaired by 
current and former IOSCO officials. The Monitoring Board is chaired by the Chair 
of the IOSCO Board, the IFRS Foundation is chaired by a former chair of the 
IOSCO Technical Committee and the IASB is chaired by a former vice chair of 
IOSCO Technical Committee (IFRSF, 2012a). The Monitoring Board is hosted 
and supported by IOSCO (IFRSF, 2012b).  
There is also evidence (IFRSF, 2011a; IFRSF, 2012a) to suggest that the IASB is 
actively aligning itself with the G-20 countries. Annexure A shows that 47 seats 
(84%) out of the 56 available on the Monitoring Board, the IFRS Foundation and 
IASB are occupied by G-20 countries. Argentina, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia 
and Turkey are the only G-20 countries using IFRS that have no seats on any of 
Constitution Current Proportional Current Ideal Current Difference
Africa 1                        1 1 0 2                          1 -1                        
Asia/Oceania 4 5 4 3 8 8 0
Europe 4 5 4 7 8 12 4
North America* 4 4 4 4 8 8 0
South America 1 1 1 0 2 1 -1
Other 2 0 0 0 2 0 -2
16                      16 14 14 30 30 0
IASB IFRIC Combined
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the three structures. The strategy of aligning with G-20 may give IFRS political 
clout but it is risky because the G-20 membership criteria, and therefore its 
legitimacy, is contested (G-20, 2007). The G-20 was setup in the aftermath of the 
Asian financial crisis and only incorporates “systemically significant economies” 
(G-20, 2007:8). It is an exclusive club of the economies that are considered 
important for financial stability. 
4.2.4 Advisory committees 
The IFRS Advisory Council is the only advisory committee currently provided for 
in the constitution (IFRSF, 2010b). Its responsibilities include advising the IASB 
on agenda decisions and priorities, and giving advice to both the IASB and the 
Trustees. Members of the Council are appointed by the Trustees but there is no 
geographical breakdown prescribed although geographical diversity is a 
consideration. Members of the Council pay for their cost of participating at 
meetings. The EC, JFSA and SEC have observer status on the Council (IFRSF, 
2012a). 
The Small and Medium Enterprises Implementation Group (SMEIG) is a recent 
committee assisting with the implementation of IFRS for SMEs (IFRSF, 2011a). 
The Emerging Economies Group (EEG) is also a recent committee chaired by 
China (IFRSF, 2012a). Both SMEIG and EEG can be described as ad hoc 
committees with limited life spans as they are not explicitly provided for in the 
constitution (IFRSF, 2010b) of the IFRS Foundation. They were established after 
the onset of the global financial crisis. 
4.2.5 The allocation of IFRS governance seats 
The IFRS Foundation strategy review (IFRSF, 2011b:15) conceded that future 
changes to the geographical distribution of seats on IFRS governance structures 
are likely to reflect the global adoption of IFRS. It is a realisation that the 
continued exclusion of countries using IFRS from governance structures may 
jeopardize the harmonisation of accounting standards. This view is reinforced by 
the emphasis of the Trustees on developing mechanisms to report on countries 
diverging from IFRS as issued by the IASB (IFRSF, 2011b).  
As discussed in section 2.3, 145 countries use IFRS with 101 requiring or 
permitting them to be used by unlisted companies. In addition, 15 of the countries 
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have no stock exchanges but require or permit the use of IFRS. This evidence 
supports the argument for expanding the membership of the Monitoring Board 
beyond capital market authorities. The size of a capital market depends on the 
volume of listed shares and their prices which may be distorted when markets are 
inactive (IASCF, 2009b). The use of GDP to allocate seats on IFRS governance 
structures, as opposed to market capitalisation, may be more appropriate as the 
Trustees are already considering aligning funding contributions to a country‟s 
proportion of GDP (IFRSF, 2011b). Besides, GDP encompasses all measurable 
economic activity within a jurisdiction as opposed to focusing on the values of 
listed entities only. 
Figure 4.4 below compares the current distribution of seats on the Monitoring 
Board, the Foundation and the IASB to a hypothetical distribution based on six-
year averages (2006-2011) of GDP and market capitalisation of the 145 countries 
permitting or requiring the use of IFRS. Six-year averages are necessary to 
neutralise the impact of temporary but significant changes in GDP values as a 
result of the global financial crisis. The data is from the World Bank (no date) 
development indicators database. 
Figure 4.4 below compares the current allocation of all seats on IFRS governance 
structures to revised allocations based on either GDP or market capitalisation but 
limited to countries using IFRS. When compared to current allocation, Africa and 
Europe are over-represented at the expense of North America. The allocation for 
the Asia/Oceania region would stay the same while the South American region 
would gain one seat based on GDP but stay the same based on market 
capitalisation. 
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Figure 4.4 A comparison of the allocation of IFRS governance seats 
 
Source: The World Bank (no date) 
Table 4.2 compares the current allocation of seats in each structure to a re-
allocation based on a proportion of GDP. The Asia/Oceania region would lose 
one seat on the Monitoring Board to the North American region. Europe and 
North America would gain one seat each on the IFRS Foundation at the expense 
of Africa that would not qualify for representation. The Africa region would also 
lose its seat on the IASB to North America. Europe would be the biggest loser on 
IFRIC representation, giving up three seats. 
Table 4.2 The allocation of IFRS governance seats according to GDP 
 
Source: The World Bank (no date) 
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North America would be the overall winner if either GDP or market capitalisation 
alone were to be used to re-allocate seats. The region would get three more 
Trustees seats based on market capitalisation. It is the only region with a market 
capitalisation higher than its GDP, reflecting the size and influence of the US 
capital markets. The size of its capital markets is driven by the US tradition of 
using stock exchange listings to raise capital as well as the listing of foreign firms 
on US stock exchanges (Martinez-Diaz, 2005). In contrast, both Asia/Oceania 
and Europe have higher GDP values than market capitalisation. A number of 
other regional financial centres including Hong Kong, Luxembourg, Singapore, 
South Africa, Switzerland and the UK have market capitalisations that are higher 
than their GDP. 
Table 4.3 The allocation of IFRS governance seats according to market 
capitalisation of stock exchanges 
 
Source: The World Bank (no date) 
The standard-setting structures are just a part of the standard-setting due 
procedures. The standard-setting procedures are also important in enhancing or 
inhibiting the legitimacy of IFRS.                  
4.3 IFRS standard-setting procedures 
The constitution (IFRSF, 2010b) requires the Trustees to establish due process 
procedures and monitor the IASB‟s compliance. The due process procedures are 
outlined in the Due Process Handbook (IFRSF, 2012c) while the task of 
compliance monitoring is performed by the DPOC. The IASB due process 
procedures are intended to achieve transparency, extensive consultation and 
accountability (IFRSF, 2012c). Transparency is to be achieved through holding 
IASB meetings that are open to the public, and publishing notices, drafts and 
comment letters on the website. Extensive consultation is achieved through 
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soliciting written comments on drafts, public hearings and field visits, and 
releasing project summaries and feedback statements to explain the rationale for 
certain decisions (IFRSF, 2012c).  
The due process procedures consist of six stages: agenda setting, project 
planning, discussion paper, exposure draft, IFRS publication and post-
implementation review (IFRSF, 2012c). This study groups the due process 
procedures in figure 4.5 below into the three parts of procedural legitimacy: input, 
throughput and output legitimacy. Such an approach allows for a proper 
assessment of IFRS standard-setting due process. When supplemented by Esty‟s 
(2006) toolbox and the moral legitimacy of Suchman (1995), such a framework 
ensures an assessment that interrogates the requirements of a practical 
discourse as proposed by Habermas (1973). 
Figure 4.5 The IFRS due process procedures 
 
Source: Adapted from IFRS Foundation Due Process Handbook (IFRSF, 2012c). 
4.3.1 Input legitimacy 
The analysis of input legitimacy in chapter two concluded that the participation of 
affected parties was essential. This section is concerned about assessing 
opportunities for participation. The actual participation of affected parties is dealt 
with in chapter six. Participation opportunities exist during agenda setting, 
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publication of consultation documents and consultation meetings such as public 
hearings, field visits and field tests. 
4.3.1.1  Agenda setting and project planning 
Agenda setting is the first step in the IFRS due process and is informed by input 
from staff, the IFRS Advisory Council, IFRIC and other stakeholders. Standard-
setters with formal liaison relationships with the IASB contribute to agenda setting 
through their research outputs because of their “sufficient expertise, time and staff 
resources” (IFRSF, 2012c:8). These standard-setters are from Australia, New 
Zealand, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and US together 
with the Technical Expert Group of EFRAG (IFRSF, 2012c:18). The IASB has 
informal liaisons with other national standard-setters. 
To widen inputs into the agenda-setting process, the IASB has initiated three-
yearly public consultations on its work programme which should inform its agenda 
(IFRSF, 2012a). The Monitoring Board can also make agenda referrals to the 
IASB (IASCF, 2009c). During the IFRS governance review process, stakeholders 
expressed concern that such referrals might compromise the independence of the 
IASB (IFRSF, 2012b).  
The planning phase involves the allocation of resources to projects identified by 
the IASB as priority (IFRSF, 2012c). Project teams and working groups are set up 
during project planning. This stage also involves entering into partnerships with 
other standard-setters especially those with formal liaison status. Partnerships 
can include the secondment of staff to the IASB (IFRSF, 2012c).  
4.3.1.2  Discussion papers and exposure drafts 
Submission of comment letters to the IASB when discussion papers and 
exposure drafts are published remains the most common and widely available 
means of participation for most stakeholders (IFRSF, 2012c). The publication of a 
discussion paper is not a mandatory step but is normally used to solicit early 
views on major projects (IFRSF, 2012c). It also serves as the first point at which 
all other constituents become aware of the potential development of an IFRS. A 
discussion paper and associated comments from stakeholders serve as input into 
an exposure draft (IFRSF, 2012c) 
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The publication of an exposure draft is a mandatory step (IFRSF, 2012c). It 
serves as the IASB‟s main form of consulting stakeholders on technical 
proposals. Exposure drafts together with associated comment letters from 
stakeholders are available on the IFRS Foundation website. Both a discussion 
paper and exposure draft must be exposed for public comment for a period of 120 
days, but the Trustees may approve a shorter period. Depending on the 
comments received from constituents, the publication of an exposure draft may 
be followed by another exposure draft, public hearings, round tables and/or field 
tests (IFRSF, 2012c). 
4.3.1.3  Public hearings, round tables and field visits and tests 
The IASB hold public hearings and round tables to follow up on issues raised 
during the comment period of a consultation document (IFRSF, 2012c). 
Participants make presentations followed by question and answer sessions. 
Constituents can request public hearings with the IASB to explain their concerns 
especially during the comment period. 
Field visits are used by the IASB to understand industry practices and the impact 
of proposed standards (IFRSF, 2012c). They are normally undertaken after the 
publication of a discussion paper or exposure draft. Participants are identified by 
the IASB. The IASB also conducts field tests of proposed standards when there is 
a need but restricts its use because of cost implications (IFRSF, 2012c).  
Unlike comment letters, data on public hearings, round tables, field visits and 
tests are not readily available. This leaves a significant portion of the due process 
out of public scrutiny and thus hampers transparency.  
4.3.2 Throughput legitimacy 
Throughput legitimacy depends on the fairness of converting inputs into outputs 
and the rigour of decision-making (Richardson & Eberlein, 2011). Throughput 
legitimacy in IFRS standard-setting due process may be affected by the conduct 
of IASB meetings, controls on undue influence, analysis of comment letters, and 
balloting requirements. 
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4.3.2.1  IASB meetings 
IASB meetings to discuss technical issues are open to the public and individuals 
may attend as observers (IFRSF, 2012c). Constituents may view and/or listen to 
the meetings over the internet subject to a fee to cover the cost of transmission. 
Summaries of decisions and webcast recordings of past meetings are available 
on the IFRS Foundation website. 
The approach to IASB meetings seems to satisfy the openness of decision-
making and availability of information required to achieve transparency under 
procedural legitimacy (Uhlin, 2010). The same approach satisfies the need for 
public and open deliberation process in Esty‟s (2006) toolbox. 
4.3.2.2  Controls on corruption, self-dealing and undue influence 
Esty (2006) recommended the disclosure of personal interests, recusal from 
deliberations when conflicted, disclosure of material gifts, limits on the activities of 
special interest lobbyists and confirmation of compliance with due process as 
measures to control the impact of undue influence. The IFRS Foundation has a 
conflict of interest policy (IFRSF, 2010a) that requires the disclosure of personal 
interests and gifts above £100. The policy also prohibits Trustees, IASB members 
and staff from benefiting from the decisions they make in the course of their 
duties. The monitoring of IASB compliance with due process requirements is the 
responsibility of the DPOC (IFRSF, 2012c).  
4.3.2.3  Analysis of comment letters 
The IASB considers comment letters as vital in sourcing constituents‟ inputs into 
proposed standards (IFRSF, 2012c). Commenting on draft documents is the 
participation tool available to all the constituents of the IASB as the cost of 
participation is low. Comment letters are publicly available on the IASB website 
unless a participant‟s request to keep the comments private has been granted. 
The technical staff summarises the key points in the comment letters for 
consideration by the IASB board members (IFRSF, 2012c).  
Constituents have expressed concern in the past regarding how divergent 
comments are being handled by the IASB and the mechanism used to decide on 
conflicting content (IFRSF, 2011b). The Trustees are of the view that the project 
summaries and feedback statements address these concerns. The continued 
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interest of constituents in submitting comment letters may depend on their 
perception of how their input is being considered by the IASB. Legitimacy requires 
the participation of all affected parties.  The participation of all affected parties 
implies that the volume of comment letters increases. Such broad participation 
would seem to be at variance with the expertise-based approach adopted by the 
IASB (Richardson & Eberlein, 2011). To the extent that accounting standards 
address accounting challenges, their technical authority is necessary but not 
sufficient for legitimacy (Porter, 2005). 
4.3.2.4  Balloting procedures 
The table below shows the balloting requirements for the different decisions of the 
IASB. The issuance of an exposure draft, IFRS or interpretation of IFRS requires 
approval by at least nine of the sixteen IASB board members unlike a discussion 
paper that only requires a simple majority.  
Table 4.4 The IASB balloting requirements 
Simple majority Nine votes 
 Agenda and topic decisions  Exposure draft 
 Discussion paper  IFRS 
 Other discussion documents  Interpretation of IFRS 
 Administrative decisions  
Source: IFRSF (2012c:17) 
Richardson and Eberlein (2011) applaud the requirement for more than simple 
majority support on exposure drafts and IFRSs. They argue that such voting 
requirements offer protection against the capture of due process by narrow 
interests.  
The IFRS standard-setting does not provide for an independent recourse 
structure when constituents do not agree with the content of a standard. While 
constituents can appeal to the DPOC on matters of compliance with due process 
(IFRSF, 2012c), there is no appeal system on technical decisions of the IASB. 
Constituents are expected to not adopt the IFRS if they disagree with its content. 
Black (2008) cited this absence of recourse as a weakness of due process. 
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Allowing appeals on technical matters may stall standards development but not 
providing for recourse leaves the IASB with unchecked authority. The alternative, 
not available to many states, is to amend IFRS as necessary with the unintended 
consequence of undermining global harmonization of accounting standards and 
forego the perceived benefits.  
4.3.3 Output legitimacy 
Output legitimacy in IFRS standard-setting due process can be assessed at either 
the publication of an IFRS or the post-implementation review. Output legitimacy 
comes from the successful discharge of policy objectives, the costs and benefits 
of outcomes and their redistributive effects (Richardson & Eberlein, 2011). As 
discussed in chapter two, states are unlikely to easily agree on policy outcomes to 
be pursued by the IASB as their decisions to adopt IFRS are motivated by 
divergent policy considerations such as crisis avoidance (Eaton, 2005), 
accounting reforms (Edwards, et al; 2006), access to aid (Lasmin, 2011) and 
pressure from stock exchanges (Martinez-Diaz, 2005). The FCAG (2009) also 
dealt with the question of whether IFRS should meet the information needs of 
investors or that of regulators. 
4.3.3.1  Publication of an IFRS 
The publication of an IFRS is accompanied by the release of a project summary 
and feedback statement in which the IASB explains how it dealt with the 
comments from stakeholders (IFRSF, 2012c). An IFRS is also accompanied by a 
basis for conclusions explaining the rationale of certain decisions and may also 
include implementation guidance where necessary. The approach adopted by the 
IASB to publish feedback statements and the basis for conclusions seems to 
satisfy Esty‟s (2006) requirement for written decisions accompanied by 
justification. This approach creates a perception of an accountable IASB.  
However, Young (2003) views such an approach as an attempt to convince 
constituents that the standard is an outcome of a legitimate process and that all 
voices have been considered (Young, 2003:633). 
4.3.3.2  Post-implementation reviews 
A post-implementation review is conducted two years after the mandatory 
effective date of a standard (IFRSF, 2012c). A review is used to understand 
70 
 
unanticipated issues but also to promote consistent application of IFRS. It is 
normally limited to implementation issues identified as contentious during the 
development process. A review is not used to assess constituents‟ achievement 
of their heterogeneous policy objectives or the wider society implications of 
applying a particular IFRS. Although it is difficult for IFRS to achieve output 
legitimacy through fulfilling broader policy objectives, their ability to provide 
appropriate technical solutions to accounting challenges will still add to the their 
legitimacy (Porter, 2005). The contribution of the different parts of the IFRS 
standard-setting process also enhances the legitimacy of the standards. The next 
section analyses the role of standard-setting resources. 
4.4 Standard-setting resources 
Weber (1978) identified funding and technical skills as the two resources most 
important to the survival of a bureaucracy. Technical skills are needed to 
perpetuate dominance through knowledge acquired over several years of practice 
and difficult to replicate. According to Weber (1978), a bureaucracy will further the 
interests of those who provide for its survival through technical skills and funding. 
4.4.1 Technical skills 
The technical staff of the IASB is responsible for the research and drafting of 
discussion papers, exposure drafts and standards (IASCF, 2009a:43). In 2011, 
the IASB had 59 technical staff from 30 countries (IFRSF, 2012a). The technical 
staff consists of directors, project managers, technical associates, practice fellows 
and industry fellows (IASCF, 2008). Directors are the senior staff while project 
managers lead specific projects. Technical associates are staff in their early 
stages of their careers seconded to the IASB to gain exposure (IASCF, 2008). 
Practice fellows come from accounting firms and research institutions while 
industry fellows are seconded from companies.   
All the large international accounting firms (Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers), companies like Siemens and countries like Canada, 
China, Italy, Korea, Japan, UK and US second staff to the IASB to either work on 
specific projects or learn how the standard-setting process works (IASCF, 2008; 
IASCF, 2009a; IFRSF, 2011a; IFRSF, 2012a). Secondment involves a country, 
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firm or company sponsoring a staff member to be at the IASB. The secondments 
are not surprising given the central role of IASB staff in due process. 
4.4.2 Funding 
The IFRS Foundation received funding of US$33 million during 2011 (IFRSF, 
2012a). Excluding the contributions from international accounting firms 
(US$9 million), 54% of the remaining US$24 million funding came from the 
European region followed by Asia/Oceania (29%) and North America (15%) as 
shown in the pie chart below. The contributions from Europe include a 
US$6 million direct contribution from the EC (IFRSF, 2012a). 
Figure 4.6 The 2011 IFRS funding contributions by region 
 
Source: Adapted from IFRSF, 2012a 
A total of 25 countries contributed in 2011 with 17 of them represented on the 
Monitoring Board, IFRS Foundation, IASB or IFRIC (IFRSF, 2012a). South Africa 
and Sweden were the only countries with seats that did not contribute. South 
Africa has pledged $70,000 for 2012 (IFRSF, 2012a) while Sweden is covered by 
the EC contribution.  
Nigeria and Switzerland were the only two countries without seats on any of the 
structures that contributed more than US$100,000. Nigeria was the only 
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contributor from Africa and has pledged another $100,000 for 2012 (IFRSF, 
2012a). Brazil was the only contributor from South America whilst the US and 
Canada were the only contributors from North America apart from the 
international accounting firms. 
The Trustees (IFRSF, 2011b) are concerned about the possible lack of objectivity 
when dealing with requests presented by funders. There are potential threats to 
the independence and objectivity of the IASB. To mitigate the risks, the Trustees 
(IFRSF, 2011b) intend to expand the financing base and secure long-term 
commitments of publicly sponsored funding. The Trustees prefer funding to come 
from levies relative to a country‟s GDP with a target to get all G-20 countries to 
pay their share (IFRSF, 2011b:22). It is worth noting that representation on 
governance structures is based on market capitalisation, funding is to be linked to 
GDP and continued membership on the Monitoring Board is to be based on the 
use of IFRS.  
4.5 Summary and conclusions 
The structures, procedures and resources of the IFRS standard-setting due 
process have been assessed according to moral legitimacy, the governance 
toolbox and procedural legitimacy. Such a combination provides a framework that 
assesses adherence to the requirements of a practical discourse capable of 
legitimating its outcomes. 
The allocation of seats on the Monitoring Board, IFRS Foundation and the IASB 
was assessed for representativeness. The conclusion is that the membership of 
the Monitoring Board, currently limited to capital market authorities, falls short of 
the representation of all affected as required in a practical discourse. The use of 
IFRS is not restricted to listed companies hence representation of diverse views is 
paramount. The introduction of the Monitoring Board seems to suggest that the 
IASB is seeking cognitive legitimacy by attempting to align its governance 
structure with that of the FASB albeit under wrong assumptions. The other 
structures have disproportionate representation of the European region. 
The IASB is also courting the political endorsement of the G-20 and seems intent 
on getting all its members on board. The IASB governance structures are 
overwhelmingly dominated by G-20 countries. The BCBS is also an observer on 
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the Monitoring Board. IOSCO and the EC are represented in IFRS oversight and 
can influence the content of standards contrary to repeated claims of the 
independence of due process. In fact, the IASB is now a standard-setting organ of 
IOSCO with all its three tiers of governance headed by current and former IOSCO 
officials. The oversight structures of IFRS standard-setting are dominated by 
powerful stakeholders. 
The due process procedures of the IASB can afford stakeholders the opportunity 
to participate and influence standard-setting. The IASB has instituted a number of 
due process measures aimed at improving transparency and enhancing 
participation. IASB meetings that are open to the public, balloting requirements, 
availability of information on the website, the basis for conclusion and feedback 
statements are some of the due process procedures implemented by the IASB. 
These measures should enhance the legitimacy of IFRS. 
Commenting on consultation documents remains the participation method 
available to all constituents. The unavailability of information on other participation 
methods such as round tables and field visits is a concern as it tends to obscure 
certain parts of due process. A second concern is that stakeholders represented 
on governance structures and standard-setters with formal liaison status have 
more opportunities for participation than the rest of the constituents. The due 
process procedures therefore do not provide equal opportunities for participation. 
The IASB has also proved to be a bureaucracy with technical skills and funding 
playing a critical role. The technical staff plays a key role in due process as they 
provide input into meetings and summarise comment letters for consideration by 
the IASB board members. Summarising comment letters is necessary as it may 
be impossible for all the IASB board members to read every comment letter. 
Unfortunately, the summarising of comment letters can be achieved at the 
expense of disregarding minority views. It is not surprising that the major funders 
are seconding staff to the IASB.  
The rest of the 145 countries requiring or permitting the use of IFRS, excluded 
from decision-making structures, have a chance to influence the content of IFRS. 
Submitting comment letters to the IASB has been found to be effective under 
certain conditions. Chapter six analyses the participation of stakeholders in the 
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development of IFRS 9 and IFRS 13. These two standards deal with the issues at 
the heart of the global financial crisis. The next chapter explains the research 
method used to analyse participation in the development of IFRS 9 and IFRS 13. 
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5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
5.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this study is to establish the legitimacy of IFRS through an 
assessment of the participation of affected parties in the due process of IFRS 
standard-setting. One of the conditions for a practical discourse capable of 
legitimating its outcomes is that all affected parties, as free and equal participants, 
must have equal opportunities to influence the outcome (Habermas, 1973).  
Uhlin (2010) noted that participation has cost implications and involves both the 
quality and quantity of participation. The capacity of constituents to engage in the 
discourse is paramount. The approach adopted for this study focuses on the 
quantity rather than the quality of participation. The intention is to assess the 
participation of the different IASB geographic regions and interest groups.  
This chapter discusses the research design in terms of its appropriateness, prior 
research and its strengths and weaknesses that may affect the interpretation of 
the results.  This chapter also details the methodology including how the research 
design has been applied to this study and the justification for such an approach. 
The sources, quality and completeness of data are also discussed. The approach 
to analysing the data is explained. 
5.2 Research design 
This study uses descriptive statistics to analyse constituent participation in IFRS 
standard-setting due process. Descriptive statistics are used to summarise 
properties of a variable such as location, dispersion and shape (Hirschberg, Lu & 
Lye, 2005). The mean and median are the most common methods used to 
describe location while standard deviation is the most common measure of 
dispersion. Other methods include minimum and maximum to measure absolute 
values and skewness and kurtosis to measure distribution (Hirschberg, et al; 
2005). Tables and graphs are also used to present data. 
Constituent participation in standard-setting has been studied by several authors 
(Durocher, Fortin & Cote, 2007; Georgiou, 2004; Georgiou, 2010; Hansen, 2011;  
Larson, 2002, Larson, 2007; Larson & Herz, 2011; Sutton, 1984; Tandy & 
Wilburn, 1992;  Watts & Zimmerman, 1978). Watts and Zimmerman (1978) 
developed a positive accounting theory through which they argue that firm size 
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and the costs of complying with proposed standards affect the likelihood of 
participation in due process. According to Watts and Zimmerman (1978), 
standard-setters must expect firms to continue participating for as long as 
proposed standards have potential impact on the firms‟ cash flow.  
Sutton (1984) studied participation in the UK and the US from a political angle as 
he viewed accounting standards as regulations that restrict accounting choices 
and force disclosure of information. He concluded that participation in standard-
setting is influenced by the cost of participation, the perceived benefits and the 
probability of influencing the decision. Sutton (1984) describes participation in 
standard-setting as lobbying since affected parties attempt to influence the 
content of standards. The word lobbying is used in this study in the same context.  
Durocher, Fortin and Cote (2007) studied the participation of users in Canadian 
standard-setting due process. They classify reasons for participation in standard-
setting into three groups: the positive accounting theory group (PATG), the 
economic theory of democracy group (ETDG) and the coalition and influence 
group (CIG). The PATG is about economic consequences and participation is 
driven by a desire to avoid adverse consequences. The ETDG resembles the 
views of Sutton (1984).  The CIG is about coalitions among interest groups 
resulting in other stakeholders not participating because of a perception of due 
process capture by interest groups.  Durocher, et al (2007) concluded that 
domination of participation by a certain interest group will reinforce perception of 
due process capture and hence affects the participation of other affected parties.  
Georgiou (2004), building on the work of Sutton (1984), studied the methods, 
timing and perceived effectiveness of lobbying in the UK. He classifies lobbying 
methods as either direct or indirect. Direct methods include submitting comment 
letters, speaking at public hearings, meetings with representatives of standard-
setters, and seconding staff to a standard-setter‟s projects. Indirect methods 
include media articles, submitting views to trade associations, use of external 
auditors, sponsoring research and making representations to government 
agencies. Georgiou (2004) concluded that lobbyists employ more than one 
method but submitting comment letters is one of the effective methods.  
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Hansen (2011) studied the lobbying of the IASB and concluded that pre-exposure 
draft engagement with the standard-setter influences the decision to issue an 
IFRS while comment letters have a significant impact on the final standard. 
Hansen (2011) argues that the ability to influence the IASB increases when the 
information is considered credible. In addition, participants from countries with 
large capital markets are more able to secure an audience with the IASB than 
their counterparts from countries with small capital markets. Hansen (2011) also 
found that dissenting IASB board members tend to echo the views of participants 
from their home countries underscoring the importance of representativeness. 
Tandy and Wilburn (1992) studied the participation of affected parties in the 
standard-setting of the FASB. Their study employed research questions aimed at 
establishing 1) the standard which elicited the highest levels of participation, 2) 
the extent of participation of various constituent groups and 3) the extent of 
participation of constituent groups affected by the standard under consideration. 
They classified participants as industry, public accounting, securities, banking, 
academia, government, law and other. Tandy and Wilburn (1992) used the 
descriptive statistics of mean, median and standard deviation techniques to 
analyse the participation levels of different interest groups. 
Larson (2002) used the median to explore the participation of different constituent 
groups in the due process of the IASC‟s Standing Interpretations Committee 
(SIC). He also used research questions to analyse comment letters according to 
respondents‟ names, interest groups and country. Interest groups were identified 
as IASC member bodies, standard-setters, public accounting firms (auditors), 
accounting organisations, non-banking companies and their associations, banking 
interests, securities, law, academic, financial executives and other.  
In a follow-up study of IFRIC, Larson (2007) focused on legitimacy with a 
particular emphasis on the participation of constituents from all geographic areas. 
He used research questions and analysed participation by individual 
organisations, interest groups, stakeholder groups and by country and region. 
The stakeholder groups were identified as the accounting profession, regulators, 
preparers, users and others. Both Larson (2002) and Larson (2007) considered 
the absolute number of comment letters submitted as well as expressed them as 
a percentage of the total submissions. 
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Larson and Herz (2011) analysed the submission of comment letters by 
academics in response to the invitation for comments from the IASB and IFRIC. 
Using research questions, they explored the number of comment letters 
submitted, the geographic origin of participants, the frequency of comment letters 
and the trend of comment letters over time.  
This study adopts the research approach of formulating research questions and 
analysing comment letter submissions using quantitative analysis of mean, 
median and standard deviation. Such an approach has been adopted by several 
scholars (Larson, 2002; Larson, 2007; & Larson & Herz, 2011; Tandy & Wilburn, 
1992). Tandy and Wilburn (1992) studied the FASB and the other three focused 
on the IASB and its predecessor, the IASC. The similarities in FASB and IASB 
due process make the work of Tandy and Wilburn (1992) appropriate for this 
study as well. 
5.3 Methodology 
The research focuses on the development of two standards linked to the global 
financial crisis: IFRS 9 and IFRS 13. IFRS 9 outlines the accounting requirements 
for financial instruments and is intended to ultimately replace IAS 39. In keeping 
with the complexity of the issues covered in the scope of the standard, IFRS 9 is 
being developed in three phases. The phases include classification and 
measurement, impairment and hedge accounting. The standard can therefore be 
classified as work-in-progress. 
IFRS 13 deals with fair value measurements and sets the measurement for all 
financial transactions required by various IFRSs to be measured at fair value. The 
development of the standard was completed in May 2011.  
The comment letters submitted during the development of IFRS 9 and IFRS 13 is 
discussed in sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2 below. The comment letters are the data 
used to analyse the participation of constituents. 
5.3.1 IFRS 9 comment letters 
The data consists of 1 711 comment letters submitted to the IASB between 
March 2008 and October 2011. During that period, the IASB published ten 
consultation documents (CDs) for comment. Two were discussion papers (CD1 
and CD6), one was a request for information (CD3) and the other seven (CD2, 
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CD4, CD5, CD7, CD8, CD9 and CD10) were exposure drafts. All the comment 
letters except those submitted in response to the supplementary exposure draft 
on amortised cost and impairment (CD5), and the offsetting of financial assets 
and financial liabilities exposure draft (CD9) are available on the IASB website. 
The responses to CD5 and CD9 are available on the FASB website. 
The IASB procedures allow for certain comment letters to be kept confidential at 
the request of a respondent. In such instances, such letters will not be part of the 
analysis. 
Table 5.1 The consultation documents published for comment during the 
development of IFRS 9 
CD 
code 
Publication 
date 
Closing 
date 
Comment 
letters 
Document title 
CD1 03/2008 09/2008 165 
DP 2008 Reducing complexity in 
reporting financial instruments 
CD2 07/2009 09/2009 246 
ED/2009/7 Financial Instruments: 
classification and measurement 
CD3 06/2009 09/2009 89 
RFI 2009 Request for information 
(expected loss model) Impairment 
of financial assets: expected cash 
flow approach 
CD4 11/2009 06/2010 192 
ED/2009/12 Financial instruments: 
amortised cost and impairment 
CD5 01/2011 04/2011 215 
Supplement to ED/2009/12 
Financial instruments: amortised 
cost and impairment 
CD6 06/2009 09/2009 123 
DP/2009/2 Credit risk in liability 
measurement 
CD7 05/2010 07/2010 138 
ED/2010/4 Fair value option for 
financial liabilities 
CD8 12/2010 03/2011 247 ED/2010/13 Hedge accounting 
CD9 01/2011 04/2011 165 
ED/2011/1 Offsetting financial 
assets and financial liabilities 
CD10 08/2011 10/2011 131 
ED/2011/3 Mandatory effective 
date of IFRS 9 
   1  711  
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5.3.2 IFRS 13 comment letters 
The development of IFRS 13 was initiated before the global financial crisis with 
the publication of a discussion paper (CD11) in November 2006. This was 
followed by the publication of two exposure drafts (CD12 and CD13) in May 2009 
and June 2010. A total of 387 comment letters were submitted and are available 
on the IASB website. 
Table 5.2 The consultation documents published for comment during the 
development of IFRS 13  
CD 
code 
Publication 
date 
Closing 
date 
Comment 
letters 
Document title 
CD11 11/2006 04/2007 136 
Discussion paper: Fair value 
measurements 
CD12 05/2009 09/2009 160 
ED/2009/5 Fair value 
measurement 
CD13 06/2010 09/2010 91 
ED/2010/7 Measurement 
uncertainty analysis: Disclosure for 
fair value measurement 
      387   
 
5.3.3 Analysis 
The submission of comment letters was analysed based on the participation per 
CD, the participation of individual respondents, countries and IASB regions, and 
the participation of interest groups. The names of respondents were obtained 
from the comment letters and the lists published on the IASB and FASB websites. 
The country of the respondent was obtained from the address in the comment 
letter and in cases where no address could be located, company websites were 
used to establish their headquarter address. Where none could be found, such 
respondents were classified as international. 
The interest group classification was a combination of Larson‟s (2007) interest 
groups and stakeholder group classification. The respondents were classified 
according to the interest groups as explained in table 5.3 below. The use of a 
financial institution category was meant to isolate a particular interest group that 
had been worst affected by the financial crisis. It is to be expected that financial 
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institutions would find it beneficial to participate in the development of IFRS 9 and 
IFRS 13 given the fair value debate. 
Table 5.3 The classification of participants into interest groups 
Interest group Explanation 
Academia Universities and tertiary education institutions.  
Accountancy bodies Public accounting firms and other accountancy 
bodies. 
Associations Any respondent normally representing an industry or 
more than one firm excluding those representing 
financial institutions. 
Corporates Any other firm or company not classified as a 
financial institution or accountancy body. 
Financial institutions Any bank, hedge fund, insurance company, asset 
manager or finance related business including their 
industry associations. 
Individuals Respondents writing in their personal capacity. 
National standard-setters Any respondent with responsibility for setting 
accounting standards in a particular jurisdiction. 
Regulators Governments, regulators, central banks and any 
other respondent with regulatory oversight in their 
jurisdiction.  
Source: Adapted from Tandy & Wilburn (1992), Larson (2002 & 2007) and 
Larson & Herz (2011) 
The classification of countries into IASB regions follows the same approach 
adopted in chapter four and outlined in annexure A. The same IASB regions of 
Africa, Asia/Oceania, Europe, North America and South America used in chapter 
three have been used in this analysis. 
The responses were analysed to answer five research questions as outlined 
below. Each of the questions is designed to explore some key issues impacting 
on the legitimacy of IFRS as discussed in chapters two and three. 
5.3.4 Levels of participation per consultation document 
The participation of all affected parties is a condition to be met by a practical 
discourse capable of legitimating its outcomes (Habermas, 1973). Participants 
must be afforded the opportunity to submit inputs. 
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Research question 1 (RQ1): Which request for input solicited the 
highest/lowest levels of constituent participation? 
5.3.5 The participation of interest groups 
Habermas (1990) argues that the inclusion of all affected creates the possibility of 
satisfying everyone‟s interests. It is only when the views of all affected are 
considered that consensus could be deemed as valid. Practical discourse is 
intended to prevent others from dictating what is good for everyone, thereby 
achieving a fair balance of interests. 
Research question 2 (RQ2): What has been the extent of participation of 
the different interest groups? 
5.3.6 The participation of IASB regions 
Due process is intended to ensure that “all voices in all geographic regions” have 
a chance to make their views known (FCAG 2009:14). Receiving input from all 
regions gives the IASB increased perceived legitimacy while making sure that 
other regions do not incur more costs than the benefits they will reap from 
applying the standards. It is possible that participation can be affected by a lack of 
technical and financial resources (Lasmin, 2011) and cultural factors (Zeghal & 
Mhedhbi, 2006).  
Research question 3 (RQ3): Which IASB regions submitted the most 
comment letters? 
Research question 4 (RQ4): Which countries and constituent groups from 
Africa submitted comment letters to the IASB? 
Research question 5 (RQ5): Are there countries that do not use IFRS that 
submitted comment letters to the IASB? Countries that use IFRS are listed 
in annexure A. 
5.4 Limitations 
Georgiou (2004) outlined other participation methods which are difficult to study 
or observe. The IASB due process procedures show that there are other 
participation methods such as presenting to IASB members, field tests, round 
tables and public hearings for which no data is publicly available. Submitting 
comment letters is one of the many methods of participation. An analysis of 
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comment letters alone is likely to understate the extent of participation in the 
development of an IFRS. 
Not all comment letters are publicly available, as some respondents can request 
that their letters be kept confidential. In such cases, not all comment letters will 
count towards participation. In addition, comment letters have a submission 
deadline and must be submitted before the deadline in order to be considered by 
the IASB board members. The IASB still accepts and publicly displays all letters 
including late submissions. In such cases, the analyses include letters that were 
never considered by the IASB. 
The classification of respondents into interest groups relies on considerable 
judgement and verification against other sources of evidence. For example, some 
countries use their accountancy bodies as national standard-setters. It is possible 
that such respondents may be classified as accountancy bodies when they 
should have been classified as national standard-setters. 
5.5 Summary and conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the research methodology to be applied in the analysis 
of participation in the development of IFRS 9 and IFRS 13. Participation of 
affected parties is a condition to be met by a practical discourse capable of 
legitimating its outcomes.  
Descriptive statistics is used in chapter six to analyse the participation of 
constituents in IFRS standard-setting due process. The same research design 
has been applied by several other scholars in the past. Descriptive statistics is 
used in conjunction with five research questions that are answered during the 
analysis.  
The analysis of participation is limited to comment letters as they are publicly 
available. The limitation is that participation through other methods such as 
meetings with IASB board members, round tables, field visits and field tests is 
excluded from the analysis. It is also possible that some comment letters could be 
kept private at the request of the participants. Such letters would not be part of 
the analysis. Despite the limitations, analysis of comment letters is still a valid way 
of assessing participation in standard-setting due process. 
  
84 
 
6 ANALYSIS OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 
6.1 Introduction 
The literature review in chapter two highlighted the legitimacy challenges of the 
financial reporting “law” called IFRS. For this “law” to be legitimate, IFRS 
standard-setting due process should afford participation opportunities for affected 
parties. Chapter four assessed the extent to which the structures, procedures and 
resources of the IFRS standard-setting due process impact the legitimacy of 
IFRS.  
This chapter analyses the participation of affected parties during the development 
of IFRS 9 and IFRS 13. Chapter five discussed the research design and the 
methodology to be applied in analysing the participation of affected parties in 
IFRS standard-setting due process. This chapter applies the methodology to 
analyse the submission of comment letters to the IASB during the development of 
IFRS 9 and IFRS 13. 
6.2 Constituent participation in the development of IFRS 9 
The development of IFRS 9 is divided into three phases: classification and 
measurement, impairment and hedge accounting. Only the classification and 
measurement phase had been completed at the time of this study.  
The development of IFRS 9 also involved the amendment of the presentation and 
disclosure requirements of financial instruments in IAS 32 and IFRS 7 
respectively. Some of the consultation documents (CD) analysed in this study 
also resulted in the amendment of the two standards. 
6.2.1 Overall participation  
Ten CDs were published between March 2008 and August 2011. Two were 
discussion papers (CD1 and CD6), one was a request for information (CD3) and 
the other seven were exposure drafts. The seven exposure drafts dealt with 
accounting issues spread across all three phases of IFRS 9. A request for 
information is not a normal IFRS standard-setting due process document. The 
gathering of information is normally achieved by the publication of a discussion 
paper. 
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Three CDs (CD2, CD5 and CD8), all exposure drafts and covering all three 
phases, had responses exceeding 200 comment letters with CD8 recording the 
maximum response rate of 247 comment letters. The minimum response was 89 
comment letters received in respect of CD3, a request for information on the 
expected loss model. The mean response rate was 171 comment letters with a 
median of 165. Sixty per cent of the CDs had response rates below the mean of 
171. The response rates to all the ten CDs had a standard deviation of 53 
comment letters.  
Table 6.1 The number of comment letters submitted to the IASB during the 
development of IFRS 9 
CD 
code 
Publication 
date 
Comment letters Document title 
  Number % of 
total 
 
CD1 03/2008 165 10% 
DP 2008 Reducing complexity in 
reporting financial instruments 
CD2 07/2009 246 14% 
ED/2009/7 Financial Instruments: 
classification and measurement 
CD3 06/2009 89 5% 
RFI 2009 Request for information 
(expected loss model) Impairment 
of financial assets: expected cash 
flow approach 
CD4 11/2009 192 11% 
ED/2009/12 Financial instruments: 
amortised cost and impairment 
CD5 01/2011 215 13% 
Supplement to ED/2009/12 
Financial instruments: amortised 
cost and impairment 
CD6 06/2009 123 7% 
DP/2009/2 Credit risk in liability 
measurement 
CD7 05/2010 138 8% 
ED/2010/4 Fair value option for 
financial liabilities 
CD8 12/2010 247 14% ED/2010/13 Hedge accounting 
CD9 01/2011 165 10% 
ED/2011/1 Offsetting financial 
assets and financial liabilities 
CD10 08/2011 131 8% 
ED/2011/3 Mandatory effective 
date of IFRS 9 
  
1 711 
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The IASB received 1 711 comment letters from 570 participants representing an 
average of three letters per participant. This implies that on average, participants 
submitted comment letters to only three of the ten CDs published during the 
development of IFRS 9. Figure 6.1 shows the number of participants and the 
number of comment letters per participant. 
Figure 6.1 The number of comment letters per participant 
 
There were 32 participants (6%) that submitted ten or more comment letters. A 
total of 129 participants (23%) submitted at least five comment letters each. There 
were 157 participants (22%) that submitted between two and four comment letters 
each while 284 participants (50%) only submitted one comment letter. About half 
(286) of the participants submitted 83% (1 426) of the comment letters. 
The 32 participants that submitted ten or more comment letters are listed in table 
6.2 below. They were mainly national standard-setters (32%) and financial 
institutions (29%).  
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Table 6.2 Participants that submitted ten or more comment letters 
 
Almost two-thirds (65%) of the 32 participants were from Europe followed by the 
Asia/Oceania region (19%), North America (13%) and Africa (3%). There were no 
participants from South America that submitted ten or more comment letters. The 
South African Institute of Chartered Accountants (SAICA) was the only participant 
to submit 12 comment letters. The European Insurance CFO Forum, the Institute 
of International Finance, the joint French business associations 
South African Institute of Chartered 
Accountants
South Africa Africa National standard-setter 12
Accounting Standards Board United Kingdom Europe National standard-setter 11
ACTEO, AFEP, MEDEF France Europe Association 11
Australian Accounting Standards Board Australia Asia/Oceania National standard-setter 11
European Insurance CFO Forum Europe Europe Association 11
Institute of International Finance United States North America Financial Institution 11
AFRAC Austria Europe National standard-setter 10
British Bankers' Association United Kingdom Europe Financial Institution 10
BUSINESSEUROPE Belgium Europe Association 10
Canadian Accounting Standards Board Canada North America National standard-setter 10
Canadian Bankers Association Canada North America Financial Institution 10
CFA Institute United States North America Association 10
Dutch Accounting Standards Board Netherlands Europe National standard-setter 10
EFRAG Belgium Europe National standard-setter 10
Ernst & Young United Kingdom Europe Accountancy 10
European Banking Federation Belgium Europe Financial Institution 10
F.Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd Switzerland Europe Corporate 10
FEE Belgium Europe Accountancy 10
French Banking Federation France Europe Financial Institution 10
German Accounting Standards Committee Germany Europe National standard-setter 10
Hong Kong Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants
Hong Kong Asia/Oceania Accountancy 10
HSBC Holdings PLC United Kingdom Europe Financial Institution 10
Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
England & Wales
United Kingdom Europe Accountancy 10
Japanese Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants
Japan Asia/Oceania Accountancy 10
KPMG United Kingdom Europe Accountancy 10
Malaysian Accounting Standards Board Malaysia Asia/Oceania National standard-setter 10
Mazars France Europe Accountancy 10
National Australia Bank Australia Asia/Oceania Financial Institution 10
PricewaterhouseCoopers United Kingdom Europe Accountancy 10
Singapore Accounting Standards Council Singapore Asia/Oceania National standard-setter 10
SwissHoldings Switzerland Europe Association 10
UBS Switzerland Europe Financial Institution 10
Total 327
Comment 
letters
Participant Country IASB region Interest group
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(ACTEO/AFEP/MEDEF) and the national standard-setters of Australia and the UK 
were the only participants to submit 11 comment letters each. 
6.2.2 Participation by interest groups 
The classification of participants into interest groups was explained in chapter 
five. The identified interest groups are financial institutions, national standard-
setters, corporates, associations, academia, accountancy bodies, regulators and 
individuals. Figure 6.2 shows the breakdown of the 570 participants that 
submitted comment letters during the development of IFRS 9 by interest group. 
Figure 6.2 The breakdown of participants by interest groups 
 
Table 6.3 shows the number of comment letters submitted by each interest group 
per CD. The mean, median and standard deviation of comment letters submitted 
by each interest group is also shown.  
38%
6%
17%
11%
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Table 6.3 The number of comment letters per CD submitted by each interest 
group 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3 shows the average number of comment letters per participant by 
interest group. The participation of each interest group, as depicted in figures 6.2 
and 6.3, and table 6.3, is discussed in the subsections below. 
Figure 6.3 The average number of comment letters per participant by 
interest group 
 
6.2.2.1 Financial institutions 
Financial institutions were the most active interest group during the development 
of IFRS 9. They submitted 657 comment letters (38%) out of the 1 711 letters 
received by the IASB. The maximum number of comment letters per CD 
CD1 CD2 CD3 CD4 CD5 CD6 CD7 CD8 CD9 CD10 Total % of 
total
Mean Median Standard 
Deviation
Financial Institution 49 101 39 76 110 45 48 81 66 42 657 38% 66             58             25             
National standard-setter 18 23 16 26 22 17 22 24 23 27 218 13% 22             23             4               
Corporate 25 19 5 17 11 8 6 58 15 14 178 10% 18             15             15             
Association 27 36 9 25 21 19 13 32 20 16 218 13% 22             21             8               
Academia 3 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 7 0% 1               1               1               
Accountancy 27 25 12 34 28 19 25 31 26 20 247 14% 25             26             6               
Individual 5 22 3 2 7 6 7 12 5 4 73 4% 7               6               6               
Regulator 11 19 5 12 15 9 17 8 10 7 113 7% 11             11             4               
Total 165 246 89 192 215 123 138 247 165 131 1711
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submitted by financial institutions was 110 (CD5) while the minimum was 39 
(CD3). Comment letters from financial institutions constituted at least 30% of all 
comment letters submitted per every CD. The mean number of comment letters 
per CD was 66, with a median of 58 and a standard deviation of 25.  
The 657 comment letters were submitted by 218 participants from across the 
world representing 38% of all participants. The top participants were mostly 
financial industry associations from Europe and North America. The average 
number of comment letters per participant was three which was less than the 
average achieved by national standard-setters and the accountancy profession. 
6.2.2.2  Accountancy bodies 
The accountancy profession was the second highest contributing interest group 
with 247 comment letters from 60 participants. Over half (57%) of the comment 
letters came from Europe, 21% from Asia/Oceania, 19% from North America and 
1% from Africa. There were no participants from South America. The maximum 
number of comment letters submitted per CD was 34 with a minimum of 12. This 
resulted in a mean of 25 comment letters with a standard deviation of 6. The 
average number of comment letters per participant was four, the second highest 
amongst all interest groups.  
6.2.2.3  National standard-setters 
National standard-setters were tied with associations as the third most active 
interest group contributing 218 (13%) of the total comment letters. The maximum 
number of comment letters submitted in response to any CD was 27 with the 
minimum being 17. The mean was 22, a median of 23 and a standard deviation of 
4. Unlike financial institutions, the participation of national standard-setters 
remained fairly stable throughout the ten CDs. The average number of comment 
letters per participant of seven was the highest of any interest group. 
National standard-setters from all IASB regions participated in the development of 
IFRS 9 with three from Africa, 11 from Asia/Oceania, 13 from Europe, 2 from 
North America and 3 from South America. All the national standard-setters with 
formal liaison relationships with the IASB (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, 
Japan, New Zealand, UK and EFRAG) submitted comment letters. The US did 
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not submit comment letters as IFRS 9 is a joint project between the IASB and the 
FASB. 
The two regional standard-setters of Asia/Oceania and South America, AOSSG 
and GLASS respectively, submitted comment letters. AOSSG submitted six 
comment letters while GLASS submitted one. PAFA, the newly established 
African regional standard-settter, did not submit any comment letter. 
6.2.2.4  Associations 
Associations submitted 218 comment letters making them the joint third most 
active interest group. The comment letters came from 63 associations located in 
Asia/Oceania (11), Europe (33) and North America (19) resulting in an average of 
three comment letters per participant. The other two regions, Africa and South 
America, did not have any associations submitting comment letters. Associations 
representing the financial industry were classified as financial institutions for the 
purpose of this study. The mean comment letters were 22 with a standard 
deviation of eight. 
6.2.2.5  Regulators 
A total of 42 regulators submitted 113 comment letters as shown in table 6.4 
below. The mean and median number of comment letters submitted for each CD 
was 11 with a standard deviation of 4. The maximum number of comment letters 
submitted per CD was 19 with the minimum being 5. The average number of 
comment letters per participant was three as shown in figure 6.3.  
The Asia/Oceania region accounted for about a third of both comment letters 
submitted and participants. Regulators from Europe submitted 27% of the 
comment letters while their counterparts in North America accounted for 18%. 
There were no submissions from regulators in Africa or South America. 
The BCBS and IOSCO are two of the four regulators classified as international. 
Both organisations submitted nine comment letters each to the IASB during the 
development of IFRS 9. The participation of regulators, just like that of national 
standard-setters, is important as they have the authority to sanction the use of 
IFRS within their jurisdictions. 
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Table 6.4 Submission of comment letters by regulators 
 
6.2.2.6  Corporates 
Corporates were the fifth most active interest group with 95 of them submitting 
178 comment letters, an average of 2 comment letters per participant. The 
maximum number of comment letters submitted for each CD was 58 with a 
minimum of 5. The inconsistent participation resulted in a mean of 18 being 
almost equal to the standard deviation of 15. 
Only one corporate, as shown in table 6.2, submitted ten or more comment 
letters. Of the 95 corporates that submitted comment letters, only six (6%) 
submitted at least five letters. Over half (53%) of the comment letters came from 
corporates in Europe, 24% from North America, 19% from Asia/Oceania and 4% 
from Africa. Corporates also participated through their industry or national 
associations.  
6.2.2.7  Academia 
The participation of the academia was very low with only seven comment letters. 
There were no comment letters submitted by academia for five of the ten CDs 
published during the development of IFRS 9. The maximum number of comment 
letters submitted in response to the publication of any CD was three. The seven 
comment letters were submitted by the Universidade de São Paulo (1), Turku 
School of Economics (1), Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (1) and Universidad 
de Chile (4).  
6.2.2.8  Individuals 
A total of 56 individuals submitted 73 comment letters with an average of 1 
comment letter per participant as shown in table 6.5 below. The individuals were 
Comment 
letters
% of Total Participants % of Total Average 
Comment 
letters
Africa 0 0% 0 0% -                  
Asia/Oceania 37 33% 15 36% 2                      
Europe 30 27% 13 31% 2                      
North America 20 18% 10 24% 2                      
South America 0 0% 0 0% -                  
International 26 23% 4 10% 7                      
Total 113 42
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mainly from Asia/Oceania (12), Europe (11) and North America (19). Africa and 
South America had one participant each. Twelve individuals, classified as 
international, could not be allocated to regions because of a lack of addresses. 
Table 6.5 Submission of comment letters by individuals 
 IASB region Comment 
letters 
% of 
total 
Participants % of 
total 
Average 
comment 
letters 
Africa 1 1% 1 2% 1                      
1  Asia/Oceania 16 22% 12 21%                     
1  Europe 18 25% 11 20% 2                     
2  North America 19 26% 19 34% 1                     
1  South America 2 3% 1 2% 2                     
2  International 17 23% 12 21% 1                     
1  Total 73   56    
 
6.2.3 Participation by IASB regions 
The IASB has five regions: Africa, Asia/Oceania, Europe, North America and 
South America. Almost half (49%) of the 1 711 comment letters submitted during 
the development of IFRS 9 came from Europe. North America was the second 
largest contributor of comment letters (23%) followed closely by Asia/Oceania at 
21%. The Africa region contributed 37 comment letters (2%) while South America 
submitted 21 comment letters (1%). Participants not affiliated with any of the five 
IASB regions, classified as international, submitted 62 comment letters (4%). The 
BCBS, IOSCO and the World Bank were classified as international and each of 
them submitted nine comment letters. 
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Figure 6.4 Percentage of comment letters received from IASB regions 
 
Comment letters were received from 48 countries across all the IASB regions as 
shown in table 6.6 below. All countries with seats on IFRS governance structures 
had participants that submitted comment letters. Seventeen (85%) of the G-20 
countries submitted comment letters except for Argentina, Indonesia and Saudi 
Arabia. All countries that contributed to the funding of IFRS standard-setting 
activities in 2011 submitted comment letters except for Bulgaria, Cyprus, 
Kazakhstan and Nigeria. The funding from these four countries accounted for less 
than 1% of 2011 total contributions. 
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Table 6.6 The details of countries that submitted comment letters 
 
Of the over 145 countries that permit or require the use of IFRS as shown in 
annexure A, only 42 (29%) countries submitted comment letters. The 42 countries 
that submitted comment letters account for 78%, 92% and 97% of the population, 
GDP and market capitalisation of the countries that require or permit the use of 
IFRS. There were five countries (Iran, Pakistan, Rwanda, Thailand and Tunisia) 
Country IASB region IFRS 
governance 
seats
G-20 Funding   
(US$)
Use of 
IFRS
GDP  
(US$bn)
Market 
capitalisation 
(US$bn)
Population  
(Millions)
IFRS 9 
comment 
letters
Botswana Africa -                  -            -                1               14             4                      2                  1               
Kenya Africa -                  -            -                1               29             12                   39                1               
Rwanda Africa -                  -            -                -            -            -                  -               1               
South Africa Africa 2                     1               -                1               313           769                 49                25             
Tanzania Africa -                  -            -                1               20             1                      43                1               
Tunisia Africa -                  -            -                -            -            -                  -               2               
Zambia Africa -                  -            -                1               14             3                      13                6               
2                     1               -                5               390           790                 146              37             
Australia Asia/Oceania 1                     1               1,020,632    1               1,016       1,164              22                121           
China Asia/Oceania 3                     1               1,302,746    1               4,825       4,101              1,328          22             
Hong Kong Asia/Oceania 1                     -            193,352       1               215           1,045              7                  22             
India Asia/Oceania 2                     1               414,230       1               1,384       1,182              1,199          40             
Iran Asia/Oceania -                  -            -                -            -            -                  -               1               
Israel Asia/Oceania -                  -            -                1               195           182                 7                  8               
Japan Asia/Oceania 6                     1               2,764,111    1               4,992       3,903              128              74             
Malaysia Asia/Oceania 1                     -            64,661         1               213           302                 28                11             
New Zealand Asia/Oceania 2                     -            158,678       1               129           49                   4                  19             
Pakistan Asia/Oceania -                  -            -                -            -            -                  -               7               
Russia Asia/Oceania -                  1               -                1               1,420       937                 142              4               
Singapore Asia/Oceania -                  -            95,778         1               184           300                 5                  20             
South Korea Asia/Oceania 2                     1               705,391       1               983           896                 49                14             
Thailand Asia/Oceania -                  -            -                -            -            -                  -               2               
Turkey Asia/Oceania -                  1               -                1               671           217                 71                1               
United Arab Emirates Asia/Oceania -                  -            -                1               287           128                 6                  2               
18                   7               6,719,580    13             16,514     14,404            2,996          368           
Austria Europe -                  -            -                1               382           116                 8                  17             
Belgium Europe -                  -            -                1               470           285                 11                96             
Czech Republic Europe -                  -            -                1               194           51                   10                1               
Denmark Europe -                  -            -                1               314           206                 6                  13             
EU Europe -                  1               5,947,443    -            -            -                  -               12             
Finland Europe -                  -            -                1               245           190                 5                  1               
France Europe 5                     1               1,377,609    1               2,602       2,027              65                102           
Germany Europe 4                     1               1,536,466    1               3,330       1,461              82                103           
Ireland Europe -                  -            10,037         1               232           76                   4                  16             
Italy Europe 2                     1               1,066,865    1               2,110       615                 60                15             
Luxembourg Europe -                  -            -                1               53             98                   0                  9               
Malta Europe -                  -            -                1               8               4                      0                  1               
Netherlands Europe 2                     -            564,109       1               789           654                 17                22             
Norway Europe -                  -            -                1               411           244                 5                  9               
Portugal Europe -                  -            24,209         1               231           91                   11                1               
Slovakia Europe -                  -            -                1               87             5                      5                  2               
Spain Europe 2                     -            562,030       1               1,433       1,262              45                41             
Sweden Europe 1                     -            -                1               459           487                 9                  37             
Switzerland Europe -                  -            315,039       1               498           1,097              8                  55             
United Kingdom Europe 4                     1               1,388,987    1               2,458       2,768              62                284           
20                   5               12,792,796 19             16,304     11,735            414              837           
International International -                  -            -                -            -            -                  -               62             
-                  -            -                -            -            -                  -               62             
Canada North America 2                     1               817,775       1               1,476       1,773              34                81             
Mexico North America -                  1               -                1               1,026       364                 111              11             
United States North America 12                   1               2,803,325    1               14,150     16,495            305              294           
14                   3               3,621,099    3               16,652     18,631            450              386           
Brazil South America 2                     1               369,545       1               1,725       1,102              192              16             
Chile South America -                  -            -                1               191           224                 17                5               
2                     1               369,545       2               1,916       1,326              209              21             
56                   17             23,503,020 42             51,776     46,885            4,215          1,711       Grand Total
Africa Total
Asia/Oceania Total
Europe Total
International Total
North America Total
South America Total
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that submitted comment letters but are not currently known to require or permit 
the use of IFRS.  
Figure 6.5 below shows the participation of different interest groups by region 
compared to the average of all regions. Each region is discussed separately in the 
subsections below. 
Figure 6.5 The participation of interest groups by IASB region 
 
6.2.3.1  Africa 
The African participants were drawn from Botswana, Kenya, Rwanda, South 
Africa and Zambia. The participant from Tunisia was the AfDB which is a 
continent-wide financial institution. Two-thirds of the comment letters came from 
South Africa, the only African country to submit comment letters (25) for all CDs. 
Zambia was the second highest source of comment letters (6), followed by 
Tunisia (2) with each of all the other African countries submitting one comment 
letter. 
More than half (51%) of the comment letters from Africa came from national 
standard-setters which contrasts with a global average of 13% for the same 
interest group. SAICA submitted comment letters in its capacity as the secretariat 
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of the national standard-setter, the Accounting Practices Board. All its comment 
letters are attributed to a national standard-setter. The Financial Reporting 
Standards Council was recently constituted as the standard-setter following the 
promulgation of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. Financial institutions accounted 
for 19% of all comment letters which is half the 38% participation rate achieved 
globally.  
6.2.3.2  Asia/Oceania 
The Asia/Oceania region submitted 368 comment letters with a third (121) of the 
letters coming from Australia. Japan (74), India (40), China (22) and Hong Kong 
(22) were some of the top participating countries. Sixteen countries from the 
Asia/Oceania region submitted comment letters. 
The participation level of financial institutions (31%) was close to the global 
average of 38%. Like Africa, the participation of national standard-setters (20%) 
was above the global average of 13%. The third most active interest group in the 
Asia/Oceania region was the accountancy profession which accounted for 14% of 
all comment letters submitted. 
6.2.3.3  Europe 
The European region dominated participation by accounting for 49% of all 
comment letters. The 837 comment letters from Europe were submitted by 19 
countries. The participation level of financial institutions (39%) was almost equal 
to the global average of 38%. The participation levels of the other interest groups 
were as follows: national standard-setters (12%), corporates (11%), associations 
(15%) and the accountancy profession (17%). 
A third (284) of the comment letters came from the UK, followed by Germany 
(103) and France (102). The UK was the second highest source of comment 
letters globally. The Czech Republic, Finland, Malta and Portugal only submitted 
one comment letter each. 
6.2.3.4  North America 
The North American region was the second highest contributing region with 386 
comment letters. The letters came from three countries: Canada (81), Mexico (11) 
and the US (294). The US was the largest source of comment letters globally.  
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The US is home to the FASB, the IASB‟s partner during the development of IFRS 
9. The two documents issued by the FASB on behalf of the IASB, CD5 and CD9, 
attracted the highest responses from North America of 88 and 64 comment letters 
respectively. The maximum number of comment letters received for documents 
issued directly by the IASB (except CD5 and CD9) was 50. Almost half (48%) of 
the participants from North America were financial institutions, followed by 
associations (14%), the accountancy profession (12%), corporates (11%) and 5% 
for each for national standard-setters, regulators and individuals. 
6.2.3.5  South America 
Only Brazil (16) and Chile (5) submitted comment letters. Like Africa, national 
standard-setters were the most active interest group with 33% of the comment 
letters followed by financial institutions (29%) and the academia (24%). The 
participation of the academia was the highest across all regions. The next section 
analyses the participation of constituents in the development of IFRS 13. 
6.3 Constituent participation in the development of IFRS 13 
IFRS 13 was published in May 2011 but its development formally started in 
November 2006 with the publication of a discussion paper (CD11). The project 
became the focus of attention following the fair value debate that questioned the 
role of accounting standards in causing or exacerbating the global financial crisis. 
The IASB prioritised the development of fair value measurement guidance as part 
of its response to the crisis.  
Two exposure drafts (CD12 and CD13) were published in 2009 and 2010 
respectively. CD12 was the main document that outlined the technical proposals 
related to fair value measurement for all valuations required in IFRS. CD13 was 
issued to deal with the disclosure of measurement uncertainty analysis in cases 
where fair values were based on unobservable inputs.  
6.3.1 Overall participation  
The response to the publication of the three CDs was 387 comment letters from 
240 participants across the world. The main exposure draft, CD12, attracted the 
highest number of comment letters (160). The discussion paper (CD11) had the 
second highest comment letters (136) with the second exposure draft, CD13, 
attracting the least number (91) of responses. 
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Table 6.7 The breakdown of comment letters submitted during the 
development of IFRS 13 
CD 
code 
Publication 
date 
Comment 
letters 
Document title 
    Number % of 
total 
  
CD11 11/2006 136 35% 
Discussion paper: Fair value 
measurements 
CD12 05/2009 160 41% ED/2009/5 Fair value measurement 
CD13 06/2010 91 24% 
ED/2010/7 Measurement uncertainty 
analysis: Disclosure for fair value 
measurement 
    387     
 
Figure 6.6 shows the number of constituents that participated in the development 
of IFRS 13 and their participation levels. Of the 240 participants, only 47 
participants (20%) submitted comment letters in response to all three CDs. A 
further 53 participants (22%) submitted comment letters to two of the three CDs. 
The majority of participants, 140 (58%), only submitted one comment letter. Of the 
140 participants that submitted one comment letter, 63 (45%) only commented on 
the main exposure draft (CD12), 56 (40%) commented on the discussion paper 
(CD11) and the remaining 21 (15%) only commented on the second exposure 
draft (CD13). 
Figure 6.6 The number of comment letters submitted by each participant 
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6.3.2 Participation by interest groups 
Table 6.8 shows the number of comment letters submitted by each interest group 
in response to the three CDs published during the development of IFRS 13. It also 
shows the number of participants per interest group and the average number of 
comment letters per participant. The details in table 6.8 are discussed in the 
subsections below. 
Table 6.8 The number of comment letters submitted by interest groups per 
IFRS 13 CD 
 
6.3.2.1  Financial institutions 
Financial institutions were the most active interest group with 102 (26%) comment 
letters out of the 387 submitted to the IASB. The mean comment letters per CD 
was 34, with a median of 36 and a standard deviation of 7. The maximum number 
of comment letters submitted was 40 with the minimum being the 26 comment 
letters. Sixty-four financial institutions submitted an average of two comment 
letters each. 
6.3.2.2  Accountancy bodies 
The accountancy profession was the second most active interest group with 70 
(18%) comment letters. The maximum number of comment letters was 29 (for 
CD12) and the minimum was 18 (for CD13). The mean and median was 23 
comment letters with a standard deviation of 6. The comment letters were 
submitted by 37 participants resulting in an average of 2 comment letters per 
participant. 
6.3.2.3  National standard-setters 
The third most active interest group was national standard-setters with 58 (15%) 
of all the comment letters. National standard-setters were the only interest group 
CD11 CD12 CD13 Total % of total Mean Median Standard 
Deviation
Number  % of total Average 
comment 
letters 
Financial Institution 36 40 26 102 26% 34            36            7              64 27% 2                     
National standard-setter 18 21 19 58 15% 19            19            2              25 10% 2                     
Corporate 16 17 8 41 11% 14            16            5              32 13% 1                     
Association 19 27 8 54 14% 18            19            10            37 15% 1                     
Academia 6 5 1 12 3% 4              5              3              10 4% 1                     
Accountancy 23 29 18 70 18% 23            23            6              37 15% 2                     
Individual 6 8 3 17 4% 6              6              3              16 7% 1                     
Regulator 12 13 8 33 9% 11            12            3              19 8% 2                     
Total 136 160 91 387 129          136          35            240 2                     
NUMBER OF COMMENT LETTERSINTEREST GROUP  PARTICIPANTS
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not to have less CD13 comment letters than CD11 and CD12 comment letters. 
The maximum of 21 comment letters per CD was close to the minimum of 18 
resulting in a low standard deviation of 2. The 58 comment letters were submitted 
by 25 participants contributing an average of 2 comment letters per participant. 
6.3.2.4  Associations 
Associations submitted 54 (14%) comment letters to rank as the fourth most 
active interest group. They had the highest standard deviation of 10 because of a 
huge gap between their maximum of 27 comment letters and a minimum of 8. The 
letters came from 37 participants resulting in an average of 1 comment letter per 
participant. 
6.3.2.5  Corporates 
Thirty two corporates submitted 41 (11%) comment letters with a maximum of 17 
comment letters and a minimum of eight letters per CD.  The mean was 14 
comment letters with a standard deviation of 5. The average was one comment 
letter per participant. 
 
6.3.2.6  Others 
The remaining comment letters came from regulators (9%), individuals (4%) and 
academia (3%). Ten academic institutions, including the Universidad de Chile, 
submitted comment letters. 
6.3.3 Participation by IASB regions 
Just like the development of IFRS 9, the majority (56%) of comment letters 
submitted during the development of IFRS 13 came from Europe. The 
Asia/Oceania region submitted 22% of the 387 comment letters followed by North 
America with 14%. Africa and South America contributed 2% each while the 
remaining 4% came from participants classified as international. There were ten 
participants classified as international: four were individuals whose addresses 
were not known; one was a joint response from the American, European and 
Japanese insurers; and the remaining five were participants with a global 
mandate or membership such as The World Bank as shown in figure 6.7 below. 
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Figure 6.7 The percentage of comment letters received from each IASB 
region 
 
Comment letters were submitted by participants in 38 countries across all the 
IASB regions as shown in the table below. With the exception of Spain, all 
countries with seats on IFRS governance structures had participants that 
submitted comment letters. Just like IFRS 9, comment letters came from 
seventeen (85%) of the G-20 countries except for Indonesia, Saudi Arabia and 
Turkey. All countries that contributed to the funding of IFRS standard-setting 
activities in 2011 submitted comment letters except for Bulgaria, Cyprus, 
Kazakhstan, Nigeria and Spain.  
Of the over 145 countries that permit or require the use of IFRS as shown in 
annexure A, only 35 (24%) countries submitted comment letters. The 35 countries 
account for 75%, 87% and 93% of the population, GDP and market capitalisation 
of the countries that require or permit the use of IFRS. Participants from 
Colombia, Pakistan and Thailand submitted comment letters but these countries 
are not currently known to require or permit the use of IFRS.  
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Table 6.9 The list of countries with constituents that submitted comment 
letters during the development of IFRS 13 
 
The participants from the different regions differed in terms of the proportion of the 
various interest groups. Figure 6.8 shows the composition of each interest group 
in terms of comment letters submitted. The data in table 6.9 and figure 6.8 is 
discussed in the subsections below. 
Country IASB region IFRS 
governance 
seats
G-20 Funding   
(US$)
Use of 
IFRS
GDP  
(US$bn)
Market 
capitalisation 
(US$bn)
Population  
(Millions)
IFRS 13 
comment 
letters
South Africa Africa 2                   1               -                1               313           769                  49               8
Zambia Africa -                -            -                1               14             3                      13               1
2                   1               -                2               327           772                  62               9
Australia Asia/Oceania 1                   1               1,020,632    1               1,016       1,164              22               30
China Asia/Oceania 3                   1               1,302,746    1               4,825       4,101              1,328          7
Hong Kong Asia/Oceania 1                   -            193,352       1               215           1,045              7                 4
India Asia/Oceania 2                   1               414,230       1               1,384       1,182              1,199          7
Japan Asia/Oceania 6                   1               2,764,111    1               4,992       3,903              128             12
Malaysia Asia/Oceania 1                   -            64,661         1               213           302                  28               3
New Zealand Asia/Oceania 2                   -            158,678       1               129           49                    4                 6
Pakistan Asia/Oceania -                -            -                -            -            -                   -              2
Russia Asia/Oceania -                1               -                1               1,420       937                  142             1
Singapore Asia/Oceania -                -            95,778         1               184           300                  5                 5
South Korea Asia/Oceania 2                   1               705,391       1               983           896                  49               4
Thailand Asia/Oceania -                -            -                -            -            -                   -              1
United Arab Emirates Asia/Oceania -                -            -                1               287           128                  6                 1
18                 6               6,719,580    11             15,648     14,005            2,917          83
Austria Europe -                -            -                1               382           116                  8                 7
Belgium Europe -                -            -                1               470           285                  11               23
Denmark Europe -                -            -                1               314           206                  6                 1
Europe Europe -                1               5,947,443    -            -            -                   -              1
Finland Europe -                -            -                1               245           190                  5                 2
France Europe 5                   1               1,377,609    1               2,602       2,027              65               24
Germany Europe 4                   1               1,536,466    1               3,330       1,461              82               22
Ireland Europe -                -            10,037         1               232           76                    4                 7
Italy Europe 2                   1               1,066,865    1               2,110       615                  60               6
Luxembourg Europe -                -            -                1               53             98                    0                 1
Malta Europe -                -            -                1               8               4                      0                 1
Netherlands Europe 2                   -            564,109       1               789           654                  17               4
Norway Europe -                -            -                1               411           244                  5                 3
Romania Europe -                -            -                1               166           30                    21               1
Sweden Europe 1                   -            -                1               459           487                  9                 11
Switzerland Europe -                -            315,039       1               498           1,097              8                 17
United Kingdom Europe 4                   1               1,388,987    1               2,458       2,768              62               86
18                 5               12,206,556 16             14,525     10,357            363             217
International International -                -            -                -            -            -                   -              16
-                -            -                -            -            -                   -              16
Canada North America 2                   1               817,775       1               1,476       1,773              34               22
Mexico North America -                1               -                1               1,026       364                  111             3
United States North America 12                 1               2,803,325    1               14,150     16,495            305             30
14                 3               3,621,099    3               16,652     18,631            450             55
Argentina South America -                1               -                1               321           63                    40               1
Brazil South America 2                   1               369,545       1               1,725       1,102              192             2
Chile South America -                -            -                1               191           224                  17               2
Colombia South America -                -            -                -            -            -                   -              2
2                   2               369,545       3               2,236       1,388              249             7
54                 17             22,916,781 35             49,388     45,153            4,041          387Grand Total
Africa Total
Asia/Oceania Total
Europe Total
International Total
North America Total
South America Total
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Figure 6.8 Proportion of comment letters submitted by each interest group 
per IASB region 
 
6.3.3.1  Africa 
The nine comment letters from Africa were submitted by national standard-setters 
(44%), corporates (33%) and financial institutions (22%). The other interest 
groups did not submit any comment letters. Only participants from South Africa 
(86%) and Zambia (14%) submitted comment letters. 
6.3.3.2  Asia/Oceania 
Comment letters from Asia/Oceania came from national standard-setters (23%), 
the accountancy profession (19%), financial institutions (16%), regulators (14%), 
associations (11%), corporate (10%) and other interest groups (7%). Fifty-five 
participants from 13 countries submitted the 83 comment letters. Just like IFRS 9, 
Australia accounted for over a third (36%) of all comment letters from 
Asia/Oceania. 
6.3.3.3  Europe 
Almost a third (30%) of the 217 comment letters from Europe were submitted by 
financial institutions. The other interest groups contributed as follows: the 
accountancy profession (22%), associations (16%), national standard-setters 
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(13%), corporates (11%) and other interest groups (9%). The comment letters 
were submitted by participants in 18 countries. The comment letters from the UK 
(86) surpassed the total for the Asia/Oceania region and exceeded all other 
regions. The second highest number of comment letters from an individual 
country was 30, almost a third of the UK total. 
6.3.3.4  North America 
North America was the region with the highest proportion of financial institutions 
(35%) amongst its participants. The second most active interest group was 
associations (18%) followed by corporates (13%) and the accountancy profession 
(11%). The comment letters came from participants in Canada (22), Mexico (3) 
and the US (30). 
6.3.3.5  South America 
South America is the only IASB region where individuals were the dominant 
interest group with 43% of the comment letters. The three letters were submitted 
by three individuals in Argentina (1) and Colombia (2). National standard-setters 
(29%) and the academia (29%) were tied in second spot with two comment letters 
each. The comment letters were submitted by participants in four countries. 
6.4 IFRS 9 and IFRS 13 participation 
The development of IFRS 9 and IFRS 13 generated a combined 2 098 comment 
letters in response to 13 CDs. Table 6.10 compares the participation indicators for 
both projects. The indicators show that the development of IFRS 9 attracted more 
interest than that of IFRS 13.   
Table 6.10 A comparison of IFRS 9 and IFRS 13 participation indicators 
Participation Indicator IFRS 9 IFRS 13 
The average comment letters per CD 171 129 
The average number of participants per CD 170 129 
The number of countries that participated 48 39 
The participation of countries using IFRS     
·  Countries represented 41 34 
·  % of G-20 countries represented 85% 85% 
·  % of IFRS seats 100% 96% 
·  % of funding 99% 98% 
·  % of GDP represented  91% 87% 
·  % of market capitalization represented 96% 93% 
·  % of population represented 78% 74% 
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The average number of comment letters for IFRS 9 was 171 compared to 129 for 
IFRS 13. The differences in the averages is partly because six of the ten CDs 
published during the development of IFRS 9 had response rates above the 
maximum of 160 comment letters per CD achieved for IFRS 13. The average 
number of participants was almost identical to that of the comment letters. IFRS 9 
attracted responses from 48 countries compared to 39 for IFRS 13. The 
participation of countries using IFRS was higher in IFRS 9 (48) than IFRS 13 (39). 
The other participation performance indicators were consistently higher in IFRS 9 
than IFRS 13.  
This study does not investigate the reasons behind the differences in participation 
indicators between the two standards. It is possible that constituents perceived 
IFRS 9 to have more potential impact on their cash flows than IFRS 13. Watts and 
Zimmerman (1978) argue that firms will participate as long as they perceive 
proposed accounting standards to have potential impact on cash flows. 
6.4.1 The top participants 
The development of IFRS 9 attracted 570 participants while that of IFRS 13 
attracted 240 participants. Of the 240 participants that submitted comment letters 
during the development of IFRS 13, 174 (73%) also submitted comment letters 
during the development of IFRS 9.  
There were 33 participants, as shown in table 6.11 that submitted at least nine 
and three comment letters during the development of IFRS 9 and IFRS 13 
respectively. Although ten CDs were published during the development of IFRS 9, 
one document was a request for information which is not a normal IASB due 
process document. The top 33 participants constituted 6% of participants and 
19% of comment letters for IFRS 9. For IFRS 13, they constituted 14% of 
participants and 26% of comment letters. 
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Table 6.11 The list of participants that submitted commented on all three 
IFRS 13 CDs and at least nine IFRS 9 CDs. 
 
A further analysis of the top 33 participants, as per table 6.12 below, shows that 
the dominant interest group was the accountancy profession which accounted for 
over a third (36%) of both the number of participants and comment letters. The 
second and third most active interest groups were the national standard-setters 
(29% of comment letters and 27% of participants) and financial institutions (24% 
of comment letters and participants) respectively. Associations and regulators 
were tied at 6% of both comment letters and participants. Corporates, academia 
and individuals did not feature in the top 33. 
Except for New Zealand and the US, every other country with a national standard-
setter with a formal liaison relationship with the IASB had a participant in the top 
33. The absence of the US from the list of the top participants is deceiving as both 
Participant Country Type IFRS 13 
comment 
letters
IFRS 9 
comment 
letters
Total 
comment 
letters
South African Institute of Chartered Accountants South Africa National standard-setter 3 12 15
3 12 15
Australian Accounting Standards Board Australia National standard-setter 3 11 14
Hong Kong Institute of Certified Public Accountants Hong Kong Accountancy 3 10 13
Japanese Institute of Certified Public Accountants Japan Accountancy 3 10 13
Malaysian Accounting Standards Board Malaysia National standard-setter 3 10 13
Singapore Accounting Standards Council Singapore National standard-setter 3 10 13
Australian Heads of Treasuries Accounting and 
Reporting Advisory Committee Australia Association 3 9 12
Group of 100 Australia Association 3 9 12
Life Insurance Association of Japan Japan Financial Institution 3 9 12
24 78 102
AFRAC Austria National standard-setter 3 10 13
Dutch Accounting Standards Board Netherlands National standard-setter 3 10 13
EFRAG Belgium National standard-setter 3 10 13
Ernst & Young United Kingdom Accountancy 3 10 13
FEE Belgium Accountancy 3 10 13
French Banking Federation France Financial Institution 3 10 13
German Accounting Standards Committee Germany National standard-setter 3 10 13
HSBC Holdings PLC United Kingdom Financial Institution 3 10 13
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England & Wales United Kingdom Accountancy 3 10 13
KPMG United Kingdom Accountancy 3 10 13
Mazars France Accountancy 3 10 13
PricewaterhouseCoopers United Kingdom Accountancy 3 10 13
UBS Switzerland Financial Institution 3 10 13
BNP Paribas France Financial Institution 3 9 12
Chartered Accountants Ireland Ireland Accountancy 3 9 12
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu United Kingdom Accountancy 3 9 12
Deutsche Bank Germany Financial Institution 3 9 12
FAR SRS Sweden Accountancy 3 9 12
Grant Thornton International United Kingdom Accountancy 3 9 12
Morgan Stanley United Kingdom Financial Institution 3 9 12
60 193 253
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision International Regulator 3 9 12
IOSCO International Regulator 3 9 12
6 18 24
Canadian Accounting Standards Board Canada National standard-setter 3 10 13
Canadian Bankers Association Canada Financial Institution 3 10 13
6 20 26
99 321 420
North America Total
Grand Total
Africa Total
Asia/Oceania Total
Europe Total
International Total
108 
 
standards were joint projects between the IASB and the US national standard-
setter, the FASB. Four national standard-setters with formal liaison relationships 
(Australia, Canada, EFRAG and Germany) were part of the top 33 participants. 
Table 6.12 The top 33 participants by interest group 
 
6.4.2  Participation by interest groups 
Figure 6.9 shows the participation of each interest group by geographical region. 
Financial institutions were the most active interest group in Asia/Oceania (28%), 
Europe (37%) and North America (46%) during the development of the two 
standards. In contrast, they were the third most active interest group in both Africa 
(20%) and South America (21%). National standard-setters were the most active 
interest group in Africa (50%) and South America (32%) but were second in 
Asia/Oceania (21%), fourth in Europe (12%) and joint fourth in North America 
(5%). The proportion of regulators was highest in Asia/Oceania (11%) with 
Europe (4%) and North America (5%) almost identical. There were no regulators 
from Africa and South America.  
Interest Group Average 
comment 
letters
Number % of total Number % of total
Financial Institution 100 24% 8 24% 13
National standard-setter 120 29% 9 27% 13
Corporate 0 0% 0 0% 0
Association 24 6% 2 6% 12
Academia 0 0% 0 0% 0
Accountancy 152 36% 12 36% 13
Individual 0 0% 0 0% 0
Regulator 24 6% 2 6% 12
Total 420 33
Comment letters Participants
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Figure 6.9 The proportion of IFRS 9 and IFRS 13 comment letters by interest 
per IASB region 
 
The accountancy profession was fairly active across all regions except South 
America which had none. All regions had corporate participants with close to a 
quarter (22%) of the African participants belonging to this interest group. 
Asia/Oceania (11%), Europe (15%) and North America (15%) had active 
participation from industry associations while Africa and South America had none. 
Participation through industry associations may be one way of reducing the cost 
of participation and overcoming capacity constraints. Corporates accounted for 
10% of comment letters followed by regulators at 8%. Individuals (4%) and 
academia (2%) were the least active interest groups. 
The differences in the participation of the various interest groups, especially 
regulators and national standard-setters, have legitimacy implications for IFRS. 
The membership of the Monitoring Board is limited to capital markets regulators 
on the basis that IFRS is intended to meet investors‟ information needs. The 
motivations for adopting IFRS, as outlined in chapter two, go beyond the 
accounting needs of listed entities. For South Africa, it is about broader policy 
reforms while for most developing countries it is because of a lack of resources to 
write their own accounting standards or pressure from the World Bank and the 
IMF. These reasons have nothing to do with capital markets hence participants 
from Africa and South America are dominated by national standard-setters with 
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no regulators submitting comment letters. Limiting the membership of the 
Monitoring Board to regulators of capital markets ignores the important 
considerations for adoption of IFRS by developing countries. 
6.4.3 Participation by IASB regions 
Table 6.13 compares the proportion of comment letters submitted from each IASB 
region with each region‟s proportion of a number of indicators. Only 2 020 
comment letters were analysed as there were 78 letters received from participants 
classified as international.  
The Africa region contributed 2% of all comment letters which was in line with its 
proportion of GDP and market capitalisation. Africa accounts for 17% of the 
number of countries using IFRS and 10% of their population. The comment letters 
came from seven (29%) out of a possible 24 countries. It is possible that the non-
participation of the other 17 countries may be due to a lack of technical and 
financial resources.  
Table 6.13 A comparison of some key participation indicators by region 
 
The Asia/Oceania region submitted 22% of the comment letters which is below its 
proportion of all other indicators. Its proportion of GDP and stock market 
capitalisation is 31%. The region is home to 63% of the population of countries 
using IFRS and 28% of the countries using IFRS. Asia/Oceania currently holds 
32% of IFRS governance seats which is in line with its share of most indicators 
except the population. 
The European region contributed 52% of comment letters yet its proportion of 
GDP and market capitalisation is 32% and 25% respectively. The disproportionate 
contribution of UK based participants (35%), where the IASB is located, skews the 
numbers. The European region accommodates 11% of the population of countries 
% of IFRS 
governance 
seats
% of IASB 
2011 
funding
% of 
countries 
using IFRS
% of GDP % of Market 
capitalisation
% of  
population
Africa 4% 0% 17% 2% 2% 10% 2%
Asia/Oceania 32% 29% 28% 31% 31% 63% 22%
Europe 36% 54% 29% 32% 25% 11% 52%
North America 25% 15% 18% 30% 38% 10% 22%
South America 4% 2% 8% 5% 3% 6% 1%
COUNTRIES USING IFRS AS PER ANNEXURE AIASB REGION COMMENT 
LETTERS
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using IFRS and has 36% of all IFRS governance seats, the highest of any region. 
It accounts for the highest proportion (29%) of countries using IFRS and the 
largest financial contribution to IFRS standard-setting activities in 2011. 
North America accounted for 22% of comment letters which is lower than its share 
of GDP (30%) and market capitalisation (38%). The proportion of comment letters 
is higher than the proportion of its population (10%) and financial contributions 
(15%). The IASB and FASB convergence efforts give the latter more participation 
opportunities than demonstrated by an analysis of comment letters. 
The South America region contributed 1% of the comment letters which is below 
its proportion of all other indicators. The region accounts for 6% of the population, 
5% of GDP and 3% of market capitalisation. It has 4% of IFRS governance seats, 
the same as Africa. 
6.5 Summary and conclusion 
The development of IFRS 9 attracted 1 711 comment letters following the 
publication of ten CDs between March 2008 and August 2011. The average 
number of comment letters received per CD was 171. A total of 570 participants 
submitted comment letters at an average of three letters per participant. There 
were 32 participants that submitted ten or more comment letters. Half of the 570 
participants only submitted one comment letter. 
Financial institutions contributed the highest number (38%) of both participants 
and comment letters while the academia had the lowest contribution of 1%. The 
accountancy profession (14%), national standard-setters (13%) and associations 
(13%) were the second, third and fourth most active interest groups respectively. 
The dominant participation of financial institutions may have been motivated by 
the need to lobby for specific outcomes to minimise the impact of the proposed 
standards on their businesses. The analysis of lobbying is beyond the scope of 
this study. 
Almost half (49%) of the comment letters came from participants in Europe. The 
Asia/Oceania (21%) and North American (23%) regions contributed in all almost 
identical proportions. South America (1%) was the least contributing region 
followed by Africa (2%).  Participants in the US and UK contributed the most 
comment letters. Only 28% of the 145 countries using IFRS participated in the 
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development of IFRS 9. Six other countries not known to be using IFRS submitted 
comment letters. 
The development of IFRS 13 involved the publication of three CDs between 
November 2006 and May 2011. The IASB received 387 comment letters from 240 
participants. The average number of comment letters per CD was 129, lower than 
the 171 for IFRS 9. The participation of interest groups followed the same order 
as during the development of IFRS 9. However, the proportion of comment letters 
from financial institutions dropped from 38% to 26%. The accountancy profession 
(18%), national standard-setters (15%) and associations (14%) were the second, 
third and fourth most active interest groups respectively. 
The breakdown of comment letters by region resembled that of IFRS 9 with 
Europe (56%) being the dominant region followed by Asia/Oceania (22%) and 
North America (14%). Unlike with IFRS 9, South America and Africa were tied at 
2% each. The UK had the highest number of comment letters (86) with Australia 
and the US a distant second with 30 each. 
When IFRS 9 and IFRS 13 participation is combined, the maximum number of 
comment letters received per CD was 247. This was received in response to the 
publication of CD8, the hedge accounting exposure draft. The lowest number of 
responses was 89 comment letters received in response to the publication of 
CD3, a request for information document. 
The participation of interest groups varied across all regions but financial 
institutions were the most active interest group overall followed by the 
accountancy profession, national standard-setters, corporates and associations. 
The least active interest groups were the academia and individuals. 
Over half (52%) of the comment letters came from Europe with Asia/Oceania and 
North America tied at 22%. Africa accounted for 2% of all comment letters and 
South America contributed 1% of the letters. South Africa, Australia, the UK, the 
US and Brazil were the largest source of comment letters from Africa, 
Asia/Oceania, Europe, North America and South America respectively. Each of 
these countries accounted for at least a third of comment letters from their 
respective regions. All five countries are represented on IFRS governance 
structures and are members of the G-20. 
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Botswana, Kenya, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Tunisia and Zambia are the 
countries from Africa that submitted comment letters. The two letters from Tunisia 
were submitted by the AfDB. All the other countries submitted one comment letter 
except South Africa and Zambia. The same two countries were the only ones to 
submit comment letters for both IFRS 9 and IFRS 13. 
The countries that participated in the development of both standards represented 
28% of the 145 countries using IFRS. They also represented at least 75%, 87% 
and 93% of the population, GDP and market capitalisation of the countries using 
IFRS respectively.  
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7 SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.1 Introduction 
The main problem investigated by the study was the legitimacy of the financial 
reporting “law” that is IFRS. The 16 IASB board members are writing financial 
reporting “law” for more than 100 countries without being formally mandated by 
the citizenry of these countries. The study sought to assess the legitimacy of 
IFRS by evaluating the IASB‟s standard-setting due process. The study aimed to: 
 highlight the legitimacy challenges of IFRS especially from the perspective of 
the African region; 
 offer insight into possible legitimation strategies employed by the IASB; 
 highlight opportunities for participation in IFRS standard-setting due process; 
 reveal information about the influences on the direction of IASB and the 
content of IFRS; and 
 recommend possible ways of improving IASB due process. 
This chapter is divided into four parts including the summary of findings, the 
conclusions, recommendations and areas of possible future research. The 
summary of findings highlights the key issues and findings of the major chapters. 
The conclusions, recommendations for improvements of IFRS standard-setting 
due process and participation, and possible areas for future research are also 
discussed.  
7.2 Summary of the study 
The findings of the study are split into four chapters. Chapter two conceptualised 
legitimacy and dealt with the legitimacy challenges of IFRS standard-setting. 
Chapter three discussed the legitimacy implications of the global financial crisis. 
The fourth chapter analysed the legitimacy implications of due process focusing 
on structures, procedures and resources. Chapter five outlined the research 
methodology. Chapter six dealt with the participation of constituents during the 
development of IFRS 9 and IFRS 13. The summary of each of these chapters is 
discussed below. 
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7.2.1 The conceptualisation of legitimacy  
Legitimacy was conceptualised according to both the Weberian conception and 
the Habermasian view. Under the Weberian conception, legitimacy can be based 
on rational, traditional or charismatic grounds. Rational authority, based on a 
belief in the legality of enacted rules and the authority of those properly elected, 
was found to be relevant in understanding standard-setting due process. The 
interpretation and application of rules makes this conception of legitimacy reliant 
on a bureaucracy to police procedures. The bureaucracy has the role of 
generating knowledge and policing rules. The role of the bureaucracy triggers a 
battle for its control which can lead to a legitimacy crisis. 
A different conception is the Habermasian view, based on the assumption that all 
truth can be discursively established when affected parties engage in a practical 
discourse. In order to legitimate its outcomes, practical discourse should be 
underpinned by the non-exclusion of those who can contribute; equal 
opportunities for all affected to participate; the absence of coercion other than the 
force of a better argument; and that the only motive of participants is the 
cooperative search for the truth. The assumption is that any due process that 
satisfies these conditions should produce a legitimate outcome. Notwithstanding 
the perception of due process, the globalisation of IFRS and the global financial 
crisis have legitimacy implications. 
7.2.2 The globalisation of IFRS and its legitimacy implications 
The accounting standards developed by the IASB, IFRS, are permitted or 
required in over 145 countries across the world. Of the 145 countries, 129 and 
101 countries permit or require the use of IFRS by listed and unlisted companies 
respectively. The reasons for permitting or requiring the use of IFRS fall into two 
broad groups: globalisation and the IASB‟s relationship with key stakeholders. 
Globalisation has been driven by the expansion of multinationals, cross-border 
listings, the liberalisation of capital flows, integration of capital markets and 
technological advancement. The development of IAS, the predecessor to IFRS, 
was in response to a demand for harmonised accounting standards. IFRS 
became the obvious choice because of a perception that they are voluntary best 
practice that respects the sovereignty of states. 
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Apart from globalisation, the IASB has managed its relationship with powerful 
stakeholders like the EC, IOSCO and the SEC. The endorsement of IAS, the 
predecessor to IFRS, by IOSCO and the EC in 2000 paved the way for their 
worldwide acceptance. The endorsement made IFRS become a viable alternative 
to US GAAP. The 2007 decision by the SEC to remove the requirement for 
foreign firms listed on US stock exchanges to reconcile their financial statements 
to US GAAP also accelerated the acceptance of IFRS. The endorsement of IFRS 
by powerful stakeholders transformed IFRS from being voluntary soft law to 
mandatory hard law. 
Evidence shows that countries are permitting or requiring IFRS for different 
reasons. Most African countries adopted IFRS because the World Bank and the 
IMF made adoption of IFRS a condition for aid. Adoption of IFRS has also been 
motivated by a lack of financial and technical resources to write their own 
accounting standards. Some countries, like South Africa, have adopted IFRS for 
strategic reasons such as accounting and corporate governance reforms in order 
to attract FDI inflows. 
The large economies such as China, India and Japan have opted for 
convergence instead of the adoption of IFRS. These countries are following the 
example of the US which is working jointly with the IASB to converge US GAAP 
and IFRS. Convergence means a jurisdiction eliminates differences between 
IFRS and its national GAAP but does not adopt IFRS word-for-word. 
The global adoption of IFRS has legitimacy implications for IFRS emanating from 
challenges that are internal and external to the IASB. The legitimacy challenges 
of IFRS that are internal to the IASB include a lack of a formal mandate from 
countries using IFRS, the absence of independent recourse structures, perceived 
capture of due process by vested interests and the narrow scope of IFRS‟ focus 
on investors‟ needs which limits consideration of other policy implications.  
The challenges external to the IASB are mostly the existence of national GAAP 
and the emergence of regional standards bodies such as EFRAG, AOSSG, PAFA 
and GLASS that could serve as alternatives. The external challenges also 
emanate from the state‟s outcome responsibility which forces states to delegate 
standard-setting responsibilities to the IASB while retaining responsibility for the 
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outcomes. The sensitivity of certain policy fields also heightens legitimacy 
concerns irrespective of the fairness or otherwise of due process. The global 
financial crisis demonstrated the sensitivities of delegating accounting standard-
setting responsibilities to the IASB. 
The GDP and market capitalisation proportions of the Africa region are lower than 
its proportion of the world population. As a result, its representation on bodies 
whose membership is determined by economic factors will always be low. The 
relationship between the IFRS governance structure and G-20 countries means 
the Africa region, forced by circumstances to adopt IFRS, will have to depend on 
South Africa for representation. The low and highly-concentrated levels of African 
participation in IFRS standard-setting projects may result in standards that are not 
relevant for the region. 
7.2.3 Legitimacy implications of the global financial crisis 
The global financial crisis was caused by weak regulatory oversight, poor capital 
and liquidity management, excessive risk taking and compensation schemes 
based on short term targets. A search for high yields in low credit quality 
investments also resulted in the creation of complex structured credit products. 
The complexity of these investment products forced investors to abandon normal 
due diligence practices and place reliance on credit ratings. 
In 2007, liquidity dried up and the market for structured credit products became 
inactive and asset prices declined leading to valuation write-downs. Financial 
institutions recorded losses estimated at over US$1,4 trillion. Several other 
financial institutions collapsed; others were either forcibly acquired or forced to 
recapitalise. True to their outcome responsibility, governments guaranteed the 
obligations of financial institutions to save them from bankruptcy. Economic 
growth (GDP) contracted, unemployment rose, international trade shrank and 
emerging markets were disrupted by currency volatility. 
IFRS, together with US GAAP, became the focus of attention. Critics blamed fair 
value accounting for exacerbating the crisis. This led to a debate about the role of 
accounting standards. The fair value debate put pressure on the IASB to act. 
The IASB accelerated the revision of its accounting requirements for financial 
instruments. Together with the FASB, it also set up an advisory group to study the 
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standard-setting implications of the financial crisis. The advisory group 
recommended improvements to IFRS oversight structures and procedures, and 
the accounting standards for financial instruments.  
The EC forced the IASB to amend IAS 39 to allow the reclassification of financial 
assets out of the fair value category. The reclassification was intended to protect 
financial institutions using IFRS from suffering fair value losses by applying 
accounting provisions that were not required for similar institutions using US 
GAAP. The IASB obliged and issued an amendment to IAS 39 without following 
due process. The actions of the EC demonstrated the response of states when 
anticipated policy outcomes are in jeopardy. Stakeholders called for 
improvements in due process structures and standard-setting procedures to 
enhance the legitimacy of IFRS.  
7.2.4 Legitimacy implications of IFRS due process 
The global financial crisis led to changes in the oversight structures and due 
process of the IASB. The structures changed with the introduction of the 
Monitoring Board, the expansion of the IASB and IFRIC board membership and 
the introduction of additional advisory committees. The Monitoring Board was 
established as a third layer of governance with the responsibility of appointing and 
supervising the Trustees. Its membership of six is currently limited to capital 
market authorities of the EU, Japan, the US and three members from IOSCO. The 
restricted membership of the Monitoring Board is at variance with that of the IFRS 
Foundation and the IASB which is much broader with all IASB regions 
represented.  
The IFRS governance structures are dominated by representatives from the 
European region, G-20 countries and individuals with links to IOSCO. The 
introduction of the Monitoring Board and the expansion of IASB and IFRIC 
membership resulted in the European region dominating representation (36% of 
all seats) on IFRS governance structures. Seventeen of the G-20 countries are 
represented on the IFRS governance structures. The three tiers of IFRS 
governance, the Monitoring Board, the IFRS Foundation and the IASB, are all 
headed by current and former IOSCO officials.  
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The due process procedures of the IASB are a six stage process: agenda setting, 
project planning, the publication of a discussion paper, the publication of an 
exposure draft, IFRS publication and post-implementation review. The different 
stages afford stakeholders the opportunity to participate and influence standard-
setting. The IASB meetings are open to the public and stakeholders can attend in 
person or through electronic means. Information and consultation documents are 
available on the website. The decision-making process is such that the 
publication of an IFRS or exposure draft requires more than simple majority 
support by the IASB board members to limit the influence of special interests.  
The publication of an IFRS is accompanied by a basis for conclusions and 
feedback statements to stakeholders as a way of justifying decisions.  
Despite the positive aspects of due process procedures, the lack of publicly 
available data about participation through other methods such as round tables 
and field visits impedes transparency. Another concern is that stakeholders 
represented on governance structures and national standard-setters with formal 
liaison status have more opportunities for participation than the rest of the 
constituents. They stand a better chance of influencing the content of IFRS than 
the excluded constituents. 
The IASB relies on funding and technical skills for its financial and operational 
viability. Funding contributions to the IASB are voluntary contributions as it has no 
enforcement mechanism. This raises concerns regarding the potential threats to 
the independence of IFRS standard-setting due process. The Trustees intend to 
broaden the contribution base by requiring jurisdictions using IFRS to pay for their 
share based on their proportion of GDP. The absence of an enforcement 
mechanism may still prove to be a major weakness. 
Technical skills are availed to the IASB through board members, IASB staff and 
input from constituents. The IASB board members are selected from all regions 
based on their technical competence. The technical staff play a key role in due 
process as they provide input into meetings and summarise comment letters for 
consideration by the IASB board members. Stakeholders such as accounting 
firms and national standard-setters second staff to the IASB which provides the 
technical skills, with the possibility of the threat of dominance by special interests. 
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Constituents contribute to the technical skills available to the IASB through 
participation in IFRS standard-setting. The cost, quality and quantity of 
participation are important. 
7.2.5 Research methodology 
The study used descriptive statistics to analyse constituent participation in IFRS 
standard-setting due process. The mean, median and standard deviation were 
used as measures of location and dispersion. Graphs and tables were also used 
to present research findings. 
The data used to analyse participation was the comment letters submitted by 
constituents during the development of IFRS 9 and IFRS 13. While comment 
letters are not the only form of participation in standard-setting due process, they 
are the only form of participation with publicly available data. Several scholars 
have relied on comment letters as a proxy for participation in standard-setting. 
Comment letters have also been found to be a widely used and effective form of 
participation in standard-setting due process. 
The participation of constituents during the development of IFRS 9 and IFRS 13 
generated 2 098 comment letters from across the world. The letters were 
submitted in response to the publication of 13 consultation documents. Three of 
the documents were discussion papers, one was a request for information and 
the remaining nine were exposure drafts.  
7.2.6 Research findings: participation in IFRS standard-setting 
A total of 570 participants from 48 countries submitted 1 711 comment letters 
during the development of IFRS 9. The development of IFRS 13 attracted 387 
comment letters from 240 participants in 39 countries.  
The participation of interest groups varied across all regions but financial 
institutions were the most active interest group overall followed by the 
accountancy profession, national standard-setters, corporates and associations. 
The least active interest groups were the academia and individuals. 
The most active IASB region was Europe with over half of the comment letters 
followed by Asia/Oceania, North America, Africa and South America in that order. 
South Africa, Australia, the UK, the US and Brazil were the highest source of 
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comment letters from Africa, Asia/Oceania, Europe, North America and South 
America respectively. It is worth noting that each of these countries accounted for 
at least a third of comment letters from their respective regions, is represented on 
IFRS governance structures and is a member of the G-20. 
Botswana, Kenya, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Tunisia and Zambia are the 
countries from Africa that submitted comment letters. South Africa and Zambia 
were the only countries to submit comment letters for both IFRS 9 and IFRS 13. 
The countries that participated in the development of both standards accounted 
for 28% of the 145 countries using IFRS. They also accounted for at least 75%, 
87% and 93% of the population, GDP and market capitalisation of the countries 
using IFRS respectively. The statistics imply that the most populous jurisdictions, 
the large economies and those jurisdictions with advanced capital markets are 
participating in IFRS standard-setting due process. It is important to note that the 
analysis of participation was based on publicly available comment letters. It 
excludes participation by other means which may affect the generalisation of the 
results. 
7.3 Conclusions 
The main problem investigated by the study was the legitimacy of the financial 
reporting “law” that is IFRS. This “law”, applied in over 100 countries, is written by 
16 IASB board members who have not been formally mandated by the citizenry of 
these countries. The objective of this study was to assess the legitimacy of IFRS 
by evaluating the IASB‟s standard-setting due process. In doing so, it sought to 
highlight the legitimacy challenges of IFRS especially from the perspective of the 
African region and highlight opportunities for participation in IFRS standard-
setting due process. 
The study highlighted that the IASB‟s role of setting financial reporting “law” for 
over 100 countries is fraught with legitimacy challenges.  The challenges were 
categorised as internal and external. The external challenges such as the state‟s 
outcome responsibilities and the sensitivity of certain policy fields are inherent to 
transnational governance. The internal legitimacy challenges can be mitigated by 
strengthening the standard-setting due process.  
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Due process can be strengthened by ensuring that structures are representative 
of the affected parties. Due process procedures should afford affected parties 
equal opportunities to influence the outcome. The outcome of any due process 
should be one arrived at rationally and which ensures a fair balance of interests. It 
should be a due process that includes all those who can contribute and allow for 
no other coercion other than the force of a better argument. When the above 
conditions are met, the resultant output should be considered legitimate. 
The IFRS standard-setting structures are currently dominated by countries that 
belong to the G-20, the largest and most important economies in their geographic 
regions. The allocation of seats on IFRS governance structures is influenced by 
the size of capital markets. The EC and IOSCO, powerful stakeholders that 
endorsed IFRS, have been co-opted into decision-making structures. The same 
goes for the SEC. The impact of the current governance arrangements is that all 
the other countries that require or permit the use of IFRS may have to accept that 
the larger economies will determine the content of IFRS. Such an approach 
violates the practical discourse condition of the non-exclusion of those who can 
make a contribution. The exclusion of affected parties works against the 
legitimacy of IFRS as the ideal due process conditions are not met. 
The IFRS standard-setting procedures are a six-stage process of agenda setting, 
project planning, discussion paper, exposure draft, IFRS publication and post-
implementation review. The different stages offer affected parties the opportunity 
to participate in standard-setting. Affected parties can participate through 
submitting comment letters when discussion papers and exposure drafts are 
published for comment. The 120-day comment period appears long enough to 
allow for consultations. Interested parties also have the opportunity to participate 
in field tests and public hearings, and observe the IASB meetings in person or 
electronically. However, due process procedures offer more participation 
opportunities to stakeholders represented on governance structures and national 
standard-setters with formal liaison status.  
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7.4 Recommendations 
7.4.1 Membership of IFRS governance structures 
The use of IFRS is not limited to listed companies as at least 101 jurisdictions are 
using IFRS for reporting by unlisted companies. The allocation of IFRS 
governance seats based on the size of capital markets and the limiting of the 
Monitoring Board membership to capital markets regulators therefore seems 
inappropriate. 
It is recommended that the Trustees of the IFRS Foundation consider using GDP 
as a basis of allocating IFRS governance seats. GDP is a better indicator of 
economic activity in a jurisdiction than the size of capital markets. It would also 
align with the proposal to link funding contributions to a proportion of GDP. 
7.4.2 Nomination of regional representatives 
IFRS are permitted or required in more than 145 countries across the five regions 
of the IASB. It is not practical that every country requiring or permitting the use of 
IFRS can be represented on IFRS governance structures. Not every country has 
the technical skills and financial resources to participate in IFRS standard-setting 
activities. Literature review revealed that developing countries were adopting 
IFRS because of a lack of resources to develop their own standards. 
It is recommended that the nomination of regional representatives to IFRS 
governance structures be delegated to the regional standard-setters. The 
Trustees of the IFRS Foundation can continue to allocate seats to the regions and 
set the criteria to be met by potential nominees. The respective regions will 
submit a list of candidates from which the Trustees can make a final appointment. 
Such an arrangement would ensure that the views of jurisdictions using IFRS are 
considered while preserving the technical competence of decision-makers serving 
on IFRS governance structures.  
7.4.3 Participation through associations 
Africa and South America were the two regions with the least number of 
participants during the development of IFRS 9 and IFRS 13. They also happen to 
be the two regions that did not have associations participating in IFRS standard-
setting. 
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The reasons for low participation are many and would require a separate study. 
The literature review in chapter two highlighted a lack of technical and financial 
resources as a possible reason for non-participation. The perception of due 
process capture by vested interests can also affect participation levels. 
It is recommended that the IASB and national standard-setters promote the 
participation of constituents through their industry or national associations to 
overcome the resources constraint. Such an approach could improve participation 
to the extent that non-participation may be due to technical and financial 
resources constraints.  
7.5 Future research 
7.5.1 Perception of IFRS  
This study has deduced the legitimacy of IFRS from an assessment of IFRS 
standard-setting due process. However, a perception of legitimacy has a lot to do 
with traditions, beliefs and cultures. It may be worthwhile to conduct a survey to 
understand constituents‟ perception of the legitimacy of IFRS across the different 
IASB regions. 
7.5.2 Liaison with national standard-setters and regulators 
The IASB cannot sanction the use of IFRS in the different jurisdictions. The 
national standard-setters or designated regulators have that mandate. The IFRS 
Due Process Handbook only identifies a handful of national standard-setters with 
formal liaison relationships. The relationship between the IASB and national 
standard-setters deserve special scrutiny to understand why the latter agrees and 
continues to mandate the use of IFRS in their jurisdictions. 
7.5.3 Participation through other methods 
The inability to study participation through other methods remains the limitation of 
most similar studies. The confidentiality of such participation may encourage 
constituents to be more open with the IASB. A study of participation through other 
methods should be pursued to improve the understanding of how constituents 
attempt to influence the IASB.  
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Annexure A: Use of IFRS around the world 
Jurisdiction IFRS Region Statistics Use of IFRS IFRSF Oversight Representation 
Population 
(Millions) 
 GDP (US$bn)  Market Capitalisation 
(US$bn) 
G-20  Listed 
companies 
Unlisted 
companies 
2011 IFRS 
Funding 
Monitoring 
Board 
IFRS Foundation IASB IFRIC 
Botswana Africa                   1.97                13.52                  4.31    1 1                 -            
Egypt Africa                 79.03              173.03                89.96    1 0                 -            
Eritrea Africa                   5.03                  1.75                     -      0 1                 -            
Gambia Africa                   1.66                  0.95                     -      0 1                 -            
Ghana Africa                 23.55                28.48                  3.02    1 1                 -            
Kenya Africa                 39.01                29.44                11.85    1 1                 -            
Lesotho Africa                   2.14                  1.83                     -      1 0                 -            
Liberia Africa                   3.73                  0.87                     -      0 1                 -            
Libya Africa                   6.18                70.95                     -      1 1                 -            
Madagascar Africa                 19.85                  8.23                     -      0 1                 -            
Malawi Africa                 14.25                  4.36                  1.48    1 0                 -            
Mauritius Africa                   1.27                  8.97                  5.08    1 1                 -            
Morocco Africa                 31.48                85.28                63.79    1 0                 -            
Mozambique Africa                 22.60                  9.45                     -      1 1                 -            
Namibia Africa                   2.22                  9.67                  0.84    1 0                 -            
Nigeria Africa               152.72              186.87                48.74    1 0       100,769          
Reunion Africa                   0.80                17.64                     -      0 1                 -            
Sierra Leone Africa                   5.67                  1.84                     -      1 1                 -            
South Africa Africa                 49.11              312.64              768.82  1 1 1                 -      1 1   
Swaziland Africa                   1.04                  3.27                  0.20    1 0                 -            
Tanzania Africa                 42.97                19.98                  1.40    1 1                 -            
Uganda Africa                 31.89                14.36                  2.74    1 0                 -            
Zambia Africa                 12.55                14.18                  3.21    1 1                 -            
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Jurisdiction IFRS Region Statistics Use of IFRS IFRSF Oversight Representation 
Population 
(Millions) 
 GDP (US$bn)  Market Capitalisation 
(US$bn) 
G-20  Listed 
companies 
Unlisted 
companies 
2011 IFRS 
Funding 
Monitoring 
Board 
IFRS Foundation IASB IFRIC 
Zimbabwe Africa                 12.54                  6.39                  8.74    1 0                 -            
  Africa                563.30           1,023.96           1,014.19  1 19 15       100,769  0 1 1 0 
Australia Asia/Oceania                 21.69           1,016.00           1,163.51  1 1 1    1,020,632    1     
Bahrain Asia/Oceania                   1.09                20.24                20.82    1 1                 -            
Bangladesh Asia/Oceania               146.33                85.03                10.56    1 0                 -            
Brunei Darussalam Asia/Oceania                   0.39                12.26                     -      0 1                 -            
Cambodia Asia/Oceania                 13.90                10.13                     -      0 1                 -            
China Asia/Oceania            1,327.82           4,824.79           4,100.97  1 1 1    1,302,746    1 1 1 
Fiji Asia/Oceania                   0.85                  3.32                  1.02    1 1                 -            
Hong Kong Asia/Oceania                   6.98              214.97           1,045.29    1 1       193,352    1     
India Asia/Oceania            1,199.29           1,384.21           1,182.32  1 1 0       414,230    1 1   
Iraq Asia/Oceania                 30.66                74.89                     -      1 1                 -            
Israel Asia/Oceania                   7.40              194.92              181.54    1 1                 -            
Japan Asia/Oceania               127.68           4,992.17           3,903.07  1 1 0    2,764,111  2 2 1 1 
Jordan Asia/Oceania                   5.85                22.20                32.78    1 0                 -            
Kazakhstan Asia/Oceania                 15.91              128.14                46.31    1 1           9,684          
Kuwait Asia/Oceania                   2.59              128.42              123.43    1 1                 -            
Kyrgyzstan Asia/Oceania                   5.36                  4.53                  0.10    1 1                 -            
Laos Asia/Oceania                   6.07                  5.74                     -      1 0                 -            
Lebanon Asia/Oceania                   4.18                32.28                10.74    1 1                 -            
Macau Asia/Oceania                   0.52                23.23                     -      0 1                 -            
Malaysia Asia/Oceania                 27.72              212.58              301.61    1 0         64,661  1       
Maldives Asia/Oceania                   0.31                  1.80                     -      1 1                 -            
Mongolia Asia/Oceania                   2.69                  5.43                  0.71    1 1                 -            
Myanmar Asia/Oceania                 47.45                     -                       -      1 0                 -            
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Jurisdiction IFRS Region Statistics Use of IFRS IFRSF Oversight Representation 
Population 
(Millions) 
 GDP (US$bn)  Market Capitalisation 
(US$bn) 
G-20  Listed 
companies 
Unlisted 
companies 
2011 IFRS 
Funding 
Monitoring 
Board 
IFRS Foundation IASB IFRIC 
Nepal Asia/Oceania                 29.17                13.29                  4.41    1 1                 -            
New Caledonia Asia/Oceania                   0.24                     -                       -      0 1                 -            
New Zealand Asia/Oceania                   4.30              129.42                48.60    1 1       158,678      1 1 
Oman Asia/Oceania                   2.67                52.63                18.57    1 1                 -            
Palestinian 
Territory Asia/Oceania                       -                       -                    2.45    1 0                 -            
Papua New Guinea Asia/Oceania                   6.63                  8.38                  9.96    1 0                 -            
Qatar Asia/Oceania                   1.46              108.83                95.04    1 0                 -            
Russia Asia/Oceania               142.05           1,419.74              936.62  1 1 0                 -            
Samoa Asia/Oceania                   0.18                  0.55                     -      0 1                 -            
Saudi Arabia Asia/Oceania                 26.47              437.02              349.89    1 0                 -            
Singapore Asia/Oceania                   4.85              183.86              299.84  1 1 0         95,778          
South Korea Asia/Oceania                 49.05              982.93              895.57  1 1 1       705,391    1 1   
Sri Lanka Asia/Oceania                 20.35                42.02                11.19    1 0                 -            
Tajikistan Asia/Oceania                   6.74                  4.81                     -      1 1                 -            
Turkey Asia/Oceania                 71.37              671.20              216.85  1 1 0                 -            
United Arab 
Emirates Asia/Oceania                   6.44              287.22              128.19    1 1                 -            
Vanuatu Asia/Oceania                   0.23                  0.61                     -      0 1                 -            
Yemen Asia/Oceania                 23.01                26.26                     -      0 1                 -            
  Asia/Oceania             3,397.94         17,766.07         15,141.95  8 34 26    6,729,264  3 7 5 3 
Armenia Europe                   3.08                  9.25                  0.09    1 1                 -            
Austria Europe                   8.35              381.83              115.99    1 1                 -            
Azerbaijan Europe                   8.83                43.91                     -      1 1                 -            
Belarus Europe                   9.58                50.44                     -      1 1                 -            
Belgium Europe                 10.76              469.77              285.12    1 1                 -            
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Europe                   3.77                16.34                     -      1 0                 -            
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Jurisdiction IFRS Region Statistics Use of IFRS IFRSF Oversight Representation 
Population 
(Millions) 
 GDP (US$bn)  Market Capitalisation 
(US$bn) 
G-20  Listed 
companies 
Unlisted 
companies 
2011 IFRS 
Funding 
Monitoring 
Board 
IFRS Foundation IASB IFRIC 
Bulgaria Europe                   7.60                46.16                10.60    1 1           8,456          
Croatia Europe                   4.43                61.21                32.35    1 1                 -            
Cyprus Europe                   1.08                22.83                11.34    1 1           6,900          
Czech Republic Europe                 10.43              193.89                50.83    1 1                 -            
Denmark Europe                   5.51              314.28              206.40    1 1                 -            
Estonia Europe                   1.34                20.48                  3.41    1 1                 -            
Finland Europe                   5.33              244.71              190.21    1 1                 -            
France Europe                 64.54           2,601.94           2,026.56  1 1 1    1,377,609  1 2 1 1 
Georgia Europe                   4.42                11.25                  0.83    1 1                 -            
Germany Europe                 82.03           3,329.73           1,460.50  1 1 1    1,536,466    1 1 2 
Gibraltar Europe                   0.03                12.00                     -      1 1                 -            
Greece Europe                 11.25              304.63              120.77    1 1                 -            
Hungary Europe                 10.03              133.03                30.49    1 1                 -            
Iceland Europe                   0.31                15.44                14.56    1 1                 -            
Ireland Europe                   4.41              232.15                75.96    1 1         10,037          
Italy Europe                 59.93           2,109.50              614.52  1 1 1    1,066,865    1   1 
Latvia Europe                   2.26                26.75                  1.93    1 1                 -            
Liechtenstein Europe                   0.04                  4.59                     -      1 1                 -            
Lithuania Europe                   3.33                38.72                  6.36    1 1                 -            
Luxembourg Europe                   0.49                52.67                97.73    1 1                 -            
Macedonia Europe                   2.05                  8.86                  1.79    1 0                 -            
Malta Europe                   0.41                  7.93                  3.59    1 1                 -            
Montenegro Europe                   0.63                  3.95                  3.26    1 1                 -            
Netherlands Europe                 16.50              789.16              653.75    1 1       564,109    1 1   
Norway Europe                   4.80              410.95              243.64    1 1                 -            
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Jurisdiction IFRS Region Statistics Use of IFRS IFRSF Oversight Representation 
Population 
(Millions) 
 GDP (US$bn)  Market Capitalisation 
(US$bn) 
G-20  Listed 
companies 
Unlisted 
companies 
2011 IFRS 
Funding 
Monitoring 
Board 
IFRS Foundation IASB IFRIC 
Poland Europe                 38.16              451.92              151.73    1 1                 -            
Portugal Europe                 10.62              230.71                91.25    1 1         24,209          
Romania Europe                 21.49              165.75                30.26    1 1                 -            
Serbia Europe                   7.34                39.93                12.78    1 1                 -            
Slovakia Europe                   5.41                86.89                  5.20    1 1                 -            
Slovenia Europe                   2.03                47.73                13.91    1 1                 -            
Spain Europe                 45.46           1,433.49           1,261.52    1 1       562,030  1 1     
Sweden Europe                   9.26              458.93              486.98    1 1                 -        1   
Switzerland Europe                   7.69              497.65           1,096.99    1 0       315,039          
Ukraine Europe                 46.20              141.56                43.47    1 1                 -            
United Kingdom Europe                 61.61           2,458.05           2,768.38  1 1 1    1,388,987      1 3 
  Europe                602.83         17,980.98         12,225.02  4 42 39    6,860,709  2 6 5 7 
American Samoa North America                   0.07                  0.50                     -      0 1                 -            
Anguilla North America                   0.02                  0.10                     -      1 0                 -            
Antigua & Barbuda North America                   0.09                  1.22                     -      1 1                 -            
Aruba North America                   0.11                     -                       -      1 0                 -            
Bahamas North America                   0.34                  7.97                     -      1 0                 -            
Barbados North America                   0.27                  3.61                  4.81    1 1                 -            
Belize North America                   0.33                  1.35                     -      0 1                 -            
Bermuda North America                   0.06                  5.79                  1.95    1 0                 -            
Canada North America                 33.53           1,476.00           1,772.87  1 1 1       817,775    1   1 
Costa Rica North America                   4.56                30.88                  1.70    1 1                 -            
Dominica North America                   0.07                  0.45                     -      1 0                 -            
Dominican 
Republic North America                   9.73                46.17                     -      1 1                 -            
El Salvador North America                   6.15                20.87                  5.17    1 0                 -            
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Jurisdiction IFRS Region Statistics Use of IFRS IFRSF Oversight Representation 
Population 
(Millions) 
 GDP (US$bn)  Market Capitalisation 
(US$bn) 
G-20  Listed 
companies 
Unlisted 
companies 
2011 IFRS 
Funding 
Monitoring 
Board 
IFRS Foundation IASB IFRIC 
Greenland North America                   0.06                  1.36                     -      0 1                 -            
Grenada North America                   0.10                  0.78                     -      1 0                 -            
Guatemala North America                 13.88                38.24                     -      1 1                 -            
Haiti North America                   9.80                  6.28                     -      1 1                 -            
Honduras North America                   7.38                13.96                     -      1 1                 -            
Jamaica North America                   2.69                13.39                  8.70    1 1                 -            
Mexico North America               111.32           1,026.04              363.71  1 1 0                 -            
Nicaragua North America                   5.68                  6.23                     -      1 1                 -            
Panama North America                   3.43                23.58                  8.02    1 1                 -            
St Kitts and Nevis North America                   0.05                  0.68                  0.53    1 0                 -            
Trinidad & Tobago North America                   1.33                21.90                13.56    1 1                 -            
United States North America               305.24         14,150.05         16,494.63  1 1 0    2,803,325  1 5 3 3 
Virgin Islands 
(British) North America                   0.01                  0.80                     -      1 0                 -            
  North America                516.28         16,898.20         18,675.65  3 23 15    3,621,099  1 6 3 4 
Argentina South America                 39.89              320.55                62.52  1 1 0                 -            
Bolivia South America                   9.70                17.11                  2.91    1 0                 -            
Brazil South America               192.36           1,724.84           1,102.12  1 1 0       369,545    1 1   
Cayman Islands South America                   0.06                     -                    0.18    1 0                 -            
Chile South America                 16.87              190.81              223.54    1 1                 -            
Ecuador South America                 14.16                53.07                  4.69    1 1                 -            
Guyana South America                   0.75                  1.88                  0.30    1 1                 -            
Paraguay South America                   6.29                15.81                  0.50    1 1                 -            
Peru South America                 28.62              130.64                78.36    1 0                 -            
Suriname South America                   0.52                  3.47                     -      1 1                 -            
Uruguay South America                   3.34                31.66                  0.15    1 0                 -            
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Jurisdiction IFRS Region Statistics Use of IFRS IFRSF Oversight Representation 
Population 
(Millions) 
 GDP (US$bn)  Market Capitalisation 
(US$bn) 
G-20  Listed 
companies 
Unlisted 
companies 
2011 IFRS 
Funding 
Monitoring 
Board 
IFRS Foundation IASB IFRIC 
Venezuela South America                 28.16              294.86                  6.00    1 1                 -            
  South America                340.71           2,784.71           1,481.28  2 12 6       369,545  0 1 1 0 
                          
  GRAND TOTAL            5,421.05         56,453.91         48,538.08  18 130 101  17,681,387  6 21 15 14 
Source: IASPlus (No date), The World Bank (No date), IFRSF (2012a) 
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Annexure B: Comment letters submitted during the development of IFRS 9 
NAME OF PARTICIPANT COUNTRY IASB REGION INTEREST GROUP 
COMMENT LETTERS SUBMITTED 
CD1 CD2 CD3 CD4 CD5 CD6 CD7 CD8 CD9 
CD 
10 
Total 
Botswana Institute of Accountants Botswana Africa Accountancy 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
The Institute of Certified Public Accountants of Kenya Kenya Africa Accountancy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Institute Of Certified Public Accountant of Rwanda Rwanda Africa Accountancy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
De Beers South Africa Africa Corporate 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Eskom Holdings Limited South Africa Africa Corporate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
FirstRand Banking Group South Africa Africa Financial Institution 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 
JSE Limited South Africa Africa Corporate 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Kevin Frohbus and Suzanna de Jager South Africa Africa Individual 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Sappi Limited South Africa Africa Corporate 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 
South African Institute of Chartered Accountants South Africa Africa National standard-setter 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 12 
The Banking Association of South Africa South Africa Africa Financial Institution 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Transnet Limited South Africa Africa Corporate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
The National Board of Accountants and Auditors of Tanzania Tanzania Africa National standard-setter 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
African Development Bank Tunisia Africa Financial Institution 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Zambia Institute of Chartered Accountants (ZICA) Zambia Africa National standard-setter 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 6 
ANZ Australia Asia/Oceania Financial Institution 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 9 
Argo Investments Limited Australia Asia/Oceania Financial Institution 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Australasian Council of Auditors- General Australia Asia/Oceania Regulator 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 3 
Australian Accounting Standards Board Australia Asia/Oceania National standard-setter 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 11 
Australian Bankers' Association Australia Asia/Oceania Financial Institution 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 6 
Australian Foundation Investment Company Ltd Australia Asia/Oceania Financial Institution 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Australian Heads of Treasuries Accounting and Reporting Advisory Committee Australia Asia/Oceania Association 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 9 
Australian Institute of Company Directors Australia Asia/Oceania Association 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 
Australian Listed Investment Companies Association Australia Asia/Oceania Association 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Australian Securitisation Forum Australia Asia/Oceania Financial Institution 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Australian State Central Borrowing Authorities Australia Asia/Oceania Regulator 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Baycorp Australia Asia/Oceania Financial Institution 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
BHP Billiton Australia Asia/Oceania Corporate 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia Australia Asia/Oceania Financial Institution 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9 
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Department of Finance and Deregulation 
Australia Asia/Oceania Regulator 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 
ETSA Utilities Australia Asia/Oceania Corporate 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Finance and Treasury Association Australia Asia/Oceania Association 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 
Group of 100 Australia Asia/Oceania Association 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 9 
Ian Langfield-Smith Australia Asia/Oceania Individual 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Institute of Actuaries of Australia Australia Asia/Oceania Association 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 3 
Institute of Chartered Accountants Australia Asia/Oceania Financial Institution 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Joint Accounting Bodies in Australia Australia Asia/Oceania Accountancy 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8 
Macquarie Group Australia Asia/Oceania Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
National Australia Bank Australia Asia/Oceania Financial Institution 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 
NCML Australia Asia/Oceania Financial Institution 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
NSW Treasury Australia Asia/Oceania Regulator 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 
Origin Energy Limited Australia Asia/Oceania Corporate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Qantas Australia Asia/Oceania Corporate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
QBE Insurance Group Australia Asia/Oceania Financial Institution 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 5 
Telstra Australia Asia/Oceania Corporate 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 7 
Wesfarmers Limited Australia Asia/Oceania Corporate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Westpac Australia Asia/Oceania Financial Institution 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 7 
Agricultural Bank of China China Asia/Oceania Financial Institution 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Bank of China China Asia/Oceania Financial Institution 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 4 
China Accounting Standards Committee China Asia/Oceania National standard-setter 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 5 
China Construction Bank Corporation China Asia/Oceania Financial Institution 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
China Development Bank China Asia/Oceania Financial Institution 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
China Life Insurance Comany Limited China Asia/Oceania Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
China Ministry of Finance China Asia/Oceania Regulator 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 3 
Grant Thornton China China Asia/Oceania Accountancy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Petrochina China Asia/Oceania Corporate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Ping An Insurance Company of China China Asia/Oceania Financial Institution 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 
Zhongrui Yuehua Certified Public Accountants China Asia/Oceania Accountancy 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Hong Kong Association of Banks Hong Kong Asia/Oceania Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 
Hong Kong Exchanges & Clearing Ltd Hong Kong Asia/Oceania Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
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Hong Kong Institute of Certified Public Accountants Hong Kong Asia/Oceania Accountancy 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 
Jardine Matheson Ltd. Hong Kong Asia/Oceania Corporate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 
Simon Lee Hong Kong Asia/Oceania Individual 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Stock Exchange of Hong kong Hong Kong Asia/Oceania Financial Institution 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 3 
The Hong Kong Association of Banks Hong Kong Asia/Oceania Financial Institution 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 3 
Hindalco Industries Limited India Asia/Oceania Corporate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Indian Banks' Association India Asia/Oceania Financial Institution 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 7 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in India India Asia/Oceania Accountancy 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 8 
Larsen & Toubro Limited India Asia/Oceania Corporate 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 5 
Mahindra and Mahindra India Asia/Oceania Corporate 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
NeoCFO India Asia/Oceania Corporate 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 4 
Rakesh Choudary India Asia/Oceania Individual 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Reserve Bank of India India Asia/Oceania Regulator 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Securities and Exchange Board of India India Asia/Oceania Regulator 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 6 
V C Kulkarni India Asia/Oceania Individual 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Venkata Subramani Ram India Asia/Oceania Individual 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Vidhyadhar Kulkarni India Asia/Oceania Individual 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 3 
Iran Audit Organization Iran Asia/Oceania Regulator 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Bank Hapoalim Israel Asia/Oceania Financial Institution 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants in Israel Israel Asia/Oceania Accountancy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Israel Accounting Standards Board, Tel Aviv Israel Asia/Oceania National standard-setter 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 5 
Israel Securities Authority Israel Asia/Oceania Regulator 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Accounting Standards Board of Japan Japan Asia/Oceania National standard-setter 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9 
Asian-Oceanian Standard-Setters Group (AOSSG) Japan Asia/Oceania National standard-setter 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 6 
Corporate Finance and Treasury Association of Japan Japan Asia/Oceania Association 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Fujitsu Limited Japan Asia/Oceania Corporate 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
GNAIE and Four Japanese Life Insurance Companies Japan Asia/Oceania Financial Institution 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Japan Foreign Trade Council Japan Asia/Oceania Association 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 5 
Japanese Bankers Association Japan Asia/Oceania Financial Institution 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 8 
Japanese Institute of Certified Public Accountants Japan Asia/Oceania Accountancy 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 
Life Insurance Association of Japan Japan Asia/Oceania Financial Institution 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 9 
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Makoto Ito Japan Asia/Oceania Individual 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Mizuho Securities Co.,Ltd. Japan Asia/Oceania Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Nippon Keidanren Japan Asia/Oceania Association 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Nomura Holdings, Inc. Japan Asia/Oceania Financial Institution 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 
Shinkin Central Bank Japan Asia/Oceania Regulator 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 
Sumitomo Corporation Japan Asia/Oceania Corporate 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Takatsugu Ochi Japan Asia/Oceania Individual 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Takeshi Imamura Japan Asia/Oceania Individual 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
The General Insurance Association of Japan Japan Asia/Oceania Financial Institution 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
The National Association of Shinkin Banks and Shinkin Central Bank Japan Asia/Oceania Financial Institution 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
The Norinchukin Bank Japan Asia/Oceania Financial Institution 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
The Security Analysts Association of Japan Japan Asia/Oceania Association 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 6 
Tokio Marine Holdings, Inc Japan Asia/Oceania Financial Institution 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Tokyo Bankers Association Japan Asia/Oceania Financial Institution 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Malaysian Accounting Standards Board Malaysia Asia/Oceania National standard-setter 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 
Public Bank Berhad Malaysia Asia/Oceania Financial Institution 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Fonterra Co-operative Group Limited New Zealand Asia/Oceania Corporate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Genesis Power Limited & Meridian Energy Limited New Zealand Asia/Oceania Corporate 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Institute of Chartered Accountants of New Zealand (ICANZ) New Zealand Asia/Oceania National standard-setter 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 7 
Landcorp Farming Ltd New Zealand Asia/Oceania Corporate 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
New Zealand Securities Commission New Zealand Asia/Oceania Regulator 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 6 
New Zealand Treasury New Zealand Asia/Oceania Regulator 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Simon Cole New Zealand Asia/Oceania Individual 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
The New Zealand Treasury New Zealand Asia/Oceania Regulator 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Institute of Chartered Accountants of Pakistan Pakistan Asia/Oceania Accountancy 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 7 
Central Bank of Russia Russia Asia/Oceania Regulator 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 4 
DBS Bank Singapore Asia/Oceania Financial Institution 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 3 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants of Singapore Singapore Asia/Oceania Accountancy 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 3 
Kim Chiu Chua Singapore Asia/Oceania Individual 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Pearl Tan Singapore Asia/Oceania Individual 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 3 
Singapore Accounting Standards Council Singapore Asia/Oceania National standard-setter 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 
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Industrial Bank of Korea 
South Korea Asia/Oceania Financial Institution 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Korea Accounting Institute South Korea Asia/Oceania National standard-setter 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 4 
Korean Accounting Association South Korea Asia/Oceania Accountancy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Korean Accounting Standards Board South Korea Asia/Oceania National standard-setter 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 7 
The Korea Shipbuilders' Association South Korea Asia/Oceania Association 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Federation of Accounting Professions Thailand Thailand Asia/Oceania Accountancy 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 
Turkish Accounting Standards Board Turkey Asia/Oceania National standard-setter 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
DFSA 
United Arab 
Emirates Asia/Oceania Regulator 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 
AFRAC Austria Europe National standard-setter 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 
Austrian Bankers' Association Austria Europe Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 
Austrian Federal Economic Chamber Austria Europe Association 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Erste Group Austria Europe Financial Institution 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 3 
AMICE Belgium Europe Financial Institution 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
ATEB Belgium Europe Association 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
BDO Belgium Europe Accountancy 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 7 
Belgian Accounting Standards Boards Belgium Europe National standard-setter 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 4 
Belgian Bankers Association Belgium Europe Financial Institution 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Belgian Financial Sector Federation (Febelfin) 
Belgium Europe Financial Institution 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 5 
BUSINESSEUROPE Belgium Europe Association 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 
CEA Belgium Europe Financial Institution 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Club of Long Term Investors Belgium Europe Financial Institution 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Comité Européen des Assurances Belgium Europe Financial Institution 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Dexia Belgium Europe Financial Institution 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 5 
EFFAS Belgium Europe Association 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 4 
EFRAG Belgium Europe National standard-setter 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 
European Association of Cooperative Banks (EACB) Belgium Europe Financial Institution 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 8 
European Association of Public Banks (EAPB) Belgium Europe Financial Institution 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 
European Banking Federation Belgium Europe Financial Institution 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 
European Commission Belgium Europe Regulator 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
European Federation of Accountants and Auditors for SMEs Belgium Europe Association 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
European Federation of Building Societies Belgium Europe Financial Institution 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
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European Savings Bank Group Belgium Europe Financial Institution 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 4 
FEE Belgium Europe Accountancy 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 
FIEC Belgium Europe Association 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
International Energy Accounting Forum (IEAF) Belgium Europe Association 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
International Private Equity and Venture Capital Valuation Board Belgium Europe Financial Institution 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
World Savings Banks/Institute aisbl /ESB Belgium Europe Financial Institution 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 3 
Czech Banking Association Czech Republic Europe Financial Institution 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Association of Danish Mortgage Banks Denmark Europe Financial Institution 0 2 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 
Danish Financial Supervisory Authority Denmark Europe Regulator 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Danish Insurance Association Denmark Europe Financial Institution 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Foreningen af Statsautoriserede Revisorer (FSR) Denmark Europe National standard-setter 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
NYkredit Denmark Europe Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
SimCorp Denmark Europe Corporate 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Bank working goup Europe Europe Financial Institution 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
European Insurance CFO Forum Europe Europe Association 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 11 
Turku School of Economics Finland Europe Academia 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
ACTEO, AFEP, MEDEF France Europe Association 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 11 
Association Française des Trésoriers d'Entreprise (AFTE) France Europe Association 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 4 
Autorité des normes comptables France Europe National standard-setter 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 6 
BNP Paribas France Europe Financial Institution 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9 
BPCE France Europe Financial Institution 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 7 
Caisse d‟Epargne France Europe Financial Institution 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Caisse des Dépôts France Europe Financial Institution 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
CESR FIN France Europe Regulator 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Confederation Nationale Du Credit Mutuel France Europe Financial Institution 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Conseil national de la comptabilite France Europe National standard-setter 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 
Credit Agricole S.A. France Europe Financial Institution 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 
Credit Mutuel France Europe Financial Institution 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 
EDF SA France Europe Corporate 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 
European Association of Corporate Treasurers France Europe Association 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 4 
European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) France Europe Regulator 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 3 
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Federation Francaise des Societes d'Assurances France Europe Financial Institution 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 7 
French Banking Federation France Europe Financial Institution 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 
French National Public Works Federation France Europe Association 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
GDF SUEZ France Europe Corporate 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 
Groupe Banque Populaire France Europe Financial Institution 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
L'OREAL France Europe Corporate 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 
Mazars  France Europe Accountancy 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 
Nicki Tillinghast France Europe Individual 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Societé Générale France Europe Financial Institution 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9 
Allianz Germany Europe Financial Institution 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 6 
Alois Knobloch Germany Europe Individual 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Association of German Banks Germany Europe Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Association of German Public Sector Banks Germany Europe Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
BMW Group Germany Europe Corporate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
CEIOPS Germany Europe Regulator 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 
Chris Barnard Germany Europe Individual 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 5 
Commerzbank Germany Europe Financial Institution 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 6 
Daimler Germany Europe Corporate 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 4 
Deutsche Bank Germany Europe Financial Institution 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9 
DGRV Germany Europe Association 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
European Central Bank Germany Europe Regulator 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Freshfields Germany Europe Corporate 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
GEBIC Germany Europe Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Gefiu Germany Europe Association 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 
German Accounting Standards Committee Germany Europe National standard-setter 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 
German Financial Reporting Enforcement Panel (FREP) Germany Europe Regulator 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
German Insurance Association Germany Europe Financial Institution 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 8 
Institut der Wirtschaftsprüfer (IDW) Germany Europe Association 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9 
KfW Bankengruppe Germany Europe Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 4 
Prof. Dr. Konrad Wimmer and Dr. Stefan Kusterer 
Germany Europe Individual 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
RWE AG Germany Europe Corporate 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 
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Siemens AG Germany Europe Corporate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
The Linde Group Germany Europe Corporate 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 3 
Thomas Nolte Germany Europe Individual 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
VMEBF e.V. Germany Europe Association 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Volkswagen Germany Europe Corporate 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 8 
Wüstenrot & Wüttembergische AG Germany Europe Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Zentraler Kreditausschuss Germany Europe Financial Institution 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 8 
Allied Irish Bank Ireland Europe Financial Institution 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 3 
Chartered Accountants Ireland Ireland Europe Accountancy 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 9 
CPA Ireland Ireland Europe Accountancy 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 4 
Assoelettrica Italy Europe Association 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Italian Banking Association (ABI) Italy Europe Financial Institution 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 5 
Organismo Italiano di Contabilita 
Italy Europe National standard-setter 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8 
Professor D.V. Ramana XIMB Italy Europe Individual 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
ATEL Luxembourg Europe Association 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 3 
European Investment Bank Luxembourg Europe Financial Institution 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 5 
RTL Group Luxembourg Europe Corporate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Bank of Valletta plc Malta Europe Financial Institution 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Dutch Accounting Standards Board Netherlands Europe National standard-setter 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 
Dutch Bankers Association Netherlands Europe Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
ING Netherlands Europe Financial Institution 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 6 
NWB Bank Netherlands Europe Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Pieter van Wijck Netherlands Europe Individual 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 
Rabobank Netherlands Europe Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Verbond Van Verzekeraars Netherlands Europe Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Finance Norway Norway Europe Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Norsk RegnskapsStiftelse - Norwegian Accounting Standards Board Norway Europe National standard-setter 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 8 
Sonae Portugal Europe Corporate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Slovak Auditing Oversight Authority (UDVA) Slovakia Europe Regulator 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 
ACS Spain Europe Corporate 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Advisory Panel of the CNMV Spain Europe Regulator 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
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Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A., Madrid Spain Europe Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 3 
Banco Santander Spain Europe Financial Institution 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Confederacion Espanola de Cajas de Ahorros Spain Europe Financial Institution 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 6 
Corporacion CAN Spain Europe Financial Institution 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Grupo Ferrovial Spain Europe Corporate 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 
IIMV Spain Europe Regulator 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 4 
La Caixa Spain Europe Financial Institution 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Repsol YPF SA Spain Europe Corporate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 
SEOPAN Spain Europe Association 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 
Spanish Banking Association (AEB) Spain Europe Financial Institution 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 4 
Spanish Confederation of Entrepeneurs Spain Europe Association 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Telefonica, S.A., Madrid Spain Europe Corporate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
The Instituto de Contabilidad y Auditoria de Cuentas (ICAC) Spain Europe National standard-setter 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 5 
Unespa Spain Europe Financial Institution 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Universidad Autónoma de Madrid Spain Europe Academia 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
AarhusKarlshamn AB Sweden Europe Corporate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Confederation of Swedish Enterprise Sweden Europe Association 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 4 
FAR SRS Sweden Europe Accountancy 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9 
Finansbolagens Förening Sweden Europe Financial Institution 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Instrum Justitia AB Sweden Europe Financial Institution 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
SEB Sweden Europe Financial Institution 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Swedish Bankers' Association Sweden Europe Financial Institution 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 6 
Swedish Export Credit Corporation Sweden Europe Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 3 
Swedish Financial Reporting Board Sweden Europe National standard-setter 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 8 
TeliaSonera AB Sweden Europe Corporate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
The Swedish Enterprise Accounting Group (SEAG) Sweden Europe Association 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
ABB Asea Brown Boveri Ltd. Switzerland Europe Corporate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Credit Suisse Switzerland Europe Financial Institution 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 8 
F.Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd Switzerland Europe Corporate 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 
Nestle Switzerland Europe Corporate 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 8 
Swiss Insurance Association Switzerland Europe Financial Institution 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
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Swiss Life/ Rentenanstalt Switzerland Europe Financial Institution 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
SwissHoldings Switzerland Europe Association 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 
Syngenta International AG Switzerland Europe Corporate 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 4 
UBS Switzerland Europe Financial Institution 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 
Vontobel Holding AG Switzerland Europe Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
AAT United Kingdom Europe Accountancy 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Accounting Standards Board United Kingdom Europe National standard-setter 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 
ADOPT Training United Kingdom Europe Accountancy 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Anglo American plc United Kingdom Europe Corporate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Association for Financial Markets in Europe United Kingdom Europe Financial Institution 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 5 
Association of British Insurers  United Kingdom Europe Financial Institution 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 6 
Association of Chartered Certified Accountants United Kingdom Europe Accountancy 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 7 
Association of Corporate Treasurers United Kingdom Europe Association 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Association of International Accountants United Kingdom Europe Accountancy 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Association of Investment Companies United Kingdom Europe Financial Institution 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Audit Commission UK United Kingdom Europe Regulator 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Baker Tilly United Kingdom Europe Accountancy 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 
Bank of Scotland Treasury United Kingdom Europe Financial Institution 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Barclays United Kingdom Europe Financial Institution 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9 
BP United Kingdom Europe Corporate 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 4 
British American Tobacco United Kingdom Europe Corporate 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 
British Bankers' Association United Kingdom Europe Financial Institution 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 10 
British Columbia Investment Management Corporation United Kingdom Europe Corporate 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
BT Group plc United Kingdom Europe Corporate 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 3 
Building Societies Association 
United Kingdom Europe Financial Institution 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
CEBS United Kingdom Europe Regulator 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 6 
Centrica plc United Kingdom Europe Corporate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
CFA Institute UK United Kingdom Europe Association 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 6 
Chartered Institute of Management Accountants United Kingdom Europe Accountancy 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 7 
CIPFA United Kingdom Europe Accountancy 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 
Cobham plc United Kingdom Europe Corporate 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 
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Confederation of British Industry United Kingdom Europe Association 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 6 
Co-operatives UK 
United Kingdom Europe Association 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 
Corporate Reporting Users Forum (CRUF) United Kingdom Europe Association 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu United Kingdom Europe Accountancy 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9 
Deutsche Bank, London United Kingdom Europe Financial Institution 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
EasyJet plc United Kingdom Europe Corporate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Ernst & Young United Kingdom Europe Accountancy 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 
European Banking Authority (EBA) United Kingdom Europe Regulator 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 4 
European Securitisation Forum United Kingdom Europe Financial Institution 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Graeme Tosen United Kingdom Europe Individual 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Grant Thornton International United Kingdom Europe Accountancy 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9 
HSBC Holdings PLC United Kingdom Europe Financial Institution 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England & Wales United Kingdom Europe Accountancy 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 
Interactive Data United Kingdom Europe Corporate 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
International Corporate Governance Network United Kingdom Europe Association 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 3 
International Underwriting Association United Kingdom Europe Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Investment Management Association United Kingdom Europe Financial Institution 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 4 
ISDA United Kingdom Europe Financial Institution 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 7 
KPMG United Kingdom Europe Accountancy 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 
Legal and General United Kingdom Europe Financial Institution 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Lloyd's United Kingdom Europe Financial Institution 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 
Lloyds Banking Group plc United Kingdom Europe Financial Institution 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 6 
London Investment Banking Association United Kingdom Europe Financial Institution 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 
London Society of Chartered Accountants United Kingdom Europe Accountancy 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 
Marathon Club United Kingdom Europe Financial Institution 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Markit United Kingdom Europe Corporate 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Matthew Modisett United Kingdom Europe Individual 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Morgan Stanley United Kingdom Europe Financial Institution 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9 
National Grid plc United Kingdom Europe Corporate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Nationwide Building Society 
United Kingdom Europe Financial Institution 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Niels Kroner 
United Kingdom Europe Individual 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
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PricewaterhouseCoopers 
United Kingdom Europe Accountancy 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 
Reed Elsevier Group plc United Kingdom Europe Corporate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Reval United Kingdom Europe Corporate 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 4 
Richard Macve United Kingdom Europe Individual 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 
Royal Bank of Scotland United Kingdom Europe Financial Institution 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 7 
Royal Dutch Shell United Kingdom Europe Corporate 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 
RSM International United Kingdom Europe Accountancy 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 
Stagecoach Holdings United Kingdom Europe Corporate 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Standard Chartered United Kingdom Europe Financial Institution 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 5 
Tata Steel Europe Limited United Kingdom Europe Corporate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
The Actuarial Profession United Kingdom Europe Association 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 
The Association of Corporate Treasurers United Kingdom Europe Association 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 4 
The Co-operative Financial Services United Kingdom Europe Financial Institution 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
The Hundred Group United Kingdom Europe Association 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 4 
The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland United Kingdom Europe Accountancy 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 7 
The Quoted Companies Alliance United Kingdom Europe Association 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 
TradeRisks Limited United Kingdom Europe Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Unilever United Kingdom Europe Corporate 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 3 
UPP Group Ltd United Kingdom Europe Corporate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Zsalya Ltd United Kingdom Europe Corporate 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision International International Regulator 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 9 
CA International International Individual 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Caroline A Walker International International Individual 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Chris Turrell International International Individual 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Ejjaz Hussain International International Individual 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
FIWG International International Corporate 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Francis Pereira International International Individual 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
IAASB International International Accountancy 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 3 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors International International Regulator 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 7 
International Banking Federation International International Financial Institution 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 5 
International Credit Union Regulators‟ Network International International Regulator 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
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IOSCO International International Regulator 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9 
Katy Brink International International Individual 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
L Venkatesan International International Individual 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 
Linus Low International International Individual 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 5 
Riaz Ahmad and Company, Chartered Accountants International International Accountancy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Richard Hicks International International Individual 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
The World Bank International International Financial Institution 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 9 
Thomas Jerome Ranney International International Individual 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Tomek Helbing International International Individual 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Wang Hongsheng International International Individual 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Bombardier Inc. Canada North America Financial Institution 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 
Canadian Accounting Standards Board Canada North America National standard-setter 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 2 1 10 
Canadian Bankers Association Canada North America Financial Institution 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 
Canadian Coalition for Good Governance Canada North America Association 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Canadian Institute of Actuaries Canada North America Association 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Canadian Life and Health Insurance Association Canada North America Financial Institution 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Canadian Natural Resources Limited, Calgary Canada North America Corporate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Canadian Public Accountability Board (CPAB) Canada North America Regulator 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
CGA-Canada Canada North America Accountancy 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 4 
Connacher Oil and Gas Limited Canada North America Corporate 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Enmax Corporation Canada North America Corporate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 
FEI Canada Canada North America Association 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 8 
Hydro Quebec Canada North America Corporate 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 5 
IACVA Canada North America Association 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 5 
Institute of Chartered Accountants of British Columbia  Canada North America Accountancy 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
International Actuarial Association Canada North America Association 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 6 
Investment Industry Association of Canada Canada North America Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Meyers Norris Penny Canada North America Accountancy 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 5 
Ministry of Finance, Province of British Columbia Canada North America Regulator 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 8 
Nortel Networks Corporation Canada North America Corporate 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Ordre des comptables agrees du Quebec Canada North America Accountancy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
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Telus Canada North America Corporate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
TransAlta Corporation Canada North America Corporate 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
TransCanada Canada North America Corporate 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 3 
CINIF Mexico North America National standard-setter 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9 
FEMSA Mexico North America Corporate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Mexican Banking Association Mexico North America Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
AFLAC United States North America Financial Institution 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 5 
AICPA 
United States North America Accountancy 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 3 
Alcoa Inc. United States North America Corporate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 
Allstate Insurance Company United States North America Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Ally Financial Services United States North America Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Amber George United States North America Individual 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
American Academy of Actuaries United States North America Association 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 
American Accounting Association United States North America Association 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
American Bankers Association United States North America Financial Institution 0 1 1 1 2 0 0 1 1 0 7 
American Council of Life Insurers United States North America Financial Institution 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 6 
American Gas Association United States North America Association 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
American International Group, Inc. United States North America Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 3 
Ameriprise Financial United States North America Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Andrew Harding United States North America Individual 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Archer Daniels Midland United States North America Corporate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Armond Simonyan United States North America Individual 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Ashley Burrowes United States North America Individual 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Association for Financial Professionals United States North America Association 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 3 
Azar Seraj United States North America Individual 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Ball Corporation United States North America Corporate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Bank America Merrill Lynch United States North America Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 3 
Bank of New York Mellon United States North America Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 
BB&T United States North America Financial Institution 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 
BDO USA LLP United States North America Accountancy 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Blackrock United States North America Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
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Bok Financial United States North America Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Brian Ayers United States North America Individual 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
CalCPA United States North America Accountancy 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 3 
Capital One Financial Corporation United States North America Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness United States North America Association 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
CFA Institute United States North America Association 2 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 
Chatham Financial United States North America Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
CIGNA Corporation United States North America Financial Institution 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 4 
Citigroup United States North America Financial Institution 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 8 
CME Group United States North America Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
CNA Financial Corporation United States North America Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Comerica United States North America Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Commercial Real Estate Finance Council United States North America Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Conference of State Bank Supervisors United States North America Regulator 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Conning United States North America Accountancy 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Constellation Energy United States North America Corporate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 
Credit Union National Association (CUNA) United States North America Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Crowe Howarth United States North America Accountancy 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Duff and Phelps United States North America Financial Institution 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 4 
Ed Trott 
United States North America Individual 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Edison Electric Institute United States North America Association 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 
Eli Lilly and Company United States North America Corporate 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 
Erin Williams United States North America Individual 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Factory Mutual Insurance Company United States North America Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Fannie Mae United States North America Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Federal Home Loan Banks United States North America Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 
Federal Housing Finance Agency United States North America Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 
FEI   United States North America Association 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 3 
FHL Banks United States North America Financial Institution 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Financial Instruments Reporting and Convergence Alliance United States North America Association 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 
Financial Reporting Advisors United States North America Accountancy 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
147 
 
NAME OF PARTICIPANT COUNTRY IASB REGION INTEREST GROUP 
COMMENT LETTERS SUBMITTED 
CD1 CD2 CD3 CD4 CD5 CD6 CD7 CD8 CD9 
CD 
10 
Total 
FirstEnergy Corp. United States North America Corporate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Fitch Ratings United States North America Corporate 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Five Federal Banking Agencies United States North America Regulator 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 
Florida Institute of CPAs United States North America Accountancy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Ford Motor Credit Company United States North America Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Four Federal Banking Agencies United States North America Regulator 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Fourteen US Banks United States North America Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Frank Walker United States North America Individual 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Freddie Mac United States North America Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Gary Topche United States North America Individual 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
General Electric United States North America Corporate 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Genworth United States North America Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 4 
Goldman Sachs United States North America Financial Institution 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 5 
Group of North American Insurance Enterprises United States North America Financial Institution 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 6 
Hess Corporation United States North America Corporate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Hong Le United States North America Individual 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Hovanes Avakian United States North America Individual 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
IACPM United States North America Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
IBM United States North America Corporate 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 
Illinois CPA Society United States North America Accountancy 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 7 
Independent Community Bankers of America United States North America Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Institute of International Finance United States North America Financial Institution 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 11 
Institute of Management Acccountants United States North America Accountancy 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 5 
Intel Corporation United States North America Corporate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 
Investment Company Institute United States North America Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Investors Technical Advisory Committee United States North America Association 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Ithaca College United States North America Accountancy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Jason Malabute United States North America Individual 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Joseph Maresca United States North America Individual 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
JP Morgan Chase United States North America Financial Institution 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 7 
Keycorp United States North America Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 
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Koch Industries  United States North America Corporate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Liberty Mutual United States North America Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Lincoln National Corporation United States North America Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Marylynn Crawford United States North America Individual 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
MBIA Inc. United States North America Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
McGladrey & Pullen (RSM International) United States North America Accountancy 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Mercer United States North America Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Merrick Bank United States North America Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
MetLife United States North America Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 3 
Microsoft United States North America Corporate 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Mortgage Bankers Association United States North America Financial Institution 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 5 
Nare Isayan United States North America Individual 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
National Association of College and University Business Officers (NACUBO) United States North America Association 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
National Association of Industrial Bankers (NAIB) United States North America Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners United States North America Regulator 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
National Oilseed Processors Association United States North America Association 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Nationwide Insurance United States North America Financial Institution 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Navy Federal Credit Union United States North America Financial Institution 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
New York State Society of Certified Public Accountants United States North America Accountancy 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 4 
NextEra Energy United States North America Corporate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
North Carolina State Board of Certified Public Accountant Examiners United States North America Accountancy 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Novelis Inc. United States North America Corporate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Pennsylvania Institute of Certified Public Accountants United States North America Accountancy 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
PNC Financial United States North America Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 
PPL Corporation United States North America Corporate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Private Companies Practice Section United States North America Accountancy 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Quadriserv United States North America Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Regions Financial Corporation United States North America Financial Institution 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
RG Associates United States North America Financial Institution 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Sandler O‟Neill & Partners United States North America Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association United States North America Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 
149 
 
NAME OF PARTICIPANT COUNTRY IASB REGION INTEREST GROUP 
COMMENT LETTERS SUBMITTED 
CD1 CD2 CD3 CD4 CD5 CD6 CD7 CD8 CD9 
CD 
10 
Total 
SNL Financial United States North America Corporate 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 
Standard and Poor's  United States North America Financial Institution 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 4 
State of New York Banking Department United States North America Regulator 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 
State of New York Insurance Department United States North America Regulator 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
State Street United States North America Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 
Stephanie Liu United States North America Individual 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Sun Trust United States North America Financial Institution 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 3 
Suzuko Kitazawa United States North America Individual 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Teresa P. Gordon United States North America Individual 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Texas Society of CPA's United States North America Accountancy 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
The Allstate Corporation 
United States North America Financial Institution 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 
The Bank of New York Mellon United States North America Financial Institution 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 
The Capital Group Companies United States North America Corporate 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
The Clearing House United States North America Financial Institution 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 8 
The Loan Syndications and Trading Association (LSTA) United States North America Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
The Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company United States North America Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
The Ohio Society of CPAs United States North America Accountancy 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
The Pennsylvania Credit Union Association (PCUA) United States North America Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
The Private Company Financial Reporting Committee United States North America Association 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Tioga State Bank United States North America Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Towers Perrin United States North America Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Toyota Motor Credit Corporation United States North America Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce United States North America Association 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Unum United States North America Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
US Bancorp United States North America Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 
US Financial Institution Regulatory Agencies United States North America Regulator 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 
US General Services Administration United States North America Regulator 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Verizon Communications United States North America Corporate 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
ViewPoint Bank United States North America Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Virginia Credit Union United States North America Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Walker Fraud Examiners, Inc. United States North America Corporate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
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Washington Society of Certified Public Accountants United States North America Accountancy 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Wells Fargo United States North America Financial Institution 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 4 
World Council of Credit Unions United States North America Financial Institution 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Zions Bancorporation United States North America Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Banco Bradesco Brazil South America Financial Institution 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Brazilian Banks Federation (FEBRABAN) Brazil South America Financial Institution 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
CPC Brazil Brazil South America National standard-setter 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 5 
Denise Silva Ferreira Juvenal Brazil South America Individual 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 
Glenif Glass Brazil South America National standard-setter 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Groupo Santander Brasil 
Brazil South America Financial Institution 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 4 
PPE FIOS ESMALTADOS Brazil South America Corporate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Universidade de São Paulo Brazil South America Academia 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Asociación de Aseguradores de Chile A.G. Chile South America National standard-setter 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Universidad de Chile Chile South America Academia 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 4 
        165 246 89 192 215 123 138 247 165 131 1711 
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Anglo Platinum Limited South Africa Africa Corporate 1 0 0 1 
FirstRand Banking Group South Africa Africa Financial Institution 1 0 0 1 
JSE Limited South Africa Africa Corporate 1 0 0 1 
Sappi Limited South Africa Africa Corporate 0 0 1 1 
South African Institute of Chartered Accountants South Africa Africa National standard-setter 1 1 1 3 
Standard Bank South Africa Africa Financial Institution 1 0 0 1 
Zambia Institute of Chartered Accountants (ZICA) Zambia Africa National standard-setter 0 1 0 1 
Alinta Australia Asia/Oceania Corporate 1 0 0 1 
ANZ Australia Asia/Oceania Financial Institution 0 1 0 1 
Australasian Council of Auditors- General Australia Asia/Oceania Regulator 1 1 0 2 
Australian Accounting Standards Board Australia Asia/Oceania National standard-setter 1 1 1 3 
Australian Heads of Treasuries Accounting and 
Reporting Advisory Committee Australia Asia/Oceania Association 1 1 1 3 
Australian Property Institute Australia Asia/Oceania Association 0 1 0 1 
Baycorp Australia Asia/Oceania Financial Institution 0 1 0 1 
Collection House Ltd Australia Asia/Oceania Financial Institution 0 1 0 1 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia Australia Asia/Oceania Financial Institution 0 1 1 2 
CPA Australia Australia Asia/Oceania Accountancy 1 0 0 1 
Department of Finance and Deregulation Australia Asia/Oceania Regulator 0 0 1 1 
Group of 100 Australia Asia/Oceania Association 1 1 1 3 
Halligan & Co Australia Asia/Oceania Accountancy 0 1 0 1 
Institute of Actuaries of Australia Australia Asia/Oceania Association 0 1 0 1 
Joint Accounting Bodies in Australia Australia Asia/Oceania Accountancy 0 1 0 1 
National Institute of Accountants Australia Asia/Oceania Accountancy 1 0 0 1 
NSW Treasury Australia Asia/Oceania Regulator 1 1 0 2 
Property Council of Australia Australia Asia/Oceania Association 0 1 0 1 
QBE Insurance Group Australia Asia/Oceania Financial Institution 0 1 0 1 
Telstra Australia Asia/Oceania Corporate 0 1 0 1 
University of Western Sydney Australia Asia/Oceania Academia 1 0 0 1 
Air China Limited China Asia/Oceania Corporate 0 1 0 1 
Bank of China China Asia/Oceania Financial Institution 0 1 0 1 
China Accounting Standards Committee China Asia/Oceania National standard-setter 0 0 1 1 
China Ministry of Finance China Asia/Oceania Regulator 0 1 0 1 
PAN-China CPA Firm China Asia/Oceania Accountancy 0 0 1 1 
Xuzhong Institute of Technology China Asia/Oceania Academia 0 1 0 1 
Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics China Asia/Oceania Academia 0 1 0 1 
Hong Kong Institute of Certified Public Accountants Hong Kong Asia/Oceania Accountancy 1 1 1 3 
RHL International Group Hong Kong Asia/Oceania Corporate 1 0 0 1 
Indian Banks' Association India Asia/Oceania Financial Institution 0 1 0 1 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in India India Asia/Oceania Accountancy 0 1 0 1 
Larsen & Toubro Limited India Asia/Oceania Corporate 0 1 0 1 
NeoCFO India Asia/Oceania Corporate 0 1 1 2 
Securities and Exchange Board of India India Asia/Oceania Regulator 0 1 1 2 
Accounting Standards Board of Japan Japan Asia/Oceania National standard-setter 1 1 0 2 
Japanese Institute of Certified Public Accountants Japan Asia/Oceania Accountancy 1 1 1 3 
Life Insurance Association of Japan Japan Asia/Oceania Financial Institution 1 1 1 3 
Mitsubishi Corporation obo 25 Japanese Companies Japan Asia/Oceania Corporate 0 0 1 1 
Takeshi Imamura Japan Asia/Oceania Individual 1 1 0 2 
The General Insurance Association of Japan Japan Asia/Oceania Financial Institution 1 0 0 1 
Malaysian Accounting Standards Board Malaysia Asia/Oceania National standard-setter 1 1 1 3 
Institute of Chartered Accountants of New Zealand 
(ICANZ) New Zealand Asia/Oceania National standard-setter 1 1 1 3 
Massey University New Zealand Asia/Oceania Academia 1 0 0 1 
New Zealand Securities Commission New Zealand Asia/Oceania Regulator 0 1 0 1 
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The New Zealand Treasury New Zealand Asia/Oceania Regulator 0 1 0 1 
Institute of Chartered Accountants of Pakistan Pakistan Asia/Oceania Accountancy 0 1 1 2 
National Accounting Standards Board of Russia (NASB) Russia Asia/Oceania National standard-setter 1 0 0 1 
Franklin Templeton Investments Singapore Asia/Oceania Financial Institution 1 0 0 1 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants of Singapore Singapore Asia/Oceania Accountancy 0 0 1 1 
Singapore Accounting Standards Council Singapore Asia/Oceania National standard-setter 1 1 1 3 
Korean Accounting Association South Korea Asia/Oceania Accountancy 1 0 0 1 
Korean Accounting Standards Board South Korea Asia/Oceania National standard-setter 1 1 1 3 
Securities and Exchange Commission of Thailand Thailand Asia/Oceania Regulator 1 0 0 1 
DFSA United Arab Emirates Asia/Oceania Regulator 0 0 1 1 
AFRAC Austria Europe National standard-setter 1 1 1 3 
Austrian Actuarial Association Austria Europe Association 1 0 0 1 
Austrian Federal Economic Chamber Austria Europe Association 0 1 0 1 
Austrian Insurance Association Austria Europe Financial Institution 1 0 0 1 
Erste Group Austria Europe Financial Institution 0 1 0 1 
BDO Belgium Europe Accountancy 0 1 0 1 
Belgian Accounting Standards Boards Belgium Europe National standard-setter 0 1 1 2 
Belgian Financial Sector Federation (Febelfin) Belgium Europe Financial Institution 0 1 0 1 
BUSINESSEUROPE Belgium Europe Association 1 1 0 2 
EFRAG Belgium Europe National standard-setter 1 1 1 3 
European Association of Cooperative Banks (EACB) Belgium Europe Financial Institution 0 0 1 1 
European Banking Associations Belgium Europe Financial Institution 1 0 0 1 
European Banking Federation Belgium Europe Financial Institution 0 1 1 2 
FEE Belgium Europe Accountancy 1 1 1 3 
International Energy Accounting Forum (IEAF) Belgium Europe Association 1 0 0 1 
International Private Equity and Venture Capital 
Valuation Board Belgium Europe Financial Institution 1 1 1 3 
Real Estate Equity Securitization Alliance (REESA) Belgium Europe Association 0 1 1 2 
SIPEF SA Belgium Europe Corporate 1 0 0 1 
Danish Insurance Association Denmark Europe Financial Institution 0 1 0 1 
European Insurance CFO Forum Europe Europe Association 0 1 0 1 
University of Tampere Finland Europe Academia 1 1 0 2 
ACTEO, AFEP, MEDEF France Europe Association 1 1 0 2 
Assoc. GEDEON-DFCE France Europe Association 0 0 1 1 
Association Française des Trésoriers d'Entreprise 
(AFTE) France Europe Association 0 1 0 1 
Autorité des normes comptables France Europe National standard-setter 0 0 1 1 
BNP Paribas France Europe Financial Institution 1 1 1 3 
BPCE France Europe Financial Institution 0 1 1 2 
Caisse d‟Epargne France Europe Financial Institution 1 0 0 1 
CESR FIN France Europe Regulator 0 1 0 1 
Confederation Nationale Du Credit Mutuel France Europe Financial Institution 0 1 0 1 
Conseil national de la comptabilite France Europe National standard-setter 1 1 0 2 
Federation Francaise des Societes d'Assurances France Europe Financial Institution 0 1 0 1 
French Banking Federation France Europe Financial Institution 1 1 1 3 
GDF SUEZ France Europe Corporate 1 0 0 1 
Mazars  France Europe Accountancy 1 1 1 3 
Societé Générale France Europe Financial Institution 1 0 0 1 
Allianz Germany Europe Financial Institution 1 1 0 2 
Arbeitskreis Externe Unternehmensrechnung (AKEU) Germany Europe Association 1 0 0 1 
Association of German Banks Germany Europe Financial Institution 1 1 0 2 
Bayer AG Germany Europe Corporate 0 0 1 1 
CEIOPS Germany Europe Regulator 1 1 0 2 
Chris Barnard Germany Europe Individual 0 0 1 1 
Deutsche Bank Germany Europe Financial Institution 1 1 1 3 
German Accounting Standards Committee Germany Europe National standard-setter 1 1 1 3 
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German Savings Bank Association (DSGV) Germany Europe Financial Institution 1 0 0 1 
Institut der Wirtschaftsprüfer (IDW) Germany Europe Association 1 1 0 2 
International Controllers Association (ICV) Germany Europe Association 1 0 0 1 
RWE AG Germany Europe Corporate 1 0 0 1 
VMEBF e.V. Germany Europe Association 0 1 0 1 
Zentraler Kreditausschuss Germany Europe Financial Institution 0 0 1 1 
Allied Irish Bank Ireland Europe Financial Institution 0 1 0 1 
Chartered Accountants Ireland Ireland Europe Accountancy 1 1 1 3 
CPA Ireland Ireland Europe Accountancy 0 1 1 2 
Irish Banking Federation Ireland Europe Financial Institution 1 0 0 1 
Consiglio Nazionale dei Dottori Commercialisti and the 
Consiglio Nazionale dei Ragionieri Italy Europe Accountancy 1 0 0 1 
Intesa Sanpaolo banking group Italy Europe Financial Institution 0 1 0 1 
Italian Banking Association (ABI) Italy Europe Financial Institution 1 0 0 1 
Organismo Italiano di Contabilita Italy Europe National standard-setter 0 1 1 2 
University of Verona Italy Europe Academia 1 0 0 1 
European Investment Bank Luxembourg Europe Financial Institution 1 0 0 1 
University of Malta Malta Europe Academia 1 0 0 1 
Dutch Accounting Standards Board Netherlands Europe National standard-setter 1 1 1 3 
Pieter van Wijck Netherlands Europe Individual 0 1 0 1 
Norsk RegnskapsStiftelse - Norwegian Accounting 
Standards Board Norway Europe National standard-setter 1 1 1 3 
The Body of Experts and Licensed Accountants of 
Romania (CECCAR) Romania Europe Accountancy 0 0 1 1 
Confederation of Swedish Enterprise Sweden Europe Association 0 0 1 1 
FAR SRS Sweden Europe Accountancy 1 1 1 3 
Gothenburg University Sweden Europe Academia 0 1 0 1 
Swedish Bankers' Association Sweden Europe Financial Institution 1 0 0 1 
Swedish Financial Reporting Board Sweden Europe National standard-setter 1 1 1 3 
The Swedish Enterprise Accounting Group (SEAG) Sweden Europe Association 1 1 0 2 
Credit Suisse Switzerland Europe Financial Institution 1 1 1 3 
F.Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd Switzerland Europe Corporate 1 1 0 2 
Nestle Switzerland Europe Corporate 1 1 1 3 
Swiss GAAP FER Switzerland Europe National standard-setter 1 0 0 1 
Swiss Re Switzerland Europe Financial Institution 1 0 0 1 
SwissHoldings Switzerland Europe Association 1 1 0 2 
Syngenta International AG Switzerland Europe Corporate 1 1 0 2 
UBS Switzerland Europe Financial Institution 1 1 1 3 
Accounting Standards Board United Kingdom Europe National standard-setter 1 1 0 2 
Association for Financial Markets in Europe United Kingdom Europe Financial Institution 0 0 1 1 
Association of British Insurers  United Kingdom Europe Financial Institution 1 1 0 2 
Association of Chartered Certified Accountants United Kingdom Europe Accountancy 1 1 0 2 
Association of Corporate Treasurers United Kingdom Europe Association 1 0 0 1 
Association of International Accountants United Kingdom Europe Accountancy 0 1 0 1 
Association of Investment Companies United Kingdom Europe Financial Institution 1 0 0 1 
Barclays United Kingdom Europe Financial Institution 0 0 1 1 
BG Energy Holdings Limited United Kingdom Europe Corporate 1 0 0 1 
BP United Kingdom Europe Corporate 0 1 0 1 
British Accounting Association  United Kingdom Europe Accountancy 1 1 0 2 
British Bankers' Association United Kingdom Europe Financial Institution 1 0 1 2 
BT Group plc United Kingdom Europe Corporate 0 1 0 1 
CEBS United Kingdom Europe Regulator 1 1 1 3 
Chartered Institute of Management Accountants United Kingdom Europe Accountancy 1 1 0 2 
CIPFA United Kingdom Europe Accountancy 1 1 0 2 
Confederation of British Industry United Kingdom Europe Association 1 1 0 2 
Corporate Reporting Users Forum (CRUF) United Kingdom Europe Association 1 0 0 1 
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu United Kingdom Europe Accountancy 1 1 1 3 
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Ernst & Young United Kingdom Europe Accountancy 1 1 1 3 
Grant Thornton International United Kingdom Europe Accountancy 1 1 1 3 
HSBC Holdings PLC United Kingdom Europe Financial Institution 1 1 1 3 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England & Wales United Kingdom Europe Accountancy 1 1 1 3 
Interactive Data United Kingdom Europe Corporate 0 1 1 2 
International Corporate Governance Network United Kingdom Europe Association 0 1 0 1 
International Underwriting Association United Kingdom Europe Financial Institution 1 0 1 2 
International Valuation Standards Council United Kingdom Europe Association 1 1 1 3 
ISDA United Kingdom Europe Financial Institution 1 1 1 3 
KPMG United Kingdom Europe Accountancy 1 1 1 3 
London Investment Banking Association United Kingdom Europe Financial Institution 1 1 0 2 
Markit United Kingdom Europe Corporate 1 1 0 2 
Morgan Stanley United Kingdom Europe Financial Institution 1 1 1 3 
Neil Chisman United Kingdom Europe Individual 1 0 0 1 
PricewaterhouseCoopers United Kingdom Europe Accountancy 1 1 1 3 
Richard Macve United Kingdom Europe Individual 0 1 0 1 
Royal Dutch Shell United Kingdom Europe Corporate 1 1 0 2 
Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors United Kingdom Europe Association 1 1 0 2 
Tesco United Kingdom Europe Corporate 0 1 0 1 
The Actuarial Profession United Kingdom Europe Association 0 1 0 1 
The Charity Commission United Kingdom Europe Regulator 1 0 0 1 
The Hundred Group United Kingdom Europe Association 1 0 0 1 
The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland United Kingdom Europe Accountancy 1 1 1 3 
The Quoted Companies Alliance United Kingdom Europe Association 1 0 0 1 
Unilever United Kingdom Europe Corporate 1 0 0 1 
University of Portsmouth United Kingdom Europe Academia 1 0 0 1 
Wales Audit Office United Kingdom Europe Regulator 1 0 1 2 
Watson Wyatt International Limited United Kingdom Europe Corporate 0 1 0 1 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision International International Regulator 1 1 1 3 
IAASB International International Accountancy 0 1 0 1 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors International International Regulator 1 1 0 2 
IOSCO International International Regulator 1 1 1 3 
Joint Response: European Insurance Forum, CEA, 
GNAIE, Japanese Life Insurers International International Financial Institution 1 0 0 1 
Linus Low International International Individual 0 0 1 1 
R. A. Rayman International International Individual 1 0 0 1 
Ruth Farrant International International Individual 1 0 0 1 
Selvida Naiken International International Individual 0 1 0 1 
The World Bank International International Financial Institution 0 1 1 2 
Canadian Accounting Standards Board Canada North America National standard-setter 1 1 1 3 
Canadian Bankers Association Canada North America Financial Institution 1 1 1 3 
Canadian Institute of Chartered Business Valuators Canada North America Association 0 1 0 1 
CGA-Canada Canada North America Accountancy 1 0 0 1 
FEI Canada Canada North America Association 0 1 0 1 
Hydro Quebec Canada North America Corporate 0 1 1 2 
IACVA Canada North America Association 0 1 1 2 
International Actuarial Association Canada North America Association 1 1 1 3 
J Alex Milburn Canada North America Individual 1 0 0 1 
Ministry of Finance, Province of British Columbia Canada North America Regulator 1 1 1 3 
Sabito Machinery Inc. Canada North America Corporate 0 1 0 1 
TransCanada Canada North America Corporate 0 1 0 1 
CINIF Mexico North America National standard-setter 0 1 1 2 
Mexican Institute of Public Accountants Mexico North America Accountancy 0 1 0 1 
Adams Street Partners United States North America Financial Institution 0 0 1 1 
American Academy of Actuaries United States North America Association 0 1 0 1 
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Bank of New York Mellon United States North America Financial Institution 0 1 0 1 
CalCPA United States North America Accountancy 0 1 0 1 
Daniel Moore United States North America Individual 0 1 0 1 
Duff and Phelps United States North America Financial Institution 1 1 1 3 
FEI   United States North America Association 0 1 0 1 
Financial Instruments Reporting and Convergence 
Alliance United States North America Association 0 1 0 1 
Fitch Ratings United States North America Corporate 1 0 0 1 
Florida Institute of CPAs United States North America Accountancy 0 1 0 1 
Goldman Sachs United States North America Financial Institution 1 1 0 2 
Group of North American Insurance Enterprises United States North America Financial Institution 0 1 1 2 
Institute of International Finance United States North America Financial Institution 0 1 1 2 
Institute of Management Acccountants United States North America Accountancy 1 1 0 2 
JP Morgan Chase United States North America Financial Institution 0 1 0 1 
Mortgage Bankers Association United States North America Financial Institution 0 1 1 2 
Property Casualty Insurers Association of America United States North America Financial Institution 1 0 0 1 
Rosanna O'Guynn United States North America Individual 1 0 0 1 
State of New York Insurance Department United States North America Regulator 1 0 0 1 
Steve Rabin United States North America Individual 0 1 0 1 
The Appraisal Institute United States North America Corporate 1 0 0 1 
Walker Fraud Examiners, Inc. United States North America Corporate 0 0 1 1 
World Council of Credit Unions United States North America Financial Institution 0 1 0 1 
José Luis Pungitore  Argentina South America Individual 0 1 0 1 
CPC Brazil Brazil South America National standard-setter 0 1 1 2 
Universidad de Chile Chile South America Academia 0 1 1 2 
Adriana Sarmiento Colombia South America Individual 0 1 0 1 
Pablo Martínez Colombia South America Individual 0 0 1 1 
TOTAL       136 160 91 387 
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